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The opening decades of the twentieth century saw the marked rise of three interrelated 
fields—applied psychology, vocational education, and occupational therapy. This 
dissertation explores the effects of these emerging fields on architectural modernism, as it 
turned to perceptual science and vocational bureaucracy as a means to judge not just 
design but designers. This took shape especially in a field known as psychotechnics, a 
discipline that blended industrial management with applied psychology and was a central 
but understudied legacy of the First World War. This research explores the links between 
architectural design (in practice and pedagogy) and the emergent bureaucracies of 
vocational placement and occupational therapy in the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and Germany, showing the sympathies between psychophysiological research 
(particularly that of Hugo Münsterberg) and the designs and teaching methods of figures 
like Nikolai Ladovsky, Moisei Ginzburg, Hannes Meyer, and László Moholy-Nagy. In 
the search for a modernism beyond the formal precepts of the “modern movement,” the 
architectural laboratory became a central scene of action, grounding architectural 
production in new models of research that redefined architecture’s status as a discipline. 
 
 
Each chapter traces a particular thread of this encounter between psychotechnics 
and architecture. Chapter One explores its implications for pedagogy, exploring the 
influence of applied psychology (explicit and latent) in two much-discussed sites of 
interwar European architectural education, the Bauhaus in Dessau (particularly under 
Meyer) and VKhUTEMAS in Moscow, where Ladovsky instituted a Psychotechnical 
Laboratory of Architecture. Chapter Two asks whether Münsterberg’s psychotechnical 
work on distinctly urban occupations, notably those having to do with operating vehicles, 
implies something of a theory of the city, tracing the influence of psychotechnics in 
projects of urban design, whether by the Soviet ARU or in the planning of the German 
Autobahn. Chapter Three focuses on an emerging understanding of disability in the years 
following the First World War, asserting that the new fields of rehabilitation and 
occupational therapy are unspoken but central participants in shaping the modernisms of 
figures like Moholy-Nagy. What these episodes illuminate is a vision of an architecture 
whose modernity is not defined on the visual or technological grounds of the building, 
but rather in the nature of architectural “work” itself, understood in the aftermath of the 
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The Library of Congress system of transliterating Russian is used throughout, with the 
exception of names familiar to readers of English in other forms (such as Ladovsky and 
Lissitzky). The original spellings are at times retained in footnotes and bibliography. Soft 
signs have been omitted from proper names, acronyms, and abbreviations but are retained 
in other transliterated text. 
 
The following abbreviations and acronyms appear in the text and are not spelled out in 
their original Russian: 
 
ARU Association of Architect-Urbanists (Ob’edinenie arkhitektorov-
urbanistov) 
 
GAKhN State Academy of Artistic Sciences (Gosudarstvennaia akademiia 
khudozhestvennoi kul’tury), Moscow 
 
INKhUK Institute of Artistic Culture (Institut khudozhestvennoi kul’tury), 
Moscow 
 
MKX Moscow Municipal Administration (Moskovskii Kommunal’nое 
Khoziaistva)—transliterated as MKX instead of MKKh in keeping 
with Russian-language sources) 
 
Narkompros People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment/Education (Narodnyi 
komissariat prosveshcheniia) 
 
NOT Scientific Organization of Labor (Nauchnaia organizatsiia truda)  
 
Proletkult Proletarian Culture (Proletarskaia kul’tura) 
 
RAKhN Russian Academy of Artistic Sciences (Rossiiskaia akademiia 
khudozhestvennykh nauk), Moscow 
 
TsIT Central Institute of Labor (Tsentral’nyi institut truda), Moscow 
 
VKhUTEIN Higher State Artistic and Technical Institute (Vysshie 
gosudarstvennye khudozhestvenno-tekhnicheskii institut), Moscow 
 
VKhUTEMAS Higher State Artistic and Technical Workshops (Vysshie 
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William James, who appear occasionally in this dissertation, was no fan of the PhD as a 
qualification for academic positions, writing in 1903 of the “unspeakably silly ambition” 
and “highly grotesque tendencies” of universities “to bespangle their lists of officers with 
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were luxuries too rarified to set such an exclusionary standard of qualification for 
university posts. This very idea of “qualification” is one of the threads that runs through 
my dissertation, and perhaps it’s a necessary cliché of doctoral study that it would end up 
seeping into my own belated ruminations about certain life decisions. Having spent more 
than seventeen of my adult years at various sites of higher education, I know it’s quite a 
privilege to spend so long assembling a stack of paper like this one. That feels like the 
first thing to acknowledge—what a strange and wonderful thing it is to be given the 
support of an institution, to be expected to avail yourself of so many people’s time and 
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to the point that they should probably be footnoted where they occur: Laura Diamond 
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In The Language of Vision, published in 1944, the artist and educator Gyorgy Kepes 
quotes at length from an essay by William James, written some sixty years before, simply 
titled “Habit”: 
The great thing, then, in all education is to make our 
nervous system an ally instead of an enemy. It is to fund 
and capitalize our acquisitions and live at ease upon the 
interests of the fund. For this we must make automatic and 
habitual as early as possible as many useful actions as we 
can. … The more of the details of our daily life we can 
hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more 
the higher powers of mind will be set free for their own 
proper work.1 
Kepes introduces James’s text into a chapter on visual representation, and he adds 
examples that imply a spatiality to this kind of learning, like getting to know a new city 
or learning to drive a car. These were, for Kepes, evidence of the educated automatism 
                                               
1 Gyorgy Kepes, Language of Vision (Chicago: Paul Theobold and Company, 1944), 66. Minor 
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described by James—skills that are gained through experience and pass into an 
unthinking, everyday register. Vision is the same, an acquired habit of seeing “as the 
painters, sculptors, architects, photographers, advertising designers teach us to see.”2 
Kepes’s appeal to the authority of James, who, along with Wilhelm Wundt, is considered 
one of the founders of the field of experimental psychology, shows the degree to which 
the visual dimensions of artistic and architectural modernism had been framed by a very 
particular outlook on understanding, and potentially recalibrating, the human sensorium, 
whose parameters stemmed from the psychological laboratories of the late nineteenth 
century. 
One way of describing this dissertation would be that it attempts to account for 
some of the links in the citational chain that spans from James to Kepes—for although 
this chain does not form a clean or singular arc, it nevertheless seemed perfectly natural 
in 1969 for an architectural thinker to be leaning on this classic of psychology in support 
of his arguments. Moving a step in from James, one finds the psychologist Hugo 
Münsterberg, a prized student of Wundt’s who was invited by James to take over his 
psychological laboratory at Harvard in 1892 and who is commonly known as the inventor 
of a strand of applied psychology called “psychotechnics.” Moving a step in from Kepes, 
one finds his erstwhile mentor, the designer and educator László Moholy-Nagy, whose 
work and pedagogy represents one of the most sustained engagements between art, 
architecture, and psychotechnics. Between Münsterberg and Moholy—and between the 
                                               




runup to the First World War and the end of the Second—lies a modernism whose debts 
to experimental psychology remain inadequately explored within architectural history. 
Psychotechnics aimed to find a new utility for a field of perceptual research that is 
perhaps best described by “psychophysics,” the term preferred by Gustav Fechner. 
Psychophysics sought quantifiable links between external stimuli and subjective 
experience, an empirical materialism of perception—a form of bodily intelligence that 
grounded psychologists and designers alike in an epistemology of “kinaesthetic 
knowing,” as Zeynep Çelik Alexander has recently described it.3 If psychophysics was 
already engaged in the production of applicable knowledge—and indeed, it was precisely 
such expertise that was being forged in psychological laboratories of the nineteenth 
century—what changes is its transformation into a process of determining and organizing 
the capacities of individuals in order to incorporate them into a form of social 
organization. In creating systems of measure for the perceptual traits of individuals, these 
traits were reformulated as the result of both talent and training, or the “native” abilities 
of the body alongside its accumulated experiences. More critically, if psychotechnics 
created a laboratory method of subjective differentiation, it also provided the means to 
reconstitute them into collectives of various kinds—a form of instrumental reason that 
arises from the conjunction of psychophysiological research and statistical thought.4 
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“The right man for the right job” was the defining dictum of psychotechnics, 
though its perceptual researches extended well beyond those traits immediately 
applicable to vocational placement. (While “the right man” was reliably gendered male, 
several professions that were subjected to psychotechnical analysis were occupied largely 
by women.)5 If the legacy of psychophysics has principally been understood to inflect the 
architecture of the long 1920s on formal terms—given the field’s evident connections to 
empathy theory, Gestalt psychology, and conceptualizations of space-time—such 
histories tend not to take account of the distinctively occupational emphasis of 
psychotechnics.6 
“Psychotechnical” was only sometimes the word used by figures whose work 
appears in this dissertation, but the term nevertheless contains within it a vivid density of 
intersections—between technology and everyday life, between the hand and the mind, 
between objects and perceptions, between the individual and mass society—that course 
throughout the architectural and artistic modernism of the period, and which combine to 
form the subject of this study. Those who lay claim to the word typically did so in the 
name of defining a field of professional inquiry, though the purview of psychotechnics 
expanded well beyond the perimeter of expertise drawn by its protagonists. A science that 
borrowed from many others, and which could take virtually any human action as a point 
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of inquiry, psychotechnics was an “applied” science to the core. This dissertation 
understands it as a discipline that took the problem of coordination (of time, of labor, of 
perception) as its primary focus, in which the human “machine” was studied precisely 
insofar as it was required to interact with a larger system of organization. James, writing 
in 1884, described the human’s “neural machinery” as “but a hyphen between 
determinate arrangements of matter outside the body and determinate impulses to 
inhibition or discharge within its organs,” a hyphen, one could say, between the human 
subject and an environment.7 It was this conjunction that psychotechnics sought to 
explore, and it is this broader understanding of the idea of psychotechnics that this 
dissertation will make use of. 
It is also this quality that makes design a privileged discipline—perhaps the 
privileged discipline, I argue—within the psychotechnical project, as design understood 
itself to be partnered with the human sensorium in navigating that subject–environment 
interface. Design thinking surfaces in this dissertation as a means of calibrating both 
poles, the subject and the environment, and it is here that the “modernity” of architectural 
modernism comes into focus beyond formal and technological definitions. This idea also 
entwines three early-twentieth-century discourses that have typically been held apart, and 
only one of which has been generally been taken to be a part of architectural history—the 
emergence of the “vocational guidance” movement, explorations into the subjectivity of 
                                               




metropolitan life, and new ideas about disability and rehabilitation that emerged during 
the First World War.8 
In that sense, this is a dissertation about architectural subjects rather than 
architectural objects. Certainly, the science of work can be found inscribed in the 
functionalist plans of factories and workplaces, and the influence of Taylorism and its 
associated thinkers on the mechanization and standardization of building was indeed a 
defining characteristic of modern architecture. But the advent of psychotechnics also 
occasioned a profound look inward, for architecture as with other professions, in which 
the objects of scrutiny were not only buildings, but architects themselves, as well as the 
effects of architecture (and cities, and objects of design) on the individual subjects they 
are meant for. 
The ideas born of psychotechnics also traveled freely between charged and often 
politically-opposed climates, whether the Progressive Era United States, Weimar 
Germany, or the Soviet Union on the cusp of the First Five Year Plan, offering a 
connective thread that navigates boundaries of stated ideological distinctions. 
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“Psychotechnics does not stand in the service of a party,” Münsterberg wrote, “but 
exclusively in the service of civilization.”9 Framing it as a civilizational tool rather than a 
partisan one is, of course, an ideological maneuver in and of itself, and it is here that 
another politics surfaces in the psychotechnical project at large—taking shape in the 
vocational thought and statistical reason that undergirded each of these social 
experiments, and which relied on a shared foundation of applied-scientific thought. This 
dissertation, then, proceeds transnationally, to understand how this science of human 
instrumentality played its part in diverse terrains of architecture and politics—in part 
because the ideas themselves proceeded transnationally (the translation of Münsterberg’s 
work into German and Soviet contexts will serve as critical moments within this history), 
and in part to suggest that the historiographical conventions that have long structured 
architectural history (monographic studies, explorations of national architectures, or 
surveys that begin from aesthetic or typological considerations) are less suited to 
understanding a phenomenon that has gone largely undiscussed but was nevertheless 
entirely central to modernism.  To call this era “psychotechnical” would be an incomplete 
formulation, no doubt, and yet the prevalence of the psychotechnical project—its 
ambition to congeal a disorderly array of human sciences, each field as unruly as the 
individual subjects who were being taken stock of, and to span scales from the eye’s most 
intimate apperceptions to the administration of cities and nations—makes it a suggestive 
frame through which to reread an otherwise all-too-familiar history.  
 
                                               





Habit, Education, and the “Personal Equation” 
In a footnote at the beginning of the first chapter of The Language of Vision, Kepes issues 
a warning to the rigorous reader. “Throughout this discussion and that which follows,” he 
writes, “it should be understood that all terms used are arbitrary, and are not to be 
considered as scientifically established. The use of such terms is made necessary by the 
lack of an adequate terminology in the field of visual experience considered as a creative 
activity.”10 His admission of the non-scientific nature of his writing is well taken, though 
his claim to arbitrariness should not be, as his terminology in fact relied on a field that 
had been exploring visual experience for several decades, even if it was rarely explicitly 
put in the service of “creative activity.” Why would a designer find fruit in a language 
that had been developed in experimental laboratories focused on human perception? Or to 
put it another way, what exactly was Kepes hunting for in the Principles of Psychology? 
James’s essay on habit begins with an observation on a particularity of the human 
species: “When we look at living creatures from an outward point of view, one of the first 
things that strike us is that they are bundles of habit. In wild animals, the usual round of 
daily behavior seems a necessity implanted at birth; in animals domesticated, and 
especially in man, it seems, to a great extent, to be the result of education.” Some habits 
are ingrained and unchanging—as in “the habits of an elementary particle of matter”—
but other forms of matter, “nervous tissue” being a notably pliable one, are endowed with 
“plasticity” and are thus subject to the development of new habits. Some are “simple 
                                               




habits,” like the “nervous event” of “putting one’s hand into one’s pockets, or of biting 
one’s nails.”11 But James’s interest is in more complex intersections of objects, muscle 
memory, and the mind, whose plastic medium is constantly traversed by newly developed 
grooves. His preferred examples are actions like the playing of a musical instrument or 
the creations of handicraft, which involve constellations of hand-eye-intention-action-
object that are no longer purely volitional but are, at least in part, habituated acts. (That 
the military offers an exemplary site for psychological study was noted by James, as it 
would be noted by many of the figures in this dissertation: “The degree to which this is 
true no one can probably appreciate as well as the one who is a veteran soldier 
himself.”)12 
Habit, in James’s formulation, negotiated two further scales, those of the 
individual and that of society. It is the interrelation of the two that made this strand of 
psychology a point of interest for designers like Kepes. What James was touching on was 
a reevaluation of the metaphysics that framed the “self” found in much of Western 
Enlightenment philosophy. That such selves come equipped with complex and sometimes 
restive materialities, in which hands and eyes are instruments with capacities, in which 
the fundamentals of perception might be made knowable on a physiological level, was of 
obvious interest to the politically-motivated designer precisely because such capacities 
could, potentially, be calibrated differently. Habit does not stop at the boundaries of the 
individual: “Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent,” writes James in a passage that takes bitter stock of what he saw as 
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the human’s frequent habituation to stark circumstance. “It alone is what keeps us all 
within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious 
uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from 
being deserted by those brought up to tread therein.”13 At the heart of this grim (and 
indeed patronizing) diagnosis of social habit, for readers like Kepes, lay a 
correspondingly utopian vision of harnessing that “flywheel” to other ends, marking 
“habit” as a site of possibility for a retooling of individuals that would take effect on a 
social scale. (Moholy’s otherwise oblique idea of a “socialism of vision,” discussed in 
chapter three, is an example of this exchange between the individual and the collective 
body.) What enabled this conceptual equation of personal and social knowability was a 
form of human measurement that was just beginning to crystallize, at the time of James’s 
essay, in the field that would become psychotechnics. 
Jonathan Crary, in his writings on attention, spectacle, and modernity, dates the 
emergence of the notion of “subjective vision” to the early nineteenth century, a moment 
that “broke with a classical regime of visuality, and grounded the truth of vision in the 
density and materialism of the body.”14 If the subject Crary describes is primarily the 
liberal subject of Enlightenment self-determination, there were implications for this 
subjective vision across the ideological lines that would emerge in twentieth-century 
geopolitics. The moment Crary describes finds an echo in another concept that emerged 
around the same time, that of the “personal equation,” a term of the early nineteenth 
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century that would, over the following century, give rise to the now-familiar notion of 
“reaction time” (a metric that groups a series of linked actions—perception, mental 
processing, muscle twitch—into a single number). In recognizing that the experiences 
and actions of human beings in fact occur asynchronously rather than being functionally 
simultaneous, if viewed on a timescale that breaks seconds into decimals, the promise of 
measurements like the personal equation is that the differences between individuals can, 
in some sense, be “resynchronized” or coordinated after the fact.  
The personal equation was initially the province of astronomers. In 1796, in a 
colorful story often retold, Nevil Maskelyne, the royal astronomer at Greenwich, 
dismissed his assistant David Kinnebrook because of differences in their recorded transit 
times. That there should be differences at all cast the facticity of astronomical science 
into doubt, particularly in terms of scientific inquiries like stellar or planetary transits that 
required the coordination of far flung data.15 And so new practices of measure—
measuring astronomers rather than astronomical phenomena—were devised, implying 
both an acceptance of individual differences and an attempt at neutralizing them. These 
forms of measure were accompanied in the middle of the nineteenth century by new 
instruments like chronoscopes and chronographs, eventually creating coefficients by 
which individual astronomers’ measurements would be adjusted. As Simon Schaffer has 
noted, we should be on guard when such practices are described as self-evident advances: 
“It is as though quantification were value-free,” when in fact, as historians of science 
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have insisted for some time now, “the values which experimenters measure are the result 
of value-laden choices … It is impossible to separate processes of quantification from the 
preferred work styles which sustain them.”16 A half-century later these “personal 
equations” had become the province of psychotechnics, with any number of professions 
joining astronomy as sites of scrutiny—and the values at stake in those occupations 
would likewise be reframed by the laboratory instruments they were being tested by. 
Another historian of science, Jimena Canales, has observed how the “tenth of a 
second,” as a unit of measure but also as a figure of thought, as rhetorically operative as it 
was scientifically vital, plays an outsized role in how modernity understood itself. (The 
more recent vintage of this concept has been the “split second,” characteristically 
deployed to excuse various forms of violence or inaction on the grounds of the “split 
second” reaction.)17 If perception had, up until around 1850, gone unquestioned as an 
effectively instantaneous act, an assumption that lasted through Descartes, an 
increasingly widespread awareness of the lag between stimulus and response remade the 
human sciences—and with it the arts—in the second half of the nineteenth century. This 
tenth of a second was an interdisciplinary preoccupation, pertaining to photography and 
cinematography as much as to astronomers and psychotechnicians like Münsterberg, 
who, Canales notes, deployed precisely that figure in arguing for the urgency of testing 
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for vocational aptitude: “If a playing child suddenly runs across the track of the electric 
railway, a difference of a tenth of a second in the reaction-time may decide his fate.”18  
By the early twentieth century, “personal coefficients” had been introduced into 
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s thinking on industrial efficiency. These coefficients were to 
be determined in university laboratories as well as in-house testing, marking the growing 
alliance between applied physiological psychology and vocational thought, a nexus of 
education and industrial organization that heralded later changes in the role of the 
university within a society.19 For some, this turn marked an era of not only scientific but 
social empiricism: “No definite and permanent advance is made in any kind of work, 
whether with materials or with men, until use is made of measurement,” argued the 
American efficiency experts Frank and Lillian Gilbreth in 1917. “The design of machines 
is constantly changing; the human being is constant. Measurement of machines that are 
obsolete is of little value. Measurement of human beings is valuable forever.”20 This 
unchanging and universalist view of the human sensorium was not necessarily shared by 
other thinkers of the era—it suffices to recall Walter Benjamin’s caution that “the way in 
which human perception is organized, the medium in which it occurs, is conditioned not 
only by nature but by history.”21 But the Gilbreths’ argument about the centrality of 
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measurement to social as much as technological advancement shows how the 
rationalization that preoccupied modernism (architectural and otherwise) stemmed not 
only from new materials and industrial methods but from a particular idea about 
occupational life, and with it, the life of the early-twentieth-century industrial metropolis. 
Benjamin goes on to argue that “the representation of human beings by means of 
an apparatus has made possible a highly productive use of the human being’s self-
alienation.” Benjamin is speaking here about the representations of the cinema—which 
“uses the revolutionary opportunities implied” by this self-alienation “for 
counterrevolutionary purposes”—but the point stems directly from psychotechnical 
thought, and not only because moving images were a key part of psychotechnical 
analysis.22 The subjectivity implied by psychotechnics was always an alienated one, and 
the application of that science of human measurement to vocational life was a gesture 
whose rhetoric and intention may have been progressive, even utopian—as Benjamin 
describes the productive alienation of filmmakers as varied as Vertov, Brecht, and 
Chaplin—but whose effects could just as easily be as “counterrevolutionary” as the 
manipulations of the cinema. There was little guarantee, nor even necessarily a particular 
likelihood, that the enumerated self—the subject, that is, of vocational examination—
would resemble the worker’s self-perception. 
Alienation, then, was a thing to be wary of, but also to exploit for its potentially 
socialist implications. Benjamin’s “alienation” was not quite Marx’s, because it belonged 
to a particular regime of work that saw individuals not as abstracted labor but as workers 
                                               




with specific and variable capacities, a change that was the work of psychotechnical 
testing: “The work process, especially since it has been standardized by the assembly 
line, daily generates countless mechanized tests. These tests are performed unawares, and 
those who fail are excluded from the work process. But they are also conducted openly, 
in agencies for testing professional aptitude.”23 As Frederic Schwartz has observed, 
Benjamin was fascinated by the utility of psychotechnics in understanding the experience 
of advertising and other media, lessons that would influence Benjamin’s own media 
practices.24 But, I would argue, Benjamin also saw the cinema’s alienation of the actor as 
a way of reversing the valence of authority that psychotechnics was at that time 
subjecting the metropolitan resident to:  
For the majority of city dwellers, throughout the workday 
in offices and factories, have to relinquish their humanity in 
the face of an apparatus. In the evening these same masses 
fill the cinema, to witness the film actor taking revenge on 
their behalf not only by asserting his humanity (or what 
appears to them as such) against the apparatus, but by 
placing that apparatus in the service of his triumph.25 
This desire to wrest the benefits of psychotechnical inquiry from industrialists to 
individuals or to establish forms of collective agency was likewise its appeal to many of 
the designers and architects who figure in this dissertation, explaining something of their 
fervent embrace of a science that for others was a clear act of numerical dehumanization. 
The idea that there could be a “personal equation” for architects (and those experiencing 
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the effects of architecture) took many forms that will be explored in the chapters that 
follow. 
This simultaneous wariness and fascination with psychotechnics is made clear in 
one of Benjamin’s radio addresses from 1930, titled “Carousel of Jobs,” one of the few 
moments when he discussed psychotechnics at length and by name. In pointing to the 
precarity of employment at a time when national socialism was on the rise in Germany—
a chaotic and uncertain market for workers captured by the word “carousel”—Benjamin 
describes a change in the nature of psychotechnical vocationalism over the 1920s: 
Where previously the question of aptitude—the expectation 
of producing one’s top performance in this or that 
profession—could direct a young person, now what 
predominates is the task of snatching a spot where the risk 
of slipping back down—the danger of being driven out of 
the production process, never perhaps to gain access to it 
again—seems as low as possible. The simple slogan “The 
right man in the right place”—still often heard these days—
actually comes from a more idyllic era of professional life; 
in fact, it comes, at least in its official recognition, from the 
time of demobilization.26 
That “simple slogan” of “the right man in the right place,” that truism of the 
psychotechnical era that Benjamin deployed here in English amid his spoken German, 
was an extension of the “total management” of World War One into peacetime, as the 
human instruments of war—whether soldiers, munitions factory workers, or 
logisticians—were to be redistributed into an equally orderly peace, a proposition taken 
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up in chapter two. “Today,” Benjamin continues, “the right place is the place where 
there’s a chance of holding on.” 
Later in the same address, Benjamin reads a passage from a recent book by the 
German psychotechnician Fritz Giese, whose influence on, and engagement with, László 
Moholy-Nagy will be taken up in chapter three. Giese describes the temperament of 
workers in a slaughterhouse, and Benjamin prefaces it by saying that it “should be 
understood not as a description of special dispositions or tendencies that the slaughterer 
carries with him from the outset, but as a formative power that is inherent in his job.” 
Giese notes attributes as varied as “resistance to adverse temperatures [and] dampness,” 
“a quietness and certainty of movement,” a “cleanliness … in respect to the work 
product” that is “also pronounced in personal life,” “good-naturedness, joviality, and 
robustness” along with “a healthy pride … that finds it unnecessary to assert itself in any 
way on the outside.”27  
The role of psychotechnicians, Benjamin concludes—positioning them here 
alongside other specialists “one mistrusts” but “who claim to clean deep insights into 
people from particulars,” whether “graphologists, palmists, phrenologists”—lies in their 
“indissoluble correlation between the inner and the outer.” This bridge between 
metaphysics and materialism was of as much interest for Benjamin as it was for James, 
Münsterberg, and Kepes, who will be joined by a number of other psychological and 
architectural thinkers in the pages that follow. But Benjamin’s concluding question 
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imagines reversing the chicken-and-egg of psychotechnics: “What fate would more 
consistently call forth such effects, both inner and outer, than the job? And where would 
such determinations be easier to make than at the job, where thousands of people are 
subjected to the same fate day in and day out?”28 Benjamin here asks something different 
of psychotechnics, wondering if it could serve not as a science of selection but something 
closer to occupational anthropology—a political recasting that again desires its benefits 
to accrue not to industrialists but workers, even as it accepts the descriptive capacities of 
the ongoing regime of vocational-psychological measurement. 
As our own technological milieu implicates us in an ever-expanding array of 
metrics for the experience of daily life, the example of the personal equation is a 
reminder of the managerial imperative that undergirds them—which in turn inscribes the 
architecture of the so-called “modern movement” within other transformations of the 
modern subject, guided by the rise of applied experimental sciences and vocational 
thought. It is also a reminder of the flow between art and science, the two terms existing 
in a co-produced tangle of spaces, techniques, instruments, and ideas—a condition in 
which “neither practice,” as Peter Galison and Caroline Jones put it, “has unique and 
absolute purchase on ‘reality,’ and neither is as alienated from history as its rhetoric 
might imply.”29 In keeping with this call to complicate and historicize the art-science 
binary—a binary which has often situated architecture as a mediating discipline between 
the two—this dissertation seeks out a more nuanced understanding of the modern 
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World War One and the Laboratory Culture of Modernism 
Such ideas, this dissertation argues, were internalized into the project of modernism 
itself, and its principle space of inquiry—the laboratory—translated across disciplinary 
lines as well. “The artist’s studio,” wrote Hannes Meyer in 1926, “has become a scientific 
and technical laboratory.”30 Le Corbusier referred to his painting studio as a “secret 
laboratory.”31 The Constructivist Karl Ioganson sought in 1923 to establish a “laboratory 
for invention in construction technics” under the auspices of INKhUK, Moscow’s 
Institute for Artistic Culture.32 It was under the same organization that Nikolai Ladovsky 
would first propose his own laboratory of architecture in 1921, later instituted at 
VKhUTEIN in Moscow, discussed in chapter one.  
Laboratories have long been held as exemplary sites of modernity, inaugurating 
new techniques and spaces for the production of scientific knowledge.33 Many architects 
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of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—when architecture was one among many 
practices simultaneously pursued by intellectual generalists—were intimately engaged in 
scientific laboratory work (as with figures like Claude Perrault or Christopher Wren).34 
With a flourishing of institutionalized laboratories in the nineteenth century, as 
“objectivity” became the scientific virtue par excellence, architects were repeatedly 
called into service to construct and represent such spaces of experimental inquiry.35 
Architects observed (and sometimes even participated in) no shortage of scientific 
discussions across these centuries, sometimes going so far as to adopt their terms into 
architectural thought, whether in the case of architecture’s long embrace of “organicism” 
as a concept or its trafficking in emerging understandings of geology and climate 
throughout the era of European colonialism. 
And yet the idea that architecture itself could be subject to laboratory protocols, 
that the design studio could be understood as a regulated space of scientific experiment, 
seems particular to the modernism that emerged after the First World War. This 
dissertation hazards a hypothesis as to why. Might the emergence of a series of applied 
sciences—theorized around the turn of the twentieth century but developed particularly in 
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the face of mechanized war on a continental scale—and, in particular, the applied 
psychology of psychotechnics, which sought to “laboratorize” the twentieth century’s 
understanding of vocation, be the precondition for such a turn? As human organization 
(its social structures and especially the codification of its systems of labor) increasingly 
became an object of scientific scrutiny, might not architecture follow suit? That the 
etymology of “laboratory” emphasizes the scripting of labor at stake in the making of 
scientific knowledge offers its own version of these questions.  
When Benjamin wrote of Moscow that “each thought, each day, each life lies here 
as on a laboratory table,” this was no metaphor, nor was it an easy valorization of the 
frequently summoned image of a “laboratory” of Constructivist life. “And as if it were a 
metal from which an unknown substance is by every means extracted, it must endure 
experimentation to the point of exhaustion,” Benjamin continues. “No organism, no 
organization, can escape this process.”36 What Benjamin detected in 1927—the year that 
saw a full-throated embrace of psychotechnics in the architectural milieus of both 
Moscow and Dessau—was this very migration of experimental “facticity” into the full 
breadth of metropolitan life, remaking the idea of vocation and with it the stakes of both 
urban life and architectural practice. 
There is a fetish character to all this facticity, many of its contemporaneous critics 
would observe, as this “rational” outcome of Enlightenment thought begins to fold in on 
itself under the weight of making so much of the human organism “knowable.” But in 
many of the cases studied here, it is not the findings that marshal a sense of legitimacy 
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but the figure of the laboratory as a scene of action, a conferral of authority on the basis 
of its instruments as much as its scientific method—indeed, instruments and techniques 
were more freely adopted into new contexts than the writings of their theorists and 
inventors. This has been said of Wilhelm Wundt’s followers in the United States: “Very 
little of Wundt’s psychological system survived the return passage” from Germany to 
America, though “it is extremely clear that what did come back with these young 
Americans was the laboratory apparatus and the floor plan of Wundt’s Leipzig 
laboratory.”37 Indeed, this dissertation contains its share of propositions by students that 
their teachers would not have sanctioned—the influence of psychotechnics generally, as 
with Wundt’s influence in the United States more specifically, was at times a product of 
mistranslation, with the devotees of psychotechnics occasionally under-equipped in their 
language comprehension, under-read in the literature, or, more simply, out to pursue 
different ends with the same instruments. What legitimizes these diverse practices is, at 
its core, not the direct transmission of knowledge so much as a worldview that embraced 
the production of data through instrumental experiment. 
Both its practitioners and its critics point unrelentingly to this inherent limitation 
of psychotechnical knowledge. “The natural sciences give us an answer to the question of 
what we must do if we wish to master life technically,” wrote Max Weber in his famous 
“Wissenschaft als Beruf” address of 1917. If the term “natural sciences” speaks to a 
notion of “pure” knowledge, however imprecise that purity might be, this twentieth-
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century ethic of “mastery” is the “applied” aspect of applied science, psychotechnics 
being a notable one. Weber continues: “It leaves quite aside, or assumes for its purposes, 
whether we should and do with to master life technically, and whether it ultimately 
makes sense to do so.”38 Münsterberg, for his part, puts it this way: 
Considering the child, the criminal, any man, as 
psychophysical apparatus which must be objectively 
changed and treated, we have applied psychology; 
considering him as subject with purposes, as bearer of an 
historical civilization whose personalities must be 
interpreted and understood and appreciated, then we need 
applied historical knowledge … All the sciences which deal 
with service in the system of civilization, service as 
teacher, as judge, as social helper, as artist, as minister, are 
sciences which apply the teleological historical knowledge, 
and their meaning is lost if they are considered as psycho-
technical sciences only. 
For Münsterberg, psychotechnics was strictly a science of means, not of ends. What goes 
unacknowledged in Münsterberg’s argument is the degree to which the means of science 
operate epistemologically—a Foucauldian apparatus, or dispositif, rather than an 
“merely” technical, and thus ostensibly neutral, apparatus awaiting use in the laboratory’s 
instrument room. That this passage also refers to the human body as an apparatus among 
others is an indication of how psychotechnics subsumes subjectivity into a productivist 
discourse of calibration, selection, and management, no matter the ends. 
The word “psychotechnics” vanished in many parts of the post-WWII world 
(though not all, as will be discussed), rejected in part for its seemingly totalizing and 
dehumanizing tendencies—a fall from grace that roughly coincides with that of eugenics, 
                                               




as both terms became associated with authoritarian regimes. The field’s very 
forgottenness, in the face of a vast applied scientific apparatus that defined vocational life 
in many metropoles of the 1920s, amplifies its potential insight in revisiting the canonical 
sites of modernism where it proved influential. In architecture, this forgetting was abetted 
by others, as the histories of the 1920s, certainly those written by English-language 
architectural historians of the generations that followed, picked their points of 
emphasis—the Bauhaus of Walter Gropius over the Bauhaus of Hannes Meyer, the 
Soviet Constructivism of Leonidov, Rodchenko, Ginzburg, and Tatlin, and others over 
the Rationalism of Ladovsky, Lissitzky, and Krutikov, who figure prominently here. 
There has been much work done in the past decades to revisit these moments, some of 
which has sought explicitly to address these limits of canonization. But the field’s 
historiographical retreat from the idea that modernism might not be an aesthetic project 
so much as the reshaping of architecture’s status as a vocation—a premise that receives 
little airing in most surveys of modern architecture, despite being a consequential point of 
discussion in the period—played its part in writing away one of the central sciences in the 
occupational lives of Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany in particular.  
 
 
The Psychotechnical Architect 
The individuals and sites that follow, and thus this dissertation, should not be taken as a 
complete picture of the engagement between architecture and psychotechnics. The field 
of applied psychology in the United States extended well beyond Münsterberg and his 




Germany and the Soviet Union the only nations to rally around vocational bureaucracy to 
this extent—France, Switzerland, Spain, and the Netherlands were among those 
European countries that pursued psychotechnics actively. Nor, for that matter, were these 
sciences confined to the residents of Western metropoles during the period discussed. In 
some cases, it spread through emigration, as in Lima and Mexico City, where 
psychotechnics appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. Psychotechnics lingered longer in 
South America than it did in Europe—describing some of the tests that appear in chapter 
one to a Chilean student, I was surprised when she responded that they were familiar 
from her own academic life, vestiges still in use from a previous idea about admittance to 
architecture school. In Spain, “pruebas psicotécnicos” remains a commonly-used term for 
aptitude testing.  
This broader spread of psychotechnics and its deployment in the service of sorting 
and ranking populations (whether by race, disability, or other forms of social dominion) 
are not bracketed out of this dissertation in the name of recuperating an “original” 
version. Indeed, these questions are unquestionably latent in the foundation of the field as 
a form of organization, whatever its stated aims, and my conclusion reflects further on 
this. But in staying close to a particular triangulation of cities (Boston–Berlin–Moscow) 
and institutions (Harvard–Bauhaus–VKhUTEMAS), my intention is, instead, to make a 
more precise intervention in the history of a design pedagogy that is still taken to be the 
foundation of teaching architecture in countless schools around the world. In confining 
my dissertation to the episodes that follow, it is my hope that this research will broaden 




that particular genealogy of architectural modernism that still takes pride of place in 
virtually any survey of the twentieth-century. 
This framing also allows a study that proceeds not geographically but 
conceptually, tracing three interlinked figurations of the subjectivities implied by 
modernism, using the frameworks of pedagogy, urbanism, and rehabilitation. This 
framing also allows my research to explore the ways in which experimental psychology 
and American industrial management percolated into and around two of the foundational 
institutions for architectural modernism, the Bauhaus in Dessau and VKhUTEMAS in 
Moscow. In revisiting these canonical sites, this dissertation also decenters them, by 
paying attention to their diasporas and understudied figures but moreover by locating 
them within larger discourses around vocational management, urban administration, and 
wartime rehabilitation. These discourses were vital to the experience of the early 
twentieth century, and they were discourses, I will argue, that such architectural 
institutions struggled to keep up with.  
Further, the transnational character of psychotechnics offers new perspectives on 
two of the frequently-made claims about the transatlantic (or, between Europe and 
Russia, transcontinental) internationalism that only later came to be called “International 
Style” architecture.39 The first describes modernism in the United States as a European 
import, depoliticized and transmitted to an American public through institutions like the 
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Museum of Modern Art.40 The other reverses the flow, describing European modernism 
as an obsession with American industrial forms, whereby circulating photographs taken 
on pilgrimages to the factories and silos became the templates for an emerging 
architecture, rendering functional expediency as style.41 Both are valuable narratives, 
focusing our attention on the role of architectural media in organizing and producing 
discourse, but both have the effect of solidifying the idea that architecture’s modernity is 
conferred through a particular set of visual codes transmitted principally through 
photographs and drawings. Looking at architecture through the lens of psychotechnics 
produces a different understanding of this U.S.–Europe–Soviet exchange, one that 
understands these powers of the early twentieth century as partners in the pursuit of 
managerial thought—a form of thought that may have taken different forms in differently 
charged contexts, but which can also be seen as a specific form of instrumental reason, 
emerging fully thanks to the First World War, that undergirded a range of ideologically 
distinct modernisms. In confronting this intersection of psychotechnics and design, then, 
the familiar methods of architectural historiography prove inadequate to the coordinated 
logic—from nervous systems to urban infrastructures—that guides these thinkers. 
If architecture (from Alberti onward) has proven consistently self-conscious, in its 
discursive forms, about its own modernity—its ability to be in tune with the politics, 
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cultures, technologies, economies, and organizations of labor that surround it—this 
dissertation documents a particular moment in that self-consciousness. At the heart of this 
moment was the idea that architecture might be understood as a vocation, a conceptual 
remaking that implied further questions: Who can (or should) become an architect? What 
qualifications might architects be judged by? How does architecture stage the perceptual 
life of the city? Which extra-architectural disciplines might the designs of architects draw 
on? The Psychotechnical Architect explores these questions through three interlinked and 
transnational case studies. 
The first chapter is centered around a series of psychotechnical experiments in 
pedagogy—particularly Nikolai Ladovsky’s Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture 
at VKhUTEIN in Moscow and Hannes Meyer’s embrace of psychotechnics within the 
curriculum of the Bauhaus in Dessau. By looking again at these sites of architectural 
modernity in conjunction with other laboratories—notably Hugo Münsterberg’s Harvard 
Psychological Laboratory and Moscow’s State Academy of Artistic Sciences—the 
vocational stakes of this psychotechnical interest become clearer. At a moment of 
redefinition for the field of architecture’s formal output, these thinkers sought a newly 
rigorous sense of what kind of qualifications were required to be an architect. 
The second chapter asks whether there might be a psychotechnics of urbanism. 
The profession that would become most associated with psychotechnical testing was that 
of the tram driver, which by implication offers a particular understanding of what it 
means to move through, and work in, an urban setting. By examining Münsterberg’s 
research on streetcars and streetlights in 1913, plans for the new Soviet city of Avtostroi 




explores how motion was seen as a central experience and driver of modern urbanism, 
and reflects on how the infrastructures of the city were imagined to be not only designed 
but operated according to an idea about the management of risk. 
Finally, the work of László Moholy-Nagy, and particularly his time as the director 
of the School of Design in Chicago between 1937 and 1946, offers the possibility of 
reconsidering the Bauhaus pedagogy through the lens of rehabilitation—a conceptual 
category that had much to do with the simultaneous rise of occupational therapy and 
vocational bureaucracy in the aftermath of the First World War. As the United States 
began to consider the likelihood of large-scale casualties, artistic institutions like the 
Museum of Modern Art and Moholy’s School of Design in Chicago began to consider 
what role them might play in their postwar recovery. The Bauhaus pedagogy seemed, to 
Moholy, a uniquely useful method to base a program of rehabilitation on, which allows 
us to reflect anew on what was actually at stake in the Bauhaus pedagogy in the aftermath 
of the First World War. 
In some instances, notably Meyer’s suspension, in 1928, of admission 
requirements to the Bauhaus (in a rejection of “talent” as a pre-vocational vestige of 
academic judgment), one can see this embrace of vocational thought as a way of 
contesting the consolidation of authority among elites that is endemic to architectural 
power structures. In others, such as Moholy’s work with veterans, it implies an opening 
up of artistic technique to allow for differing abilities, an understanding that the 
aesthetical-psychical construction of the self is a foundational act of modern subjectivity. 
In many of the examples that follow, the specter of totalitarianism haunts seemingly 




to “organize” on behalf of both individual and social betterment—the politics of this 
newly vocational discipline are often hard to pin down.42 Taken together, though, these 
various episodes in understanding both design and designers on a psychotechnical basis 
point to a modernism defined by a question that architectural historians of this period 
rarely ask—just what kind of “work” the work of architecture actually is. 
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Chelovek mera vsekh portnykh—“man is the measure of all tailors.” This cryptic pun is 
the first line of a graphical composition by El Lissitzky appearing on the back cover of 
Izvestiia ASNOVA in 1926. [FIG. 1.01] “Our great-grandmothers believed that the earth is 
the center of the universe,” Lissitzky continues, “and that man is the measure of all 
things.”1 The polemic is none too subtle—after millennia of understanding the natural 
and constructed world on an anthropocentric basis, the advent of modernity and a new era 
of revolutionary politics brought with them new means of taking measure.  
Though sparely constructed, Lissitzky’s spread is dense with the preoccupations 
of interwar architectural modernism—a rejection of solidity for lightness, a biological 
conception of construction, the emancipatory potentials of flight, the faktura of 
typography and photography, and the embrace of new architectural tectonics. But this 
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spread is not simply Moisei Ginzburg’s Style and Epoch—the Vers une architecture of 
Russian Constructivism—in another guise. [FIG. 1.02] On the contrary, Lissitzky’s 
graphic belonged to a widening rift in Soviet design discourse in which such 
technological premises were called into question, harkening instead to architecture’s 
more subjective and perceptual underpinnings. It comes as no surprise, then, that the 
great-grandmothers aren’t the only ones taken to task for their unexamined opinions 
about the built environment. Lissitzky laments that the massive iron structures of 
industrial modernity like shipping cranes—whose lightness and dynamic outlines contrast 
sharply with an ungainly tower pictured just above them in this graphic—are “compared 
with none other than fossilized animals.”2  
This is something of a reversal for Lissitzky, who just two years earlier had 
juxtaposed a human femur, redrawn from Raoul Francé’s Die technischen Leistungen der 
Pflanzen, with Mies van der Rohe’s glass skyscraper project for the Friedrichstraße. 
[FIG. 1.03] Francé was interested in the femur’s trabeculae, the structurally functional 
beams and rods that form within the collagenous tissue of a bone. In the case of 
Lissitzky’s comparison, this structural stiffening served the same role as Mies’ mullions 
in the taut surface of his curtain wall, implying an organic whole created by materially 
disparate systems. By 1926, however, Lissitzky’s flirtation with what Detlef Mertins has 
called “bioconstructivism” seems to have passed into a different register.3 He now 
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admonishes the reader to compare buildings “neither with bones nor with flesh,” and 
instead to “learn to see what is in front of your eyes.”4  
From the fossilized skeleton, then, to the living viewer. On one level, this turn 
could be said to mark the fault line between Soviet Constructivism and Soviet 
Rationalism, the latter camp having recently attracted Lissitzky. Where Constructivism 
embraced the form-giving properties of new technologies, Rationalism sought instead a 
modernist language of formal perception, one whose rhetoric eschewed functionalist 
inevitability for a more affective approach to architecture. Having returned to Moscow in 
1925 after being treated for tuberculosis in Switzerland, Lissitzky accepted Nikolai 
Ladovsky’s invitation to be a part of ASNOVA, the recently-formed Association for New 
Architecture. Izvestiia ASNOVA, edited jointly by Lissitzky and Nikolai Ladovsky, was 
intended to be the house journal of Rationalism, though it only ever produced the eight 
pages of its inaugural issue. [FIG. 1.04] (The year before, the two had also collaborated 
on housing proposals, which resulted in a built apartment block in Moscow.) [FIG. 1.05] 
This lone issue of Lissitzky and Ladovsky’s journal included the publication of 
Lissitzky’s now-famous “Volkenbügel,” an essay by Ladovsky on “The Foundations for 
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the Development of a Theory of Architecture (Under the Sign of Rationalist Aesthetics),” 
a memorial to filmmaker Viking Eggeling, and an article on the implications of the 
American skyscraper for Soviet design, among others. 
Lissitzky’s “Chelovek vera vsekh portnykh,” however, is not only an anti-
Constructivist polemic on behalf of his newfound Rationalist comrades, nor is the eye an 
incidental locus of inquiry. Lissitzky is arguing for a disciplinary understanding of 
architecture that eschews bodily metaphors while moving closer to the body itself—the 
body of the occupant and the body of the architect—which in turn positions the creation 
and experience of architecture as a kind of perceptual labor. The point is driven home by 
his conclusion, in which he repeats his opening salvo with a critical twist: “Man is 
measured by tailors, but architecture takes the measure of architecture.”5  
The phrase is something of a tautology; things do not measure themselves. The 
implication is an internal (one might even risk the term “autonomous”) science of 
architecture, one removed from cultural reference and existing means of architectural 
evaluation. What might such a science look like? One possibility can be found on the 
preceding page of Izvestiia ASNOVA. There, invoking the work of the German-American 
psychotechnician Hugo Münsterberg, Ladovsky first publicly proposed the creation of a 
Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture, inaugurating three years of research into the 
possibility that there might be a science of architectural perception, one that would 
govern the production of buildings and cities—and, moreover, the organization of the 
pedagogical environment itself. [FIG. 1.05]  
                                               




Elaborated in Münsterberg’s 1914 Grundzüge der Psychotechnik, this new field at 
the intersection of experimental psychology and industrial-vocational management had a 
vast range of nineteenth-century forebears, whether in psychophysics or the science of 
work—a set of interlinked discourses treated extensively in texts like Zeynep Çelik 
Alexander’s Kinaesthetic Knowing and Anson Rabinbach’s The Human Motor.6 The term 
was coined by the German psychologist William Stern in 1903, though it went little used 
until its later popularization. Münsterberg, however, provided a convenient point of 
origin for Ladovsky, as an instrumental figure in producing the academic laboratory 
environments that began, in the aftermath of the First World War, to flourish outside of 
academia in the form of civic testing stations. This transition from the intellectual space 
of the academic laboratory—and its claims, though sometimes tentative, to disinterested 
knowledge—to the actively managerial space of the laboratory of vocational testing is 
what occasioned the brief rise of what could be called “architectural psychotechnics.” 
That architectural education in the United States at this time had largely eschewed its 
German polytechnic beginnings in favor of a consolidation of a more “academic” Beaux-
Arts training indicates something of why Münsterberg’s bait was taken up by European 
architects more than American ones.7 If the research institutions of the United States still 
looked to Paris for their understanding of the field, despite the influence of the vocational 
movement in other aspects of American life, this turn promised other contexts a new 
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understanding of what, exactly, the vocation of an architect was—what traits and 
qualifications were to be prized under the banner of modernism, if the skill of the 
draftsman’s hand was to be left behind with the Ècole des Beaux Arts as an insufficiently 
contemporary means of judgment. 
While Ladovsky’s Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture is often discussed 
as a marginal or idiosyncratic participant in the architectural debates of the late 1920s—a 
fantastical parascience codifying a phenomenology of form-recognition—it might be read 
instead as a rare, explicit acknowledgement of a technoscientific moment that was in fact 
undergirding much of architectural thought at the time, even if that thought stayed largely 
silent on the question of laboratory psychology. Indeed, not long after Ladovsky 
embarked on his laboratory, Hannes Meyer instituted a psychotechnical curriculum at the 
Bauhaus, marking one of many moments of affinity between these much-heralded 
hothouses of modernism. Both pedagogical institutions made their names in the early 
1920s, and historians typically treat their later production as a continuation of those 
avant-gardist origins. But changes were afoot in 1927 and 1928, changes that institutional 
histories often gloss over, whether in terms of the reconstitution of VKhUTEMAS as 
VKhUTEIN—a transition that goes well beyond a simple renaming—or the Bauhaus 
directorship of Meyer, often portrayed as an interlude of Communist rabble-rousing 
between the directorships of Gropius and Mies. It was not new –isms, technologies, or 
discourses that were at stake in these developments of the late-1920s, but rather an 
increasing hegemony of urban administration and vocational management, which offered 





Looking back on the interwar period from the vantage of the late 1960s, Sibyl 
Moholy-Nagy noted that one of the central legacies of international Constructivism was 
the necessary conjoining of pedagogy and practice. “A total Constructivist had to be a 
teacher, whether he accepted the avocation or not,” she writes. “The faith in every man’s 
biological rights, in the perfectibility of his perception toward a higher emotional 
existence, was an educational commitment.”8 The statement is a telling one, showing the 
degree to which applied psychology had entered the arterial flow of architectural 
discourse. Moholy’s Constructivism was of course a far cry from the “fossilized animals” 
and functionalist skeletons that Lissitzky derided, and indeed too much emphasis on the 
Constructivist-Rationalist rift masks a wide range of similarities (seen also in Ginzburg’s 
own interests in perceptual psychology, pursued in parallel with Ladovsky’s despite their 
participation in separate Soviet movements). 
Functionalism, abstraction, and technology have long been seen as the outward 
manifestations of a new architectural worldview, but they often stemmed from a 
changing conception of creative subjectivity, one that took recent developments in 
applied psychology as something of a scientific basis. This chapter explores how the 
“perfectibility of perception” became codified by Münsterberg’s psychotechnics, and 
how Münsterberg’s ideas and instruments changed the course of architectural pedagogy 
at two of the most storied design schools of interwar European modernism, the Bauhaus 
in Dessau and VKhUTEMAS in Moscow. It explores how these schools positioned 
themselves as scenes of spatial research, borrowing the thinking, instruments, and 
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aesthetics—and moreover, the practices of legitimation—that had been developed in 




What is the architecture of experimental psychology, and conversely, what might be the 
vocational–psychological view of the field of architecture? In terms of the first part of the 
question, Münsterberg’s career tracks the changing spatial presence of the psychological 
laboratory within educational settings, and his writings in the early 1900s (the moment of 
the codification of Applied Psychology as a discipline of its own) offer explicit 
statements on the second. But despite Münsterberg’s own statements about the 
architecture of his laboratory, the typical methods of architectural analysis, as will 
become clear, prove inadequate to understanding just what it meant to build for 
psychotechnical research, as the real points of interest in his laboratory’s construction 
have to do with its embedded infrastructures of coordination. 
Münsterberg was trained in Leipzig at Wundt’s famed Institute for Experimental 
Psychology, the only psychological laboratory of its nature at the time, graduating in 
1885.9 Having taken a teaching position in Freiburg after following his PhD with a 
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medical degree in 1887, Münsterberg turned his own house into the second such 
laboratory in Germany, a place “where students worked with the tense eagerness of 
pioneers,” his daughter Margaret writes in a biography of her father.10 Brought to 
Harvard in 1892 at the behest of William James (“I, at the age of 50, disliking laboratory 
work naturally”), Münsterberg inherited the second floor of the now-demolished Dane 
Hall, already equipped to some extent by James but quickly expanded by Münsterberg 
upon his arrival.11 
The nature of the laboratory and its work in its first year is documented in a 
pamphlet prepared for the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893, an 
occasion for communicating the field of experimental psychology to a lay audience. 
“Many misapprehensions still exist, and should be corrected,” Münsterberg writes, noting 
that his field “is too often confused with experiments upon the brain by vivisection, with 
hypnotism, and even with spiritism … This account of our experiments may also serve to 
correct the error, which is so prevalent, that Experimental Psychology is confined to the 
study of sensations and simple reaction times.” Despite protesting that the laboratory’s 
collections are “of necessity merely provisional” a year into Münsterberg’s tenure, the 
pamphlet goes on to list 240 instruments in its possession, which outline the possibilities 
of research undertaken (alongside an appendix itemizing recent experiments).12 Some 
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forty instruments, models, and charts were intended for the teaching of physiology; 
another twenty-five deal with hearing, thirty-six with sight, and a scattering for muscular 
sensations. Münsterberg groups these under “sensations,” and this section of the catalog 
to some extent represents his predecessors—this instrumentarium would make for an 
excellent body of equipment for Fechner’s psychophysics. 
Münsterberg begins charting the divergence of psychotechnics from the studies of 
the previous century in the specificity of tasks that his instruments were out to measure—
a collection of devices that he terms “apparatus for studying the higher psychical 
processes,” or the coordination of various abilities and traits within less single-minded 
stimuli and reactions, in his 1893 catalog. One of his most photogenic devices, in which 
the testee puts their head inside a spherical form described by metal meridians, was 
intended to study the effects of dizziness [FIG. 1.06] The catalogue also contains images 
of tables laden with instruments for studying the perception of time or optical effects. 
[FIG. 1.07 and 1.08] Space and time—alongside seemingly subjective qualities like 
“association, attention, discrimination, memory, feelings, emotions, will, etc.”—each 
found their place within the laboratory and its instrumentation. 
In that regard, the arts played a welcome role in Münsterberg’s thinking, though 
he was careful not to conflate aesthetic experience with laboratory study. “Aesthetics 
gives rules, prescriptions, norms,” he wrote in his 1905 Principles of Art Education, 
while “psychology gives mental facts and their causes.” Nevertheless, he goes on to 
argue, both science and art “alike express the objective truth of real experience,” the 




connection to other truths while the artist’s objectivity is an isolated one.13 And yet there 
is a fascinating oscillation between art and laboratory in other ways—perhaps most 
evident in the darkened room of the cinema, which, as he would imply in his The 
Photoplay, mimicked the conditions of a laboratory. This is the aspect of Münsterberg’s 
work that Giuliana Bruno, one of few to look at the laboratory from an art or architectural 
historical angle, focuses on—her writings seek out particularly those moments of 
empathy and emotion being tested by the Harvard Psychological Laboratory’s 
instruments.14 Bruno also rightly explores the gendered nature of laboratory education at 
that time; she notes the appearance of a lone woman in archival photographs. Among 
Münsterberg’s many students from Radcliffe, who were not allowed to receive Harvard 
degrees, was Ethel Puffer, later Ethel Puffer Howes, who went on to write The 
Psychology of Beauty. Puffer met Münsterberg in Germany in 1895 and then in 
Cambridge did experiments in his lab. Her experiments on symmetry were published in 
the first issue of Harvard Psychological Studies and are cited by Ladovsky as well.15 
Moreover, one of the aspects of artistic experience that made it compelling for 
laboratory work was its distinct portability (especially as opposed to more architecturally-
scaled experiences). “The result is that the esthetic emotion can be created with all its 
richness in any corner of the laboratory,” Münsterberg writes. “A Japanese print or a 
sonnet can arouse exactly the same feelings there which it would create in the museum or 
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at the fireside.”16 Nor was scale an issue, as many of the instruments resembled the rough 
size of artworks—and in fact, their use demanded rooms closer to those of an early-
twentieth-century gallery of art than an institution of higher learning, an embrace of 
framed (if not isolated) perception. In his own description of the laboratory’s early home 
at Dane Hall, Münsterberg focuses on the progressive fragmentation of spaces that had 
formerly been used by Harvard’s law school: “In the year 1893, we divided a part of the 
adjacent lecture-room into four rooms for special investigations, and two years later the 
larger of the two original rooms was divided into five. As the lecture-room was also 
finally made part of the research laboratory, we had at least eleven rooms in Dane 
Hall.”17 When Emerson Hall was constructed, it followed along the same lines, with 
some 24 rooms for experiment on a single floor. [FIG. 1.09] While many were outfit for 
specific purposes (classroom and lecture room; the shop; coatroom; vivarium; battery 
room; photographic room; instrument room), the remainder are rooms of varying (though 
generally quite small) sizes, left unlabeled and available to be outfit for a range of 
experiments. Seven were lightproof and painted in black; others are calibrated for the 
heat and ventilation need of animals, whether mammals or reptiles; one is thoroughly 
soundproofed. But this multiplicity of rooms was also essential to Münsterberg’s 
pedagogy, in that he insisted that his students maintain involvement in four or five other 
students’ projects while pursuing their own. 
The construction of Emerson Hall in 1906 occasioned Münsterberg’s most 
architectural statements about the nature of experimental psychology and how it was to 
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fit into the schema of the American university. The name itself, Emerson Hall, is not only 
because the announcement of the building’s funding was announced on what would have 
been Ralph Waldo’s hundredth birthday—it was an appeal to aligning laboratory research 
with philosophy (the field of study that Münsterberg insisted on laying claim to) as well 
as American Pragmatism more generally. For Münsterberg, the architecture itself was a 
reconciliation of experimental psychology with the teaching of non-experimental 
philosophy as well as a reconciliation of this very different form of educational space 
with the existing campus, as yet undisturbed by the kinds of research programs that 
would resist the form of the academic buildings already on the site: 
The architect chosen was Mr. Guy Lowell, who has had to 
labor under the difficulties involved in the fact that the best 
and quietest available place was on Quincy Street opposite 
Robinson Hall. This spot demanded that the new building 
be harmonized with Robinson and Sever Halls, two 
structures most unlike in their architectural style … The 
plan finally accepted, a Greek, brick building with brick 
columns and rich limestone trimmings, provided for the 
work of the whole Philosophical Department with the 
exception of education … Surely never before in the 
history of scholarship has such a stately house been built 
for philosophy.18 
Such a home, he continues, “would give us the inspiration resulting from the mutual 
assistance of the different parts of philosophy, which in spite of their apparent separation 
are still to-day parts of one philosophy only.”19 
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This claim is difficult to sustain, given the widespread development at the time of 
psychological laboratories in positions of independence from philosophy.20 But it speaks 
also to the aspirations of the “unity of science” movement proposed in the coming 
decades, that the physiology of the mind and philosophy need not be untethered.  
But the “unity” Münsterberg describes was also an infrastructural claim, as these 
rooms were “spun into a web of electric wires,” as he puts it. It is not difficult to imagine 
that the building contained Harvard’s most “elaborate system of wiring,” supplying 
different voltages to the laboratories as required for the equipment in use, and 
Münsterberg dwells on it for several pages. Perhaps most remarkable among these wires 
in the walls, however, was a “time-circuit” that pulsed magnetic signals throughout the 
laboratory, keeping laboratory time precisely synchronized.21 This technology was a 
recent invention of the railroad industry, with many patents dating to those same years—
the railway being a frequent topic of Münsterberg’s own experimental interests, as will be 
discussed in chapter two—and marks one mode of standardization between the varying 
projects of the laboratory. 
More than any differences in space and instrumentation, though, the time between 
Münsterberg’s arrival at Dane Hall and the construction of Emerson Hall was marked by 
a shift in Münsterberg’s ideas about how to use all this knowledge, a transition is often 
described as the origin of applied psychology. The field was inaugurated largely by 
Münsterberg, who established a division of applied psychology as a part of the Harvard 
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Psychological Laboratory around 1908, shortly after the opening of Emerson Hall, 
alongside figures at peer institutions like James Cattell (a eugenicist and founder of The 
Psychological Corporation, the first American company aimed at intelligence testing), 
Walter Dill Scott (at Northwestern University, a specialist in advertising psychology), 
and Walter V. Bingham (at Carnegie Institute of Technology, an exponent of military 
classification methods).22  
The uses of applied psychology took several forms for Münsterberg, from 
industrial management to forensic psychology, and many of these strands would prove 
influential for contemporary fields of study.23 It was vocational psychology, however, 
that played a particularly central role in the larger project of psychotechnics; if its 
precepts were slow to be appreciated in the first decade of the twentieth century, its 
immense utility for the military bureaucracies of the First World War guaranteed its 
enduring influence on post-war civil society.24 
For Münsterberg, in his Vocation and Learning of 1910, vocational fitness could 
be divided into three categories—information (or “thinking,” as diagrammed by 
Münsterberg), abilities (“willing”), and motives (“feeling”), each of which is defined by a 
particular “system,” an almost encyclopedic spectrum of possibility for knowledge, 
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ability, or satisfaction. This schema, he argues, is both responsible to the job and 
responsible to the individual, relying not only on desire, skill, or experience but on a 
triangulation of all three (a more multifaceted view of vocation than many of 
Münsterberg’s followers, Ladovsky included, would pursue). The architect is among 
those vocations studied by Münsterberg, in a “glance at the artistic side of life,” as he 
puts it.25 [FIG. 1.10] “It seems as if with such a decidedly practical occupation the actual 
training would be all essential,” he notes, and yet he finds endless fields that lay some 
claim to the architect’s knowledge, whether engineering and hygiene or the study of the 
humanities—literature and foreign language are among those fields deemed essential by 
Münsterberg. If that intellectual breadth might strike some as dilettantism (or, at best, an 
embrace of the figure of the “gentleman architect” who has the time and wherewithal to 
develop such interest, with the presumption that the architect would be a recipient of 
Beaux-Arts rather than polytechnic training), those more pragmatic voices might 
nonetheless be gratified to hear that the manifold abilities required for an architect, for 
Münsterberg, “must be guided by a sense of beauty, by a constructive imagination, by a 
feeling for the needs of the time, by a sociological understanding of the architect’s 
function”—imperatives that meshed well with a modern remaking of the field. 
This vocational triangulation was hardly the vision of architecture that was being 
sought by architecturally-inclined followers of psychotechnics like Ladovsky, nor would 
the architecture of Münsterberg’s “stately house for philosophy” be of any greater interest 
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to such thinkers than a typical laboratory interior. And yet Münsterberg’s vocationalism, 
in conjunction with his regimes of sensory testing, was a vital foundation for the 
architectural psychotechnics to come. If his claims on architecture were far from a 
revolutionary upending of disciplinary norms, the world of normalization, management, 
and applied psychology that Münsterberg sketched out provided both methods and 
intellectual frameworks for a wholesale remaking of the figure of the architect, one in 




Something Other Than Construction 
The phrase “art into life”—the putting into production of design practices previously 
limited to the terrain of aesthetics—was among the more frequently repeated slogans of 
the Soviet architectural avant-garde of the 1920s. The unspoken mediating term between 
the two was invariably “science.”26 The idea that socialist life could be understood as 
something of a laboratory, one to be molded by design, became a prevailing metaphorical 
trope in many quarters of discourse in that decade. The slogan “art into life” implies a 
desire for seamlessness in the transition from the former term to the latter, from design to 
the transformed everyday by way of modern technology, though it was a passage fraught 
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with misalignments between artistic expression and technicity. In looking again at the 
architectural and parascientific practices of Nikolai Ladovsky—a central figure in 
architectural debates of the 1920s who promoted Rationalism alongside Vladimir Krinsky 
and Nikolai Dokuchaev, joined later by figures like Lissitzky and Georgy Krutikov—one 
encounters an irresolvable but nonetheless illuminating collision of discourses that evince 
an ambitious discipline struggling to imagine its potential role in the development of a 
society. 
Ladovsky’s use of the term “Rationalism,” first thoroughly explicated in the lone 
edition of Izvestiia ASNOVA, is grounded in his distinction of architectural rationalism 
from its more technical forebear. “Architectural rationalism is predicated on economic 
principles just as is technical rationalism,” he explains, but  
the difference between them stems from the fact that 
technical rationalism represents the economy of labor and 
material in the creation of an expedient structure, while 
architectural rationalism represents the economy of mental 
energy in the perception of the spatial and functional 
aspects of a building.27 
The addition of a psychical economy to the more functionalist determinants of a modern 
architecture is at the center of Ladovsky’s architectural and pedagogical thought, and set 
the stage for years of debates within the institutional structure of VKhUTEMAS, 
Moscow’s primary institution of architectural pedagogy across the 1920s. 
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 A range of causes have combined to make Rationalism a lesser-known current 
within Soviet architectural thought. Within English-language historiography, however, it 
is Berthold Lubetkin’s dismissal of ASNOVA’s rationalist doctrine, in a survey of Soviet 
architectural thought published in The Architectural Review in 1932, that cemented the 
view that Ladovsky’s Rationalism simply expanded more traditionally utilitarian notions 
of positivism into the realm of the subjective, if not the outright irrational (despite, or 
because of, Lubetkin’s own affiliations with ASNOVA as a student at VKhUTEMAS). 
“The adherents of this school envisaged an ‘objective,’ absolute, and universal system, 
based on the reactions of the perceptive organism of the spectator,” Lubetkin argues, 
allowing that “they carried out laboratory investigations into the study of scale, 
modulism, the relations of rhythm, proportion and mass, statics and dynamics regarded as 
functions of volume, etc.” The veneer of research, in Lubetkin’s telling, does little to 
mitigate an underlying formalism—and assumption of a universal subject receptive to 
suggestive influence—at work: “In spite of all their endeavors, they remained purely 
abstract, idealistic and emotional.”28 This view is seconded in Anatole Kopp’s Town and 
Revolution, among the first extensive English-language surveys of the period (which, 
among other slights, refers to the leader of the Rationalist camp as “A. Ladovsky”):  
Psychotechnical methods, denounced by ASNOVA’s 
critics as “idealistic,” were an important but not essential 
part of the VKhUTEMAS program … It is even possible 
that some, in their enthusiasm over the discovery of these 
methods, then entirely new, should have been inspired to 
visualize a system within which any emotion could be 
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consciously induced by the rational use of the formal 
vocabulary of architecture.29 
Such accounts of Rationalism, later and more nuanced scholars notwithstanding, set the 
template, to a considerable degree, for how it sits alongside the more commonly-
discussed Constructivism in much of architectural history (due in part to the 
Constructivist group OSA’s far more prolific media production).30 A different story 
emerges if Rationalism is retraced through Ladovsky’s architectural scientism on the 
grounds of its interdisciplinary and international development, considering it less as a 
formal system—though in its earliest instantiations this is one implication of Ladovsky’s 
project—and more as an organizational structure intended to reframe architecture as a 
participant in the larger emerging bureaucracy of the still young Soviet Union. 
As with the other main pedagogical tendencies in post-Revolutionary architecture, 
Rationalism was first and foremost a reaction to the classicizing tendencies of the 
immediately pre-Revolutionary moment, represented by such figures as Ivan Zholtovsky 
and Alexei Shchusev (and even architects like the Vesnin brothers, who would later 
position themselves at the center of the Constructivist circle, or Moisei Ginzburg, whose 
Rhythm in Architecture of 1923 takes its basis in classical architecture rather than the 
industrial modernism of Style and Epoch the following year). “The Revolution found 
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architecture in the moment of its ‘restoration’ after its infatuation with Modernism,” 
wrote Ladovsky in 1927, with Modernizm here evoking the Art Nouveau-inspired Stil’ 
Modern rather than the international modernism associated with the 1920s. “The thoughts 
of architects were directed to the past. The era of ‘technism’ and industrialism was 
understood as the decline of the arts and architecture … not to mention those leaders”—
by which Ladovsky was referring to Zholtovsky—“who thought that ‘all roads lead to 
Rome.’”31 Even after the reforms of 1918, the prominent Moscow School of Painting, 
Sculpture, and Architecture [Zhivskulptarkh] promoted a “living classicism” until the 
student-instigated curricular changes of spring 1920, led especially by Ladovsky’s 
“completely disorienting” belief that “space, not stone, is the material of architecture … 
It is in space that the soaring wonders of modernity will be built by art plus the 
intellect.”32 That “space” might be the primary object of design within architecture had 
already been suggested by figures like Alois Riegl, Wilhelm Worringer, and August 
Schmarsow, but it takes a particular cast within Soviet modernism.33 Ladovsky’s 
pedagogical insistence on “volumetric spatial structure” was opposed principally, at least 
in its nascence, to the architectural language of the École des Beaux-Arts, rather than the 
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“functional-constructive basis” of a Vesnin or a Ginzburg, as later debates would seem to 
crystallize.34 
That Rationalism was grounded in the negation of historicist pedagogy is 
especially critical in that a certain void remained after the successful cries of “down with 
Classicism.” Antiquity having been dethroned as the proper articulation of building, by 
what standards should architectural work be judged? “Form can be invented from 
accidental circumstances. Likewise, one may stumble across a particular form and 
technique,” argued Ladovsky. “But will this form be one that fits the contemporary 
ideal?” Bearing parallels to Wittgenstein’s work on logic and linguistic structure—
interpolated into the Soviet academies by the young psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who 
was also a vital figure within Soviet psychotechnics—Ladovsky ascribes a 
communicative spatial capacity to buildings, one that replaces the classical 
ornamentation since stripped away. “Architecture—it is a language that expresses our 
feelings. One can make the materials of architecture speak about its quality, about our 
mental attitudes, about the laws of gravity, but that does not mean that architecture is a 
mechanistic law.” This elucidative aptitude of built form proves to be the basis of 
Ladovsky’s repudiation of the tenets of Constructivism: “Architecture is a complex of 
many variable values. Among these one can include the concept of technology,” he 
wrote. But “the quality which is most characteristic of the complex of architecture will be 
spatiality and its other elements; these are its most constant dimensions … A mechanistic 
outlook considers the movement of the body. However this is not arkhitektura, but rather 
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konstruktsiia,” pointedly employing the foreign cognate that had been enthusiastically 
adopted in Soviet discourse. “Architecture can illustrate these laws, but they are the 
essence of only a certain complex; the core is something other than mechanics.”35 
Pedagogically, this took the form of introductory courses at VKhUTEMAS, 
developed by Ladovsky, Dokuchaev, and Krinsky, on prostranstvo, or “space.” If 
VKhUTEMAS has often been colloquially referred to as a “Soviet Bauhaus,” and if this 
course is often placed alongside the Bauhaus Vorkurs in being the foundation for more 
discipline specific training to follow, lost in this comparison is the more distinctly 
architectural nature of the assignments. This came to be described by Ladovsky as his 
“psychoanalytical method.” If most accounts assume this to be an idiosyncratic (or 
outright incorrect) use of the term, some have argued that it was purposeful one, alluding 
not to Freud’s analysis of sexuality so much as its excavations into the unconscious—
here meaning the unconscious response to architectural form—and of a piece with a 
common desire in the mid-1920s to reconcile psychoanalysis with materialism.36 And 
indeed, some VKhUTEMAS prospectuses explicitly list psychoanalysis among their 
techniques of training. This method was pursued through a series of tasks which broke 
down the understanding of space into discrete tasks which were frequently executed in 
rough-and-ready form with materials at hand, a textural openness that resembles the 
miscellany of Moholy-Nagy’s photograms more than the careful graphical craft of the 
Bauhaus Vorkurs, even if many of the interests between the two schools overlapped. This 
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pedagogy included studies on rhythms of vertical and horizontal combinations, the 
creation of volumes using planar surfaces of paper modeling as well as the volumetric 
mass of clay modeling, and the expression of mass and tension in space. [FIG. 1.11–1.14] 
Philosophically, this incorporation of “something other” into architecture, marked 
by an emphasis on language and cognition while abstaining from the reactionary tropes 
of tradition, is what necessitates Ladovsky’s appeal to the scientism of psychology. These 
strains emerge, tentatively at the outset, in his 1921 text for the “Working Group of 
Architects at INKhUK,” a first foray into moving beyond the ongoing debates 
surrounding composition and construction into a particular notion of space. After 
outlining the Working Group’s chief platforms, Ladovsky goes on to discuss the need for 
a psychological examination of space at curious length. “Spatiality belongs exclusively to 
architecture, but architecture itself does not concern itself with investigating it, and uses it 
very badly,” he warns. “We are not rejecting psychology, but we say that we are not 
specialists in it. The same is true with mathematics. But there is a field where we are 
Pythagorases, and that is architecture.”37 (His phrasing vividly presages Lissitzky’s 
Izvestiia ASNOVA graphic and its interest in the means of architectural measure.) But that 
insistence on disciplinary boundaries would, across the period of 1926 to 1929, also be 
modified to incorporate a particular brand of psychology, one that generates the 
knowledge through which “architecture measures architecture,” rather than relying on 
specialists. 
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Ladovsky’s argumentation—and, by extension, his appeal to an objective field of 
expertise—has to do with Vasily Kandinsky, usually portrayed as the figure who 
introduced psychoanalytic thinking to Soviet art (having picked it up in Munich in the 
twenty years leading up to World War I). Kandinsky headed the “Section of Monumental 
Arts” at INKhUK (the Moscow Institute of Artistic Culture) upon its founding in March 
1920, proposing a program that studied “the impact on the psyche” of painting, sculpture, 
architecture, music, and dance. His was a notoriously subjective and largely synaesthesic 
psychology, vividly captured in a decidedly oblique questionnaire prepared for his 
colleagues at INKhUK, a document discussed in Maria Gough’s The Artist as Producer: 
How does … a triangle seem to you—does it seem to 
move, and if so, to where, does it seem wittier to you than a 
square; is your feeling about the triangle similar to your 
feeling about a lemon; which is closer to the singing of a 
canary—a triangle or a circle; which geometric form is 
closer to vulgarity, to talent, to good weather, and so on and 
so forth.38 
This playful non-objectivity is what Ladovsky reacted to in his appeal for a more 
experimental foundation for architectural thought. Kandinsky, critiqued for “excessive 
psychologism,” departed his brief term at INKhUK by the end of 1920, with Ladovsky 
and Krinsky instituting their “Working Group” immediately thereafter.39 
At stake in this, for Ladovsky, is the refutation of an analogical approach to 
architectural meaning, an approach he finds anthropomorphic and overly subjective:  
Questions of analogy are questions of aesthetics. There 
what is being examined is a reincarnation of the individual: 
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where for example a stone lying down calls forth, by 
analogy, a feeling of rest and a standing stone, an aspiration 
upwards, and so on. Restlessness, peace, and aspiration are 
questions belonging to a special science, but not to 
architecture. And the latter already gives, albeit 
temporarily, scientifically founded truths, and not 
analogous comparisons.40 
Here, we see Ladovsky inveighing against associative abstraction—the “summoning of 
emotion” that Lubetkin and Kopp accused him of—and moving sideways from the 
subjective, from the “reincarnation of the individual” in the perception of form, into a 
territory still marked by other, more seemingly scientific practices. And indeed, returning 
to Lubetkin’s characterization of the Rationalist moment, one finds an unexpectedly 
recursive vein of critique. Lubetkin’s description of Ladovsky reads almost precisely like 
Ladovsky’s refusal of the Kandinskian paradigm: 
This new symbolism, with its cubes suggesting the 
conception of integrity, its spheres and balls expressive of 
the ideas of tranquility and equilibrium, and its 
transposition of geometric forms to serve as attributes of 
dynamism and impulse, soon created an aesthetic canon, 
imprisoned within its own strait-jacket, that was inhuman 
and incomprehensible for the non-initiated: a sort of 
universalism of the Larousse type, but a universalism in 
which everything became subjective and conventional.41  
Where Ladovsky sees situated linguistic logics, Lubetkin sees encyclopedic fixity; where 
Ladovsky aims for new categories of spatial experience, Lubetkin perceives analogical 
forms. 
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These distinctions, one could say, are confined to the realm of architectural 
debate. As the 1920s wore on, however, the formal explorations of Rationalism (under 
the rubric of Ladovsky’s psychoanalytical method) gave way to something else—still a 
psychology of perception, now positioned as a kind of psychotechnics. This turn within 
Rationalism also marks its entry into a broader conversation around the conditions of 
perception in the modern city, one that took root in Münsterberg’s laboratory at Harvard 
and was translated into the context of VKhUTEMAS. But it also marks a more unlikely 
point of affinity between the two most storied pedagogical institutions of European 
modernism, VKhUTEMAS and the Bauhaus. Each found themselves looking to 
psychotechnical thought as a means of reconstituting the political subjectivity of 
architects and those who engage with their architecture, and each evince the 




Within a year of his departure from INKhUK, Vasily Kandinsky found himself teaching 
at the Bauhaus, where he would remain until its closure in 1933.42 That the synesthetic 
psychology refused in Moscow would find an accommodating home there could indicate 
a set of differences between the pedagogy of VKhUTEMAS and the Bauhaus. Such a 
narrative would align with a distinction drawn by Éva Forgács, that the Bauhaus largely 
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“stood outside of society, but was forced into transactions with it” while “VKhUTEMAS 
was basically—if not in every detail—identified with the new, revolutionary state.”43 
Where the imperatives of mass education informed the debates around architecture in 
Moscow, in Weimar, it would seem, there was more room for Kandinsky’s perceptual 
metaphysics, adopted to an extent even by the soberer and more technically-minded 
Walter Gropius. Writing in his much later Scope of Total Architecture, he rhetorically 
asks himself if there exists a science of design: 
Shapes can be exciting or soothing. In addition, their 
colors—shrill or soft—can increase the intended effect. 
Color and the texture of surfaces have an effective 
existence of their own, sending out physical energies which 
can be measured. Such effect can be warm or cold, 
advancing or receding, bright or dark, light or heavy, in 
tension or in suspension, or even attractive or repulsive.44 
This carries more than a few shades of Kandinskian psychologism, and one might 
imagine from this that Gropius was happy to accommodate a more expressive idea about 
artistic psychology than the one pursued in the Soviet Union under the banner of 
Rationalism.  
But the Bauhaus also moved beyond the psychologism of Kandinsky, just as it 
moved beyond the mysticism of Johannes Itten, to frame a more substantive engagement 
with perceptual psychology, and psychotechnics in particular.45 László Moholy-Nagy 
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was the most psychotechnically-inclined Bauhäusler of the Gropius years, and his 
substantial engagement with the psychotechnician Fritz Giese will be taken up in chapter 
three. The exchange went both ways—architecture offered a site of possible study for 
psychotechnics as well. Erwin Gackstatter, a student of Giese’s who went on to 
participate in the psychological efforts of the Nazis, published a study that contrasted the 
vocational attributes of architects and mechanical engineers in memorium to his former 
mentor. Much of the study follows typical psychotechnical testing and surveys, though 
Gackstatter devised two rather unique contributions to the experimental canon. One was a 
“Sandkasten,” sandbox, a meter square, in which testees would arrange the topography 
and objects of an “ideal landscape”—a project in Heimat if ever there was one. The other, 
in which the architects and engineers would arrange a Froebelesque set of primary forms 
into a sailboat, went by the fanciful name of “Bauhauskasten”—literally “Bauhaus box.” 
For Gackstatter, the vocation of the architect had an evident pastoralism, of a particular 
right-wing stripe, underpinning its aesthetics.46 
If psychotechnics took such an interest in the vocational status of the architect—
belatedly, in that Gackstatter’s study was published in 1940, though he studied under 
Giese while the Bauhaus was still active under Mies—what might that mean for the 
Bauhaus’s understanding of vocational psychotechnics? Frederic Schwartz’s Blind Spots 
notes how psychotechnics, at least until 1928, pertained to the Bauhaus primarily for its 
influence for advertising—what Hannes Meyer later referred to as “psychological 
                                               





capital.”47 After all, Schwartz argues, “the psychologists of the laboratories and the 
typographers of the avant-garde met on the common ground as visual attention as an 
object of knowledge,” though  
the obvious incompatibility of the hard edges of 
constructivist geometry and the beckoning smile and soft 
curves recommended by the psychotechnicians for the 
mass-market advertisement, the clash of Sachlichkeit and 
the saccharine, makes clear that we need to attend to 
divergences rather than take at face value the protagonists’ 
own word on the importance of this alliance of artistic and 
laboratory expertise.48 
This is wise counsel—and yet might there be further readings that complement but 
expand Schwartz’s? He notes that “even after Moholy’s departure, psychotechnics 
remained on the curriculum and, if anything, increased in importance.”49 Examining the 
role of psychotechnics in the post-1928, post-Moholian Bauhaus reveals a very different 
relationship of pedagogy and psychotechnics, implying also a different idea of just what 
kind of student the Bauhaus was producing. 
Indeed, it could be argued (with regard to psychotechnics among other things) 
that Hannes Meyer’s tenure as the director of the Bauhaus might be less notable for the 
work it produced, which in many respects differed little from the projects pursued under 
Gropius, than for a pedagogical vision that never fully came to fruition. It was only with 
Meyer’s appointment as the Bauhaus’s second director that psychotechnics appeared 
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fully on the curriculum (taking a prominent place in his diagram of the revised structure 
of the school). He took over for a tumultuous two years that began on April 1, 1928, and 
in a fiery open letter written after his dismissal, Meyer described those two years as a 
battle against “incestuous theories (blocking) all access to healthy, life-oriented design … 
As head of the Bauhaus, I fought the Bauhaus style.”50 A committed internationalist who 
understood architecture as something of a biological-functional carapace, Meyer insisted 
instead, in the year that he began as the Bauhaus’s director, that “building is only 
organization: social, technical, economic, psychological organization.”51  
As Daniel Talesnik has observed, Meyer’s rhetoric on “organization” is akin to 
that of figures like Hans Schmidt and Mart Stam.52 It could also be observed, that these 
were the same component fields that were then being organized under the banner of 
psychotechnics—social, technical, economic, psychological, the last term exceeding 
more common definitions of “function”—well beyond the economy of attention that 
preoccupied the typographers and metropolitan advertising. Münsterberg’s work was also 
being freshly interpreted at this moment by the Berlin-based sociologist, economist, and 
politician Frieda Wunderlich, who completed her doctorate on Münsterberg’s 
implications for the organization of national economies in 1920, and who had recently 
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published a volume on Productivity in 1926.53 His methods were likewise becoming 
commonplace in a range of vocational organizations. (That this rationalization consists in 
a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion has led one historian to refer to it as “Weimar 
eugenics,” a continuity of Germanic social organicism that belies the seeming radical 
breaks of Weimar modernism.)54  
This explains the otherwise curious presence of the psychotechnician Hanns 
Riedel at the Bauhaus. Riedel penned a testimonial about the school in Meyer’s famed 
junge menschen kommt ans bauhaus! brochure, produced in the summer of 1929—the 
only text that does not appear in the form of an institutional voice.55 [FIG. 1.15 and 1.16] 
“The atmosphere of the Bauhaus cannot be described in a few words,” he writes. 
Nevertheless, he sums up his impressions: 
Despite the very different origins of the Bauhäusler by 
country, education, class, and talent [begabung], there is 
overall an essentially uniform intellectual attitude. Above 
all, it seems to me to be determined by an extraordinarily 
strong urge toward freedom, of a sort otherwise found only 
in the youth movement, a desire for freedom that is 
generally not only freedom “from” but freedom “for”. 
Inasmuch as this attitude, which produces an entire form of 
teaching structure, favors those of serious aspiration and 
genuine originality, it also threatens the development of 
those who cannot be self-reliant in taking their place as a 
Bauhäusler. Therefore talent alone is not enough; rather it 
is vital that there remain a character that allows these 
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talents to cohere and be fruitful for the individual as well as 
the whole.56 
This is a frank assessment, one that speaks to some of Meyer’s recent pedagogical 
changes. Having argued, soon after becoming director, that the Bauhaus “does not want 
to specialize in the talented … but simply wants to attract as many people as possible, to 
then correctly integrate them into society,” Meyer relaxed admission requirements, with 
mixed effects—among them, the overcrowding of the school in the spring of 1929, and 
some controversy among the faculty about the less-talented students.57 Riedel’s text, 
written shortly afterward as the school was preparing for the fall (and as Meyer capped 
enrollment at a more manageable number), takes note of that unevenness of talent but 
embraces it—provided that the school develop “a character” rather than relying as it had 
on the students’ expressive talents. This character, one might imagine from Riedel’s own 
teaching at the Bauhaus, was meant to move the school away from individual expression 
and toward a more rigorously organizational outlook—which indeed aligned with many 
of Meyer’s intentions. 
The same brochure notes lectures by Otto Hessler (the prominent Social 
Democrat who gave Meyer the commission for the ADGB Trade Union school), the 
“organizational engineer” Ewald Sachsenberg (who spoke on advertising), the 
psychologist Hans Prinzhorn (made famous by his research on art and mental illness, 
leading to the coinage of the term “Art Brut”), Meyer’s fellow Basler Konrad von 
Meyenburg (whose organicism was extremely influential for Meyer’s), two members of 
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the Vienna Circle (Otto Neurath and Herbert Feigl), and of course Riedel himself, on the 
organization of work—presaging Meyer’s ideas about the vocation of the architect. 
Riedel himself was substantially more conservative than Meyer, and his coinage of the 
field of “Arbeitskunde” placed psychotechnics firmly in the camp of industrialists, and 
yet within this vision of total organization, Meyer found seeds for a socialist remaking of 
the discipline of architecture.58 
At the heart of this version of the Bauhaus was a revised version of what an 
architect was. “My architecture students will not be architects,” Meyer proudly 
proclaimed in 1929. “The ‘architect’ is dead”—a remarkable claim by the person who 
had finally established an architecture department at the Bauhaus.59 In a free-verse poem 
of the same year, “bauhaus and society,” he makes clear just what he means by this vision 
of “architecture” now deceased: 
our design is not dictated by 
rhythm or hierarchy. 
we despise all forms 
that prostitute themselves into formalism. 
thus the aim of all bauhaus work 
is the unification of all life-giving forces 
for the harmonious shaping of our society. 
 
we bauhaus people are researchers: 
we are searching for the harmonious opus, 
the result of conscious organization 
of spiritual and psychic powers.60 
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This offers an illuminating contrast to many of his fellow Bauhäuslers (though it might be 
noted that Kandinsky and Klee were both allowed expanded roles within the Bauhaus 
Vorkurs under Meyer, as formalist as he found their teachings). Research and 
“organization,” explicitly framed here as a reorganization of the psyche as much as the 
rebuilding of architecture and cities on a modern basis, complementing a more 
straightforward functionalism with an investment in psychical workings as much as 
technosocial ones, were meant to effect something close to a collapse in distinction 
between architecture and psychotechnics—an ambitious remaking of the Bauhaus that 
Meyer never succeeded in bringing about, though he would continue his efforts as a part 
of the so-called “Bauhaus brigade” in the Soviet Union after his dismissal from the 
Bauhaus.61 
It would also seem to refuse other forms of architectural psychotechnics, such as 
Ladovsky’s Rationalism. Ladovsky found “rhythm” and “hierarchy” as meaningful as 
any architect, and his early appeals to perceptual psychology sought something like the 
formalism Meyer here decries as prostitution. Writing retrospectively in 1943, Meyer has 
little positive to say about VKhUTEMAS, “a sort of anti-academic academy” where 
“some of the most sectarian took haven.” In describing the work of its faculty, Naum 
Gabo (one of the first lecturers at Meyer’s Bauhaus, in November 1928) is a “dreamer-
artist,” Vladimir Tatlin’s famous tower is “that Soviet castle in the air,” and the buildings 
of Ladovsky and Leonidov are lumped together—for all the intensity of the debates 
                                               




between their respective camps—as being “practically gasometers.” At the school, Meyer 
continues, 
members belabored all kinds of experts or carried on hot 
discussions with longing glances at the great symphonic 
orchestra that played Mussorgsky without baton or 
conductor. Meanwhile the place was crowded with student 
workers, who at great sacrifices were devoting themselves 
to study, and who were all eager to build collective houses, 
factory-kitchens, and Socialistic cities. Through the 
windows could be seen crowds of workers rebuilding a 
destroyed world and looking forward to evolving a new 
architecture out of their own resources.62 
The Soviet state and its people, in Meyer’s account, understood something that a 
hothouse avant-garde, insufficiently proletarian despite its attempts to respond to the 
exigencies of the moment, did not—that “construction” (which for Meyer, as for the 
Soviets, took simultaneously architectural and socialist dimensions) operates on a scale 
that is closer to demography than any isolatable arrangement of forms.  
Having lived and worked in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1936—a period 
of great disillusionment for many who felt the promise of the 1917 revolution across the 
1920s—it is remarkable that this text conjures such an enduringly proletarian optimism. 
His disdain for the faculty of VKhUTEMAS accords with his insistence in his most 
known text, “The New World” of 1926, that “building is a technical not an aesthetic 
process, artistic composition does not rhyme with the function of a house matched to its 
purpose.”63 Meyer clearly would have taken no interest, as Ladovsky did, in deploying 
                                               
62 Hannes Meyer, “The Soviet Architect,” TASK, February 1943, 29. I am grateful to Ross Wolfe’s 
website, “The Charnel House,” for drawing attention to this article. 




the precepts of psychotechnics to bolster the arguments of any –ism or –ist. Despite all 
this, across the academic year of 1928–1929 the two were alike in asking how 
psychotechnics might reshape architecture’s vocational (and even scalar) relationship to 
the state—a change in Ladovsky’s psychotechnics that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
To approach this from another angle, however, might one see Hannes Meyer’s 
psychotechnics not as a moment of departure for the Bauhaus, but a moment of 
recognition? Certainly, Meyer differed strongly from Gropius imagining psychotechnics 
as a fully political project, a discipline according to which the discipline of architecture 
could be reframed. This was a scandalous proposition, one that to some extent led Paul 
Klee to resign his professorship. And yet, for all that, Meyer’s embrace of psychotechnics 
within Bauhaus pedagogy could also be seen as a foregrounding of something that had 
been latent all along, an epistemology of scientifically-considered perception that had 
guided the work of the Bauhaus since the beginning, as naïve (and sometimes inaccurate) 
as that attempted application of science sometimes was. Chapter three of this dissertation 
approaches this possibility through the twinning of applied psychology and rehabilitation 
in the work of Moholy-Nagy; Çelik Alexander’s Kinaesthetic Knowing offers further 
directions in this regard.64 Klee himself, despite his opposition to Meyer, offers another 
tantalizing piece of evidence in his alternative diagram for the Bauhaus curriculum.  
Walter Gropius’s version of the 1922 diagram, termed the “Idea and Structure” of 
the Bauhaus, is surely one of the most intensively analyzed diagrams of architectural 
                                               




modernism, European or otherwise. The Vorlehre comprise the outer ring, then one 
moves concentrically through a series of general principles through the study of particular 
materials before finally arriving the totemic Bau of the Bauhaus occupying the center. 
[FIG. 1.17] What goes unacknowledged in the endless repetitions of this diagram is its 
suggestive resemblance to the color diagrams of perceptual psychology—in particular, 
Wilhelm Wundt’s—which suggest something of the Bauhaus’s reliance on the color 
theories being tested in nineteenth century laboratories of perceptual psychology. 
Wundt’s initial diagram of 1863, from his Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und 
Thiersielle, locates the color white in the center of an identical configuration, the sum of 
all wavelengths of light, just as “bau” was to be the summation of the various materials 
and fields of study described by Gropius’s diagram.65 [FIG. 1.18] Nor was this simply a 
flat matrix; by the Grundzüge of 1874, Wundt made it clear that he had in mind a 
sphere.66 
This representation of color did not originate with Wundt. It had already been 
developed by the German Romantic painter Philipp Otto Runge, whose color sphere 
dates to 1807 (with his diagrams resembling those of the seventeenth-century Finnish 
physicist Aron Sigfrid Forsius).67 [FIG. 1.19] With white and black serving as poles, and 
with three primary and three secondary colors arrayed around the sphere’s meridian, 
                                               
65 Wilhelm Wundt, Vorlesungen Über Die Menschen Und Thierseele, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Leopold 
Voss, 1863), 154.It is interesting to note that this version of Wundt’s diagram positions red, blue, 
and green as the three primary colors, though his later color cone would return to a more familiar 
red, blue, yellow layout. 
66 Wilhelm Wundt, Grundzüge Der Physiologishen Psychologie, 5th ed., vol. 1 (1874; Leipzig: 
Wilhelm Engelmann, 1902). See also Rolf G. Kuehni, Color Space and Its Divisions: Color Order 
from Antiquity to the Present (New York: John Wiley, 2003). 




Runge’s Farben-Kugel influenced his friend Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, with whom 
he carried on an active correspondence about color from 1803 until his death in 1810. 
Goethe’s text—which Wittgenstein once argued sought more of a psychology of color 
than a physics—is the source of much of the metaphorical color psychology that would 
later be picked up by Kandinsky.68 This representational mode was further developed by 
the French chemist Michel Eugène Chevreul, whose hemispherical model (circa 1839) 
was used in creating gradations of yarn dyes.69 [FIG. 1.20] (This version eliminated 
Runge and Goethe’s polarities of white and black, which differed from Newton in 
arguing that black was not simply the absence of color but maintained a perceptual 
polarity of its own.) All three versions operate on the red–yellow–blue [RYB] system of 
primary colors—whose importance to modern architecture and notably De Stijl cannot be 
overestimated—and represent the consolidation of centuries of debate around the ideal 
primary colors into a fixed system that would supply modernism with its understanding 
of color combination. (The fact that scientists like Helmholtz, Maxwell, and Wundt had 
all been formulating the now widely accepted RGB model well before the Bauhaus began 
its work points to how much of their color theory remained grounded in the Romantic 
imagination rather than contemporary science—and yet the science around perceptual 
psychology was instrumental in the Bauhaus curriculum.) 
Itten acknowledged his debts to Runge, and for all of the Goethean desire for 
meaning imbued in his color schemes, Itten nevertheless placed the physicist, the 
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physiologist, and the psychologist in leading roles in understanding “psychophysiological 
color reality.”70 (For all of this appeal to science, however, Itten’s primary colors likewise 
remained doggedly incorrect.) His famous color chart kept Runge’s sphere intact on the 
top (with a circle of colors fading into white in the center) and added cuts in the bottom 
half, splaying them out to transition to black—the principle colors defining nodes from 
which twelve Mercator-like longitudes allow three dimensions to be folded into two. 
[FIG. 1.21] This device was Wundt’s, introduced in the 1893 edition of his Vorlesungen 
(and which undermines his previous RGB system by returning to RYB) and described as 
a cone—a Farben-Kegel as opposed to a Farben-Kugel—where white and black formed 
a vertical tapering with the circumference again defined by the primary colors. [FIG. 
1.22] This drawing was repeated often by Itten and his students.  
And indeed, its familiarity was such that when Paul Klee tried his hand at the 
same “Idea and Structure” of the Bauhaus pedagogy in visual form—also in 1922—it 
borrowed this split-and-flattened version of the Wundtian color cone as its basis. [FIG. 
1.23] Klee took a more rigorous approach to geometry than Itten, as his virtually endless 
teaching notes on geometrical construction attest, as well as to color; his diaries record 
him teaching the color sphere to the Bauhaus’s students.71 (Klee’s diagram includes 
bühne, theater, at the center of this configuration along with bau.) In the most literal 
sense, this might suggest reading the Bauhaus curriculum in three dimensions—a conical 
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or spherical ascent rather than a radial vector from circumference to center. Or, rather, 
instead of the typical interpretation in which these diagrams define a series of stages 
through which the student would pass—leading to the oft-remarked irony that Gropius’s 
Bauhaus never really taught bau as such, and thus never arrived at its own center—their 
indebtedness to color psychology might ask us to understand bau instead as something 
like a combination of visible spectrums, whereby the materials and discourses that break 
apart into “primary” components of the Bauhaus curriculum become bau when seen all at 
once. (Such an interpretation also might explain why bühne might be allowed to join bau, 
being a similarly cross-disciplinary ambition.) 
If there is a touch of poesy to this interpretation, it mirrors the poesy found in 
much of the Bauhaus’s engagement with science, frequently described as scientism at 
best. And yet it speaks to a recognition that outside its glass-skinned walls (where “the 
great symphonic orchestra plays Mussorgsky without baton or conductor,” to use 
Meyer’s phrase again in a different context) the world of labor, whether physical, 
intellectual, or artistic, and the mechanisms of perception that subtend it were being 
reorganized regardless of the Bauhaus’s supposed avant-gardism. Meyer made that 
explicit in his embrace of psychotechnical thought, which resulted in its own diagram of 
the Bauhaus curriculum. But these diagrams of 1922, in their borrowing from perceptual 
psychology to chart how the diverse strands of necessary knowledge combine to produce 
bau, are also vestiges of the total organization implied by post-WWI bureaucracies of 
vocation and management—reflections of the era’s “unity of science” that envisioned 




aggregative.72 At the center, or perhaps truncated peak, of these diagrams, taking the 
place of the color theorist’s white, could be bau or psychotechnics in equal measure, 
whether or not the Bauhaus always understood itself in those terms. 
 
 
Vocational Hygiene and Artistic Science in the Soviet Union 
In the Soviet Union, the ground had been well prepared for an embrace of 
psychotechnics, as it promised a new degree of empiricism that aligned with a prevailing 
suspicion of psychology as practiced in the Russian academy of the early twentieth 
century. Though there were some outliers to this academicism that resisted the 
experimentalism of applied psychology—A. I. Vvedenskii’s call for “psychology without 
metaphysics” or G. I. Chelpanov’s “experimental introspection,” to take two examples—
psychology in Tsarist Russia remained, as the historian of science Alexander Vucinich 
puts it, “an ideological crusade against the underlying materialism of modern 
experimental psychology, which was regarded as one more form of attack on the most 
sacred values of the established political order.”73 The standard for Russian experimental 
science in this period was set not by psychologists but by the physiologist Ivan Pavlov, 
whose vision of the animal brain as an economy of reflexes—a dynamic mediation of 
interior life and exterior stimulus—was central to the scientific ethos of the revolutionary 
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period. (Pavlov was following on the work of Ivan Sechenov, whom he termed the 
“father of Russian physiology” thanks to his 1863 Refleksy golovnogo mozga, “Reflexes 
of the Brain,” an upheaval of ontology that understood animals—humans included—as 
being constituted as subjects by their nervous systems.)74 Pavlov’s famed “Tower of 
Silence,” a laboratory with eight soundproofed rooms for animal experimentation under 
highly controlled conditions, had just opened in 1913, a space of experimental research 
that provided one model for an emerging form of governance that took experimental 
research to be a primary function of the administrative state. [FIG. 1.24] 
In that regard, psychotechnics and the experimental psychologies that preceded it 
proved sympathetic to Bolshevism in two ways—it embraced a mandate of quantification 
while also amplifying the politics of Russian physiology in the early twentieth century, at 
least to the extent that it countered the metaphysics (and thus the maintenance of the 
Tsarist power structure) that academic psychology had willingly embraced. These aspects 
would be repeated in Ladovsky’s embrace of psychotechnics—a term he introduced at a 
moment of some pressure to demonstrate facticity in matters of pedagogical achievement, 
as well as a moment when his own pedagogy was being derided as another kind of 
metaphysics, in the journal Lef, by a group of disgruntled students who signed their 
missive “Vkhutemaska.”75 Psychotechnics was one means of answering those students 
while also responding to the exigencies of professions under Stalin. 
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Psychotechnics also offered its own take on a “science of work” which had for 
decades taken workers (whether physical or intellectual laborers) as carriers of energy. 
Anson Rabinbach has documented the “social energeticism” of many European thinkers 
at the cusp of the twentieth century.76 In the Soviet Union, as Alla Vronskaya has 
observed in her dissertation on the “productive unconscious” of architecture and 
experimental psychology in the post-Revolutionary USSR, this “energetics” was both 
subjective and infrastructural—the economy (of work and mental life) in the individual 
was to be paired with “the electrification of the entire country,” as Lenin famously 
described one of the pillars of communism.77 As the individual’s nervous system became 
an object of state interest, so too did the government electrification bureaucracy of 
GOELRO become something like an infrastructural nervous system on a continental 
scale. In the early years of the revolution, this strand of thought took the form of 
discourses like Alexandr Bogdanov’s “tektology” or Alexei Gastev’s famed Central 
Labor Institute, TsIT (within which Isaac Spilrein proposed psychotechnics as an 
alternative to Gastev’s more strictly Taylorist and mechanical vision of the science of 
work).78 
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1921 marked the first conference on the scientific organization of labor, nauchnoi 
organizatsii truda [NOT] in the Soviet Union. As one Brezhnev-era historian from 
Moscow put it,  
the fact is that, though the overwhelming majority of 
research in this era on the scientific organization of labor 
was conducted in a comprehensive manner, in each science 
internal contradictions were ripening … for example, an 
increasing stratification of “general psychologists” and 
“psychotechnicians.” Occupational hygiene had, in this 
period, already begun to break further and further from 
psychology and turn into a poisonous toxicology.79 
The notion of “occupational hygiene,” which appeared as a grim specter in retrospect, 
received considerable interest even in pre-revolutionary Russia. At the time, it was often 
positioned as an antidote to the excesses of Taylorism, insisting on understanding 
productivity in relation to a larger social body.80 A Department of Hygiene was instituted 
at Moscow University in 1882 under Fyodor Erisman, who five years before had written 
The Occupational Hygiene of Intellectual and Physical Labor. Written in response to 
Marx’s Capital, it included those discourses still associated with “hygiene” today—
management of water, bacteria, etc.—alongside aspects that would now be ascribed to 
fields like environmental psychology.81 This was a vision of hygiene that implied not 
only the biopolitical management of bodies but a matching commitment to the 
management of the intellect. 
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Most vital to the importation of psychotechnics and its “scientifically correct 
means” to the Soviet context was its compatibility with the Marxist mandate for 
dialectical materialism. The psychologist Lev Vygotsky—the first to fully embrace the 
Marxist outlook within the field of psychology—was committed to understanding the 
“New Soviet Man … on the basis of a theory of mind that assigned primary importance 
to the role of society,” emphasizing external factors over “the isolated and independent 
activity of the mind.”82 As Ladovsky’s Rationalism was rubbing up against its proscribed 
disciplinary boundaries—searching for new techniques with which to expand 
architecture’s purview and shift its focus—the field of Soviet psychology found itself at a 
similar crossroads, as described by the young Vygotsky. “The center has shifted in the 
history of science,” he wrote, and “what was at the periphery became the center of the 
circle.” This new center took shape as a burgeoning interest in applied psychology, and 
the impetus behind the shift was the Revolution and its imperative to reorganize 
professional structures. Vygotsky, like Münsterberg many years earlier, was a student of 
the German Wilhelm Wundt, accounting for their sympathetic approaches, and while 
Vygotsky had his doubts about the foundations of Münsterbergian psychotechnics, he 
recognized their applicability to the Soviet situation: “Despite the fact that it has 
compromised itself more than once, that its practical meaning is very close to zero and 
the theory often ludicrous, its methodological meaning is enormous.” Quoting the Book 
of Psalms, no less, he posited that “the principle and philosophy of practice is—once 
again—the stone which the builders rejected and which became the head stone of the 
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corner.”83 Vygotsky was among those figures instrumental in establishing a theoretical 
and practical transfer of Münsterbergian thought to Moscow intellectual circles—a new 
form of investigation into the “sought-for general science” of the nascent Marxist state 
that “seemed not only a possible but an obligatory goal.”84 
Vygotsky’s theorization of psychology was critical in two ways. Firstly, it 
expanded “isolated” laboratory research into the social realm (an opening of the 
experimental black box that employs a “process-oriented rather than entity-oriented 
approach”).85 Moreover, it introduced the Marxist political imperative that pervaded no 
small number of intellectual pursuits in the unsettled climate of the years of the New 
Economic Policy. “Unlike most of his American colleagues,” wrote one American 
psychologist in 1934 (after Stalin’s Cultural Revolution had concretized the state’s 
interest in laboratory psychology as a strictly productionist tool), “the Soviet psychologist 
is really not just a laboratory experimentalist, a fact-finder who finds facts to be used 
somewhere, by someone, some time. He is above all a scientific worker who is to further 
and promote the cause of socialist construction.”86 This materialist bent—which was to 
transcend disciplinary specificity and imply a larger political organization—was critical 
in the reception of the applicability of psychotechnics, and complicates the common 
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assumption that the appearance of psychotechnics within architectural pedagogy, and in 
particular the case of Ladovsky, was about bolstering a sense of individuated subjectivity. 
Nor was Vygotsky any stranger to the arts. After being deposed from INKhUK in 
1921, Kandinsky founded the Gosudarstvennaia Akademiia Khudozhestvennykh Nauk 
[GAKhN], the State Academy of Artistic Sciences—which found Vygotsky among its 
members, alongside many famed thinkers (Bogdanov, Arvatov, Tarabukin) and creative 
minds (among them the theater director Stanislavsky, who, on the basis of his time at 
GAKhN, borrowed the term “psychotechnic” to describe his methods).87 Rather than the 
“boisterous avant-gardism” and “clamor of the street” often associated with Soviet 
architecture of the 1920s, as Devin Fore puts it, GAKhN pursued instead a patient 
program of intellectual discourse and laboratory research, paving the way for the 
introduction of psychotechnics into the arts.88 From 1923 to 1928 it produced the 
influential journal Iskusstvo, or “Art”, alongside the GAKhN Bulletin from 1925 to 1928, 
each of which reported on the varied researches undertaken. Kandinsky did not stay long 
at GAKhN either, leaving for the Bauhaus after a year, and it was taken over by Anatolii 
Bakushinskii.89 
An archival diagram of the “Scientific Structure of GAKhN” makes the 
organization’s ambitions clear. [FIG. 1.25] Arrayed around the central “board” are a 
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series of departments [otdel] and committees [komitet], representing GAKhN’s ambition 
to host exhibitions, publications, a library, and finally the laboratory, which undertook a 
wide range of research in support of its various programs. At the bottom, a matrix 
intersects a series of “sections”—literature, spatial arts, music, theater, and the decorative 
arts—with three major “departments,” namely sociology, physiological psychology, and 
philosophy. The tabular ambition of this diagram is clear. Having decided on the tools 
through which artistic inquiry might be made scientific, such methods were to be applied 
uniformly across disciplines, bringing their means of evaluation into rigorous parallel. 
(Notably, psychotechnics were particularly useful in the music and theater sections for 
vocal performance—an interest which was paralleled at the Bauhaus in the work of 
Gertrude Grunow.) 
The chief architectural presence at GAKhN was the Constructivist Moisei 
Ginzburg, who wrote an entry on “Architecture” for a dictionary of artistic terms 
compiled by a number of the participants in GAKhN.90 Ginzburg’s definition hewed 
closely to his ideas expressed in Style and Epoch, which was presented in preliminary 
form within the Section of Spatial Arts on November 23, 1923, in advance of its 
publication.91 Moreover, his Rhythm in Architecture of 1923 was influenced by the early 
work of the physio-psychological laboratory, which focused in 1922 and 1923 on the 
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problem of rhythm in art, among other things.92 Rhythm was among the primary tools of 
the science of work, the Taylorist rhythms of mechanized production, and percolated into 
the whole of Soviet life. GAKhN collaborated with the colorfully-named Association of 
Rhythmists and pursued the artistic, experiential, and philosophical underpinnings of this 
eminently productive discourse.93 That Ginzburg would have had access to such a 
laboratory and participated in such scientific dialogue since 1922 complicates the 
schematic distinctions between Constructivism and Rationalism—but moreover might 
point to another source of motivation for Ladovsky to initiate his own laboratory, having 
missed out on participating in this more interdisciplinary and governmentally-supported 
endeavor.  
If GAKhN had, in its early years, focused on more philosophical proposals (by 
artists like Kandinsky and Malevich), it became increasingly laboratory-like as the years 
passed. By 1925 there was an established Commission for the Study of Spatial 
Perception, which pursued many of the questions that would preoccupy Ladovsky, 
though often from more generalist perspectives.94 The laboratory’s work reaches 
something of a crest at the end of 1925 and the beginning of 1926, which perhaps 
accounts for some of Ladovsky’s renewed interest in the idea of the laboratory which, for 
him, had largely lain dormant since the early 1920s. In February 1925, the 
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psychotechnician Pavel Rudik joined the Section of Spatial Arts after having worked for 
the Central Institute of Physical Culture and the psychological laboratory of the Academy 
of Social Education.95 (This was an institutional landscape in which teaching in the 
universities was typically a separate appointment from one’s research or laboratory work 
with a governmental agency or academy.) Though there are no known exchanges 
between Ladovsky and Rudik, he was a plausible vector among others for Ladovsky’s 
encounter with psychotechnics given his involvement in the Spatial Arts sector of 
GAKhN and his own prolific publication record. Rudik was a scientist who moved freely 
between the laboratories of the Red Army and the Russian Academy of Artistic Sciences. 
That June, he proposed a research project on “The Influence of Aesthetic Impressions in 
the Flow of Reaction Processes.”96 In 1927—the same year as he became one of the 
founding board members of the All-Russian Psychotechnical Society, led by Spilrein—
Rudik published Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi [Psychotechnical Tests 
of Communication Workers], which offers a wealth of written and laboratory tests that 
would have provided food for thought for any number of psychotechnically-inclined 
practitioners in other fields.97  
Among the suggestive diagrams in the book is Rudik’s written “Test for 
Ascertaining the Metrics of the Eye”—glazomera being “metrics of the eye” and 
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providing the same root that Ladovsky used for his instruments. [FIG. 1.26] This diagram 
is accompanied by a spoken instruction, which offers an indication of the general tenor of 
these kinds of tests, and bears quoting in its entirety though it is only an example among a 
myriad of tests described in Rudik’s book: 
Attention. Listen closely. On this page, you see a line that 
has been drawn twice and is marked with the letter A. This 
line serves as nothing more than a scale. Guided by this 
scale, you will have to do the following work: You should, 
by eye, without making any measurements, determine how 
many times the length of the segment A is contained in 
each of the ten given lines, and write your answer next to 
each of them (on the board you will see where to write your 
answers. Perform this exercise completely calmly, without 
hurrying, moving from one line to another. When all ten 
lines are numbered, place your pencils on the table. Clear? 
Now get ready, take your pencils in hand. Begin.98 
These instructions speak to an atmosphere of workerly attention that is cultivated through 
psychotechnical testing—the following of instructions, down to the desired affect of calm 
efficiency and discipline that employers sought in their employees, was among the things 
being tested. (In that regard, a red herring—a line labeled “B” instead of “A”—ensures 
that the testee is listening carefully.) Moreover, it reveals geometric recognition and 
visual acuity as vital requirements for telephone and telegraph operators, pointing to the 
ways in which psychotechnics was always a science that embraced spatial intelligence, 
and that such spatial intelligence had been of interest to other fields well before the field 
of architecture picked up the scent. 
                                               




The volume continues with a plethora of examples of such written and laboratory 
testing. In an article by F. Kheifits, one finds tests that ask for jagged shapes to be 
matched with holes in lines. [FIG. 1.27] In another, testees would be shown twelve 
geometric figures for a minute and a half; they would turn the page and be greeted with 
twenty-four geometric figures and have two minutes to cross out the ones that were not 
on the previous page. [FIG. 1.28] Further exercises involve shape matching and 
recognizing the planar representations of various three-dimensional figures. [FIG. 1.29–
1.30] In a chapter on telegraph operators by A.A. Smirnov, one encounters testees being 
asked to select numbers spoken aloud from a grid, complete mazes, and sort beads. [FIG. 
1.31–1.33] Borrowing on a test devised by the German psychotechnician Walter Moede, 
testees would search out matching shapes (here using something like the elements of 
Suprematism—squares, circles, and crosses, among other abstract forms). [FIG. 1.34] 
The quickness and accuracy of the eye, then, was not prized only by architects, but by 
any number of professions that understood their work to be an interface between 
individuals and technologies, or—as will be explored in chapter two—individuals and the 
urban environment. 
The All-Russian Psychotechnical Society put out its journal, Psychophysiological 
Studies and Psychotechnics (again under Isaac Spilrein), between 1928 and 1934, a 
period that saw psychotechnics move from an initial phase of growth into its status as a 
vital governmental bureaucracy. After a trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1934, 
Ross McFarland, a professor at Columbia University, offered the following report on the 





Since the state pays students to be educated there has been 
a strong motive for careful selection. Institutes of 
psychotechnics have been established to investigate such 
problems. Over 200 laboratories have been organized to 
test for special aptitudes and physical disabilities in pilots, 
conductors, miners and factory workers. Elaborate fatigue 
studies have been carried on with the aid of physiologists. 
Researches in job analysis and the metabolic cost of 
different kinds of factory work have been made. Special 
attention is given to the safeguarding of the health of the 
laborer.99  
This description of the regimentation of personal welfare echoed Walter Benjamin’s quip 
that “the health of comrades is a prized possession of the Party, which, against the 
person’s wishes if necessary, takes such measures as are needed to conserve it.”100 The 
working subject—in capacities well beyond the factory—was to be fully administered by 
civic bureaucracy.  
It would not last. In 1935, a number of psychotechnicians, including Spilrein, 
were “unmasked” by Stalin’s government as the sciences came under attack as refuges 
for a pre-revolutionary intelligentsia and as Stalin sought “revolutionary expediency” 
from scientific and educational experts; Spilrein would die in prison in 1937.101 But for a 
brief moment, from the end of the 1920s into the early 1930s, psychotechnics obtained a 
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newfound ubiquity in the Soviet Union, and it was taken as fact that the possibilities of 
psychological evaluation had moved well beyond the traditionally Taylorist processes of 
brick-laying and industrial production. The optimism around the field, at the end of the 
1920s, certainly confirmed Ladovsky’s belief that “at the present time there is no field of 




Ladovsky’s turn to psychotechnics has been an object of some fascination for historians, 
even if one that is typically positioned as a marginal moment within the supposedly 
“lesser half” of Soviet modernism—Rationalism, as opposed to the more widely 
discussed Constructivism. And yet, the larger social and psychological history of the 
Soviet Union reveals this laboratory to be a moment of rare attunement to the vocational 
life being explored in other fields at the advent of the First Five Year Plan. Proposed in 
his Izvestiia ASNOVA article—under the title “Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture (By Way of Posing the Question)”—Ladovsky’s desire to bring the tools of 
applied psychology to bear on architectural pedagogy was instantiated at VKhUTEMAS 
as the Nauchno-Issledovatel’skaia Laboratoria, a “scientific research laboratory” that 
was open to other members of the architecture faculty as well. (It is often referred to in 
later literature as the “psychotechnical laboratory,” in deference to Ladovsky’s Izvestiia 
                                               





ASNOVA text, though it was not institutionalized under that name, nor did the laboratory 
work on Ladovsky’s projects exclusively. For clarity, this chapter will occasionally use 
Scientific Research Laboratory when referring to it as an institutional structure, while 
using the more familiar Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture in referring to a 
particular set of Ladovsky’s experiments.)  
The story of Ladovsky’s laboratory is also a story of archives and their limits, in 
that the bulk of what is known about the laboratory—beyond a limited number of 
published articles and still paltrier traces in RGALI (the Russian State Archive of 
Literature and Art)—was assembled in the 1970s through the interviews and personal 
archives gathered by the Russian historian Selim O. Khan-Magomedov. (Ladovsky’s own 
papers were lost after his death in 1941.) His account of the laboratory, published in 
Tekhnicheskaia Estetika in 1978 and followed in English by Senkevitch’s “Aspects of 
Spatial Form and Perceptual Psychology in the Doctrine of the Rationalist Movement” in 
1983, essentially set the standard for what is known of the laboratory.103 In the past 
decade, there has been renewed interest in the laboratory that recontextualizes this 
comparatively fixed body of knowledge—notably in the work of Margarete Vöhringer, 
who has discussed the laboratory alongside the cinematic experiments of Vsevolod 
Pudovkin and Aleksandr Bogdanov’s Institute for Blood Transfusion, and in the work of 
Alla Vronskaya, which takes account of Soviet intersections between architecture and 
experimental psychology, such as studies on wall painting and the design and planning of 
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the Moscow Central Park of Culture and Leisure, situating them in relation to other 
European thinkers.104  
In such examinations of Ladovsky’s work, the primary question has generally 
been how the tools and precepts of experimental psychology might change the nature of 
architectural design. This was certainly a vital aspect of the Psychotechnical Laboratory 
of Architecture, and the one most prominently discussed by Ladovsky himself. This 
chapter posits another possibility, that the laboratory served equally as a figure of 
vocational thought, one that takes the field of architecture as a participant in a larger 
conversation about the nature of design as a form of labor, and further, that this 
represents something of a turn within the laboratory rather than a self-evident outcome 
from its origins. Arriving at that understanding of the Ladovsky’s laboratory, however, 
necessitates understanding it first through its stated intentions as a potential instrument of 
design. 
The VKhUTEIN Scientific Research Laboratory, following on the model of 
Emerson Hall, was housed in a room painted entirely in black—functionally and 
symbolically vital to its recognizability as a laboratory. Only through the negation of the 
instruments’ spatial surroundings and a disarticulation of “architecture” from its spatial 
experience could the specific measurements of the experiments be deemed objective. 
Khan-Magomedov relays the story that Ladvosky’s students had to do the painting 
themselves, as the school’s hired painters refused to do something so unexpected—
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pointing again to the way in which “laboratory” is both aesthetic marker and functional 
environment.105 (Even in the administration of written tests, Soviet psychotechnical 
laboratories were careful to similarly neutralize their surroundings; an image of one such 
testing station, run by the Moscow Communal Administration [MKX], documents white 
sheets covering an otherwise typically-detailed wall.)106 [FIG. 1.35] But it was not only 
the space of the laboratory that was a Münsterbergian endeavor. “I can do no better,” 
Ladovsky writes in Izvestiia ASNOVA, “than to quote the works of Munsterberg: 
‘Psychotechnics cannot create artists… but it can give them all a solid starting point from 
which they can achieve the aims to which they aspire by the most scientifically correct 
means and by the same token avoid certain dangers.’”107 (Münsterberg amplified that 
point in a sarcastic response he once wrote to a critic: “We have in our laboratory a 
complicated apparatus with which we experiment on the psychology of poetical rhythm. I 
do not see how a poetical soul can hope in future to write a poem in good rhythm before 
he has at least seen a photograph of that apparatus.”)108 
Ladovsky’s hedging on this point is true to his source material—where the spatial 
arts are concerned, Münsterberg’s Grundzüge der Psychotechnik knows itself to be on 
mildly unreliable ground, compared to its earlier reflections on questions “social order,” 
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health, economy, law, and education. (In his Psychology: General and Applied of the 
same year, he refers to “cultural psychology” as “the outlying fields of psychotechnics,” 
an admission of its inherent limits.)109 Münsterberg regularly takes note of potential 
critiques of applying psychotechnics to art, answering them with an almost ritualistic “on 
the other hand” that argues for its possible utility. He argues that empirical psychology 
was “hitherto an application in the service of theoretical explanations”—evincing his 
intention to exceed Fechnerian psychophysics—and yet, in the same paragraph, maintains 
the centrality of the artist’s “artistry” as familiarly understood: 
the work of art should not be conceived with technical 
templates, but should be brought out of the depths of 
artistic intuition through unrestrained creative activity. The 
artist should not regard his work as an effect of calculable 
psychic processes … nor as the mechanical cause of 
psychic effects in the spectators.110 
Münsterberg matches his empiricism with something like an artistic metaphysics of 
“inner essences.”111 There is a “natural order” to his “Psychotechnik des Schönen” 
(psychotechnics of beauty), and indeed the fact that “beauty” was even the virtue at stake 
to begin with points to a different set of aesthetic ends than those pursued by Soviet 
Rationalism, even if Münsterberg’s rhetoric—with uncited echoes of the “will to form” 
explored by Alois Riegl and Wilhelm Worringer—would be appealing to Ladovsky:  
We experience inwardly what their shapes and colors and 
rhythms, their sounds and thoughts and words, desire. A 
work of art is beautiful when all this long-felt desire and 
will and striving are at the simultaneously fulfilled by the 
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work of art itself. Not that we desire the notes of the 
melody, rather that the opening notes desire the closing 
notes, and in listening to the final notes we experience the 
fulfillment of what the previous notes desired in us. The 
longing of the roof is fulfilled by the supporting columns, 
the craving of rhythms fulfilled by rhyme.112 
For a modernist architect looking for a scientific attitude toward form, there was 
surely both affinity and inconvenience in such passages. Münsterberg was interested in 
confirming the rules by which an artwork is understood to be great—for example, noting 
that the classical “golden ratio” of 34:21 was confirmed by laboratory experiment as an 
eminently “pleasing” one, or discovering, in an experiment that used white threads 
stretched across a black background, that alternating two different kinds of groupings was 
more legible to the viewer than using three or more kinds of groupings.113 Senkevitch 
observes a certain irony in the fact that Münsterberg and his compatriot Ethel Puffer 
found that vertical bilateral symmetry was notably pleasing—a finding that would not be 
preferred by either Rationalists or Constructivists.114 Münsterberg’s aesthetics were in the 
service of consolidating and explaining an existing canon rather than abetting in the 
production of new forms. And yet the implication that there could be a facticity to “good 
rhythm”—also explored in Moisei Ginzburg’s Rhythm in Architecture of 1923—or a 
“desire” on the part of spatial objects for a kind of self-expression was of immense use in 
justifying the pedagogy he had been pursuing over the previous half-decade.115 
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It is Münsterberg’s pages on Raumkunst [“Spatial Arts”] that pertain most directly 
to the perception of architecture.116 The first eight pages of the section treat the various 
“temperaments” of colors—a topic that was taken up extensively by designers interested 
in the problem of wallpainting, as thoroughly documented by Alla Vronskaya.117 Though 
Ladovsky included color in his psychoanalytical method, it served in a generally 
auxiliary role, and he was generally more concerned with questions of scale, ratio, 
rhythm, and weight—problems taken up by the remaining twelves pages of 
Münsterberg’s chapter on the spatial arts. He describes a number of experiments that ask 
for aesthetic responses on the part of the viewer—dividing lines into unequal parts, 
grouping threads in satisfying ways, selecting and arranging ellipses, framing graceful 
symmetries, and so on. These are experiments oriented around “the conditions of 
pleasure,” as Münsterberg puts it, as opposed to other research into “the technical factors 
from which the work of art is built up.”118 The former are inherently subjective decisions, 
Münsterberg acknowledges, though they become useful as principles, he claims, once 
aggregated and averaged. (This is a proposition that resonates in architectural history 
with Claude Perrault’s idea of simply averaging the column proportions of a series of 
agreed-upon classics to derive functional rules-of-thumb.) If such psychotechnical 
precepts do not produce good art, Münsterberg argues, they nevertheless provide systems 
of explanation and inspiration for an artistic process that is inherently more complex. 
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At stake in all of this is the fabled “space consciousness” of modernism. In Adolf 
von Hildebrand’s well-known Das Problem der Form—a text cited by both Ladovsky 
and Münsterberg—he describes spatial perception as follows: 
We live and move with a consciousness of space 
surrounding us even when there are in fact scarcely any 
spatial suggestions in that which our eyes chance to 
perceive. We do not ask how this consciousness comes 
about, on what sort of perceptions and impressions it is 
based. Nor do we demand of the perception that it shall 
demonstrate to us its spatial attributes, each time anew. 
And yet this consciousness of the existence of space is 
present even when we close our eyes.119 
In effectively accepting this definition, Münsterberg also takes it as something of a 
challenge. Can we not ascertain “how this consciousness comes about,” and “on what 
sort of perceptions and impressions it is based”? This was the project of the Harvard 
Psychological Laboratory, an intention that extended into Ladovsky’s laboratory as well. 
One might even say that Ladovsky takes this challenge one step further, in terms of 
Hildebrand’s statement that we do not ask a spatial object to “demonstrate to us its spatial 
attributes, each time anew”—what if buildings could communicate precisely those 
attributes? Münsterberg was interested in examining and scientifically re-articulating the 
principles of effective artistic forms; Ladovsky sought forms that speak of their own 
conditions of perceptibility, that articulate their own mass, length, angle, or volume in a 
way that makes these attributes the legible expression of architecture.  
In taking Münsterberg’s psychotechnics as a “starting point,” then, Ladovsky 
recast the work of the Harvard Psychological Laboratory as an existing and accepted 
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collection of precepts for the creation and analysis of new forms. In his Izvestiia 
ASNOVA text, Ladovsky lists a series of topics and their experimenters: “the equilibrium 
of simple forms (Pierce), unequal divisions (Angier), symmetry (Puffer), repetition of 
spatial forms (Rowland), vertical division (Davis), simple rhythmic forms, etc.”120 This 
list and its phrasings are borrowed verbatim from Münsterberg’s Gründzuge, with the last 
item conveniently abridged by his “etc.” to omit its author, one Robert MacDougall, who 
was in fact studying music. While music and architecture have long been described 
together as rhythmic arts, as Ginzburg’s Rhythm in Architecture does, there is a 
disciplinary specificity afoot here that Ladovsky elides. Indeed, Ladovsky’s rather partial 
citing curtails Münsterberg’s longer litany of the laboratory’s work on rhythmic elements, 
rhyme, the impressions of poetic language, psychophysics of melody, the resolution of 
dissonance, and so on—Münsterberg’s vision was of an artistic psychotechnics as based 
in the auditory as the visual.121 Troubling Ladovsky’s list further, some of these studies 
appear only in English, and not all of them are addressed at length in Münsterberg’s 
Grundzüge, suggesting a touch of borrowed credibility that was not entirely backed up by 
actual readings of the scientific literature. (This was not uncommon in the applied 
psychology of the era. Ideas and instruments cross disciplines and languages, and in 
doing so they encounter the friction of translation, or, often, their application in the 
absence of translation.)  
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The instrumentation of the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture was 
strictly visually evaluative, a tendency captured directly in the devices’ names, each 
ending in “glazometr” (literally eye-meter) with a distinguishing prefix. The Liglazometr 
tested the ability to perceive linear magnitudes; an unmarked bar faced the examinee, 
who was to slide a weight either by a fixed number of centimeters or a particular 
proportion relative to the bar (judged according to a scale marked on the bar’s reverse 
face). [FIG. 1.36] This instrument bore marked similarities to a glazomernyi apparat 
published by D’iakov and Petrovskii in 1928, effectively a room-sized liglazometr. [FIG. 
1.37] Similarly, the Uglazometr measured the perception of both exact and relative 
angles; the instrument was comprised by a rotating disc with a marked diameter line, 
which was then overlaid with second adjustably rotating line, again marked on the rear 
face with precise measurements. [FIG. 1.38] The Ploglazometr offered a more abstract 
metric of the recognition of surface magnitudes; a glass plate with etched lines was 
overlaid onto a composition of pure geometric forms, and the examinee was asked to 
position the plate to define particular proportions of the areas below. [FIG. 1.39] Hinged 
rulers could then be overturned to measure the precise positioning of the glass plate. 
Expanding these explicitly planar experiments into the third dimension, the Oglazometr 
tested the ability to perceive volumes of liquid in differently shaped flasks; the examinee 
would release fluid from graduated cylinders into the vessels, filling them to the 
requested proportion. [FIG. 1.40] In each case, one of the principle tools of the 
architect—a graduated scale—would be concealed to become the means of judgment. 
The results would be carefully logged, tabulated, and recombined to offer an analytical 




Such instruments, in replacing “subjective” vision with definable variables of 
difference, arrive at something like the “personal equation” of nineteenth-century 
astronomical observation. They also suited Münsterberg’s belief, articulated in 
Psychology and Industrial Efficiency [1913], that while children and young adults “may 
find out when they are favored with a special talent for art or music or scholarship … 
they hardly ever know that their attention, or their memory, or their will, or their 
intellectual apprehension, or their sensory perceptions, are unusually developed in a 
particular direction.”122 Münsterberg would go on to note in the same book that the job 
requirements assembled by “various vocational institutes … seldom goes beyond 
commonplaces,” offering as evidence the frequently expressed truism that “the future 
architectural designer … must have creative ability, artistic feeling, and power to 
sketch.”123 These four devices of Ladovsky’s do not register formal preference, nor do 
they judge “talent” as a whole, but simply offer subtler metrics of the individual eye—
and one could note that these metrics are predominantly two-dimensional and, when 
spatial, exist at a remove from spatial experience, rather than allowing the eye to be 
immersed. The results of these experiments, based largely in graphical judgment, apply 
more to the compositional than the constructional. And yet they were meant to capture an 
abstracted sense of the accuracy of the eye. 
An outlier among these instruments, though most representative of a certain 
strand of Ladovsky’s interests, was the Prostrometr. [FIG. 1.41] It offered a complex 
assembly of adjustable horizontal and fixed vertical planes, which were reconfigurable 
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into various positions; the examinee, having no firmly horizontal reference, would judge 
their comparative flatness and the spatial dynamism brought on by their misalignment (in 
the form of the instrument itself, one thinks of the intersecting roof planes of Melnikov’s 
1925 pavilion in Paris, a competition in which Ladovsky took second prize). The 
Prostrometr was also used to study the effects of slope and foreshortening, with a series 
of objects placed on the angled surfaces and then examined through the viewing window, 
which could be used for a single view or for binocular vision. If axonometry—famously 
deployed by El Lissitzky—implied a floating, non-perspectival view on the world, the 
Prostrometr was invested in perspective, but not a perspective of horizon planes and 
vanishing lines, as the rules of architectural representation had demanded from Alberti 
onward. Rather, this was a vision of liberated and mobile perspective, of multiple views. 
The Prostrometr was not intended to duplicate spatial experience so much as to offer new 
angles of architectural judgment—a condition illustrated best by a 1929 cover of the 
journal Stroitel’stvo Moskvy, which includes Prostrometr-inflected images of a model of 
Ladovsky’s “Kostino” project. [FIG. 1.42] 
The apparatuses constructed for the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture 
are often taken as a direct extension of Münsterberg’s research, an assumption backed up 
by Ladovsky’s own citations, even if his Münsterberg was a partial one and his embrace 
of psychotechnics reversed some of its polarities. It was also in some sense a reversal of 
his own position on disciplinary boundaries. Ladovsky, as we have seen, argued in 1921 
that “we do not discard psychology but we say that we are not specialists in it” during a 




an area where we are Pythagorases, architecture.”124 These instruments, then, could be 
said to be a return to specialist’s knowledge of psychology that Ladovsky had claimed the 
discipline to be lacking—or, rather, in a mirror of Lissitzky’s idea of “architecture taking 
the measure of architecture,” perhaps Ladovsky simply internalizes them into an idea 
about architectural knowledge that is distinct from the psychotechnics being pursued by 
trained practitioners of experimental psychology. 
It remains a curiosity of Anatole Senkevitch’s account of Ladovsky’s interests in 
applied psychology that the Scientific Research Laboratory is almost entirely absent, 
relegated discreetly to the footnotes. For Senkevitch, “contemporary experimental 
findings in perceptual psychology”—by which one imagines he is referring to the cited 
list of work at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory by Münsterberg and his students—
allowed Ladovsky, Krinsky, and Dokuchaev to  
develop an objective framework of formal principles for 
organizing the elements of their new design vocabulary into 
a dynamic architectural whole. The facts of perceptual 
psychology were employed not as determinants of a style, 
but as a principle for organizing the design process and 
cultivating in the designer a dynamic three-dimensional 
manner of conceiving architectural form and space.125 
The goals he outlines here are not ones that would be supported by the kind of 
instrumentation Ladovsky constructed, even if the language of “organization” was 
common in psychotechnics. Ladovsky’s 1926 text—the text that Senkevitch most relies 
on—imagines a comparatively direct translation from psychotechnical means to the 
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design of architecture, even if the tests implied by the actual apparatuses seem not to bear 
this out.  
What to make of this discrepancy? Perhaps Senkevitch is simply interested in a 
more formally-oriented reading of Ladovsky’s work and pedagogy, one that necessarily 
overlooks the experimental materialism of the laboratory itself. But perhaps Senkevitch’s 
account also helps us take note of a shift in the nature of Ladovsky’s endeavor by 
marking the intentions at the beginning, but not the results at the end, of the 
Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture. In this regard, one might take note of the 
fact that the building of Ladovsky’s instruments, with the assistance of a student named 
Frolovksy, is recorded by the Georgii Krutikov (the laboratory assistant and secretary) as 
taking place between November 15, 1927 and January 15, 1928, a full year and a half 
after Ladovsky’s first texts on the matter. (The Uglazometr is not listed among these, 
suggesting that it came later.)126 Ladovsky’s apparatuses are typically taken as a logical 
extension of his Izvestiia ASNOVA text, as seemingly self-evident outcomes of an idea set 
in motion in 1926. What happens if we attend instead to the possible discontinuities 
between text and apparatus? What, exactly, are these instruments manifestos of? What 
were the changing stakes of psychotechnics at a moment when debates were raging at 
VKhUTEMAS around the question of architecture’s role in the making of socialism, as 
the graphical expressiveness of Novyi byt [“the new everyday life”] of the New Economic 
Plan was gradually being replaced by a still more productivist mandate? 
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Krutikov’s Flying City and the Qualifications Committee 
An oblique but telling way into these questions could take the form of a more specific 
question, asking how the supposed rigors of laboratory work were reconciled with some 
of the diploma projects being concurrently produced in the architecture faculty, like 
Georgii Krutikov’s famous Flying City. Rereading the Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture through Krutikov, as an exemplary student of the architecture faculty and as 
the laboratory’s intimately engaged assistant and secretary, offers some directions—
allowing for a reconsideration of both the laboratory and Krutikov himself, long clichéd 
in surveys of Soviet modernism as a fantastical provocateur, and making evident a shift 
in the nature of architectural psychotechnics as practiced at VKhUTEMAS and its 
successor, VKhUTEIN. Being both a student and a researcher in Ladovsky’s lab, 
Krutikov, I argue, was both symptom and agent of this turn. His work was evidently 
shaped by Ladovsky’s pedagogy—in the introductory courses as well as more intensive 
studies later. Moreover, though, it is through Krutikov’s projects at the Psychotechnical 
Laboratory of Architecture that Ladvosky’s own propositions get reoriented, away from a 
spatially-analytical model (his “psychoanalytic method”) and toward a subjectively-
analytical model that moved toward the problem of architectural “qualifications.” 
Originally titled simply “Plan of a City,” the Flying City has since become an 
icon of the utopian imagination cultivated in the heady 1920s. Comprised of a series of 
ring-shaped settlements seemingly pulled up into the sky by a series of round, tiered 
masts, he portrays these as airborne groupings of dom-kommuna, communal homes. 




earth, a tear-shaped vehicle with a pathos-laden reclining chair and lonely stickshift.) 
[FIG. 1.44] The project is typically explained as a part of a Soviet “fascination with 
aeronautics … a kind of fear of not flying, of remaining earthbound.”127 These are the 
words of the historian Richard Stites, who rightly links the project to an extensive interest 
in flight and rocketry that percolated into the work of artists and designers like 
Mayakovsky and Tatlin (an interest of Krutikov’s since childhood). This was a 
contemporaneous interpretation as well. “Soviet Jules Vernes—VKhUTEMAS Prepares 
Not Builders, But Dreamers,” a headline in Postroika read.128 
In a written evaluation of Krutikov’s time as a student, prepared in advance of the 
fall of 1928, Ladovsky admitted of the Flying City that “in his diploma project, Krutikov 
came up with a peculiar look forward, more so than is typically accepted in the planning 
of cities.” But Ladovsky goes on to insist on its scientific validity as well, itemizing 
Krutikov’s researches into 
1/ the expressiveness of airborne static forms 
2/ forms moving in the air 
3/ composition of form and their articulation on the 
principle of similarity 
4/ the expressiveness of weight and resistance in a new 
environment, scale, and a number of other architectural 
principles that are a necessary part of a mobile and 
suspended architecture.129 
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That Ladovsky would write about Krutikov’s work in this light is also, to some extent, a 
product of the occasion for which he was doing the writing. This document is drawn from 
a thick folder in the archives of RGALI containing the work of the architecture faculty’s 
“qualifications committee,” instituted just before the beginning of the First Five Year 
Plan. The committee was to be comprised of five members of the architecture faculty (the 
rector, a representative from the presidium, and three additional professors) alongside 
four members from such government organizations as Gospromstroi (the state 
organization for industrial building) and Mossoviet (the Moscow city council). 
Graduating students would present their work to the panel and respond to questions, after 
which there would be readings of two written kharakteristika—descriptions of 
characteristics—evaluating the student’s body of work alongside his or her professional 
activities and presence within the school.130 Ladovsky’s text on Krutikov was an example 
of such a kharakteristika, and considering the level of controversy generated by the 
Flying City, little wonder that he sought to portray this diploma project in the most 
rigorous, research-oriented terms possible. 
And perhaps this is not such a distortion of the project—as the story goes, 
Krutikov’s initial diploma review included only his research, and he was given additional 
time to prepare the design drawings that are known today.131 If the charismatic sketches 
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of an airborne, radially-symmetrical urbanism are what have survived within architectural 
discourse, the substrate for this proposition took the form of sixteen boards of 
photographic collage dealing with technical concerns (“the visual distortion of moving 
forms,” “the composition of moving structures”), disciplinary histories (“portability of 
mobile structures,” “the evolution of buildings, from wooden huts to skyscrapers”), and 
metaphysical propositions (“man’s aspiration to extend his horizons, expanding his 
perceptions of Earth and the universe,” “dreams and fantasies”).132 [FIG. 1.45 and 1.46] 
These research panels evince Krutikov’s obsession with flight, certainly, but they are 
moreover an in-depth evocation of the modern city as it existed, a place of speed, motion, 
and mechanization—a reading of the city that would have importance for ASNOVA’s 
urbanism, discussed in chapter two of this dissertation. 
Ladovsky’s evaluation of Krutikov went still further, however, and Krutikov 
himself proves to be a central protagonist in the work of the laboratory. During his final 
year as a student of Ladovsky’s he completed a project titled “The Psychotechnical 
Examination of Abilities Concerning the Architectural Combination of Forms in 
Space”—a piece of research that marked its author as a “serious and desirable worker,” 
according to Ladovsky’s kharakteristika of Krutikov.133 (This research, as well as a semi-
circular housing proposal he undertook during his fourth year of studies, appear in this 
document before Ladovksy arrives at the Flying City—more sober investigations, 
perhaps.) This was a paper-based experiment (following on a long line of pencil-and-
paper psychotechnical tests) that anticipated the instruments of measurement still to 
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come, relying on mathematical theories to define the parameters of the “unique 
arrangements” that this research sought. [FIG. 1.47] If there is still an aspect of the 
compositional to this research, it is a critical moment in displacing the object of 
judgement for the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture—it is no longer the 
architectural form that is at stake in Krutikov’s research in the fall of 1927, but the 
architectural observer. 
That “space”—prostranstvo in Russian—was to be the primary medium of 
architecture was no mere poetics. The “space consciousness” discussed by any number of 
feverishly rhetorical modernists tends away from Hildebrand’s perceptual diagnoses and 
toward something of an ecstatic phenomenology of lightness and scale, as in the famous 
silos and grain elevators of Mendelsohn, Le Corbusier, and Gropius; for other designers, 
“space” was an alibi for eschewing materiality and decoration as determinants of 
architectural merit. Ladovsky’s use of the term, by contrast, was a more technical one, 
stemming from his readings in nineteenth century perceptual psychology, and one that 
begat a need for further terminology.134 Of particular importance were the two fairly 
interchangeable categories of “spatial giftedness” [prostranstvennoi odarennosti] and 
“spatial ability” [sposobnosti prostranstvennogo] that helped to measure one’s capacity 
for architectural design, and which could be broken down further into discrete 
elements—abilities related to spatial coordination (vertical and horizontal), spatial 
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orientation, spatial representation, spatial imagination, and spatial combinatorials.135 Ever 
flight-minded, Krutikov described the necessity of testing for such variables by 
referencing “the identification of a sense of equilibrium and an ability to balance” as a 
precursor to becoming a pilot.136 A knack for spatial perception, for Krutikov, stemmed 
from the architect’s physical embodiment.  
Krutikov’s equation of embodiment and aptitude positions architecture as a form 
of labor, a perceptual labor not unlike that of other fields tested by psychotechnicians. 
This approach also invites a remapping of architectural work, and thus the nature of 
talent—a replacement of the Beaux-Art paradigm (in which the work of architecture 
involved the decorative articulation of drawing, and thus “talent” implied a giftedness of 
hand) with a modernist paradigm of spatial coordination, demanding new talents: 
The absence of any scientific approach in selecting the 
suitability of an applicant for architecture school is 
particularly and acutely perceptible at the present moment. 
The present view, in which a facility with drawing 
determines ability [sposobnost’], is unfounded. The ability 
to organize spatial form is not at all directly related to the 
abilities needed for planar fine art. On this, it is sufficient to 
recall that most sculptors are not capable of drawing. The 
strangeness of such a view has its own origins in the false 
statements of the architectural training and education of our 
recent past. The establishment of the correct determinants 
of the concept “architect,” naturally, will affect the quality 
of its productions—its architecture.137 
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To put it another way, psychotechnics promised a science not of architecture, but of 
architects. It is “the concept ‘architect’” that was to be tested in the rooms of the 
psychotechnical laboratory of architecture. For Krutikov and Ladovsky, this concept can 
be traced in the tabulation of the architect’s perceptual traits, on the basis of both written 
tests and Ladovsky’s apparatuses, which would be recorded on something of a report card 
which would remain in the student’s files and chart his or her strengths, weaknesses, and 
development. [FIG. 1.48] 
This is an evidently Münsterbergian idea—psychotechnics was always a science 
of vocational selection, and Ladovsky’s instrumentation was indebted to Münsterberg’s. 
(Krutikov notes that the laboratory’s tests borrowed from both American and German 
models.)138 And yet this is an unexpected outcome of psychotechnics in other ways. For 
Münsterberg, the vocation of the architect was framed not around a talent for perceptual 
tasks so much as a diverse range of skills and bodies of knowledge to be cultivated, and 
his perceptual instruments were intended more for understanding the mechanisms of the 
eye at large—its workings and its tolerances—than the calibrations of individuals. If the 
“personal equation” was a critical component of psychotechnics, in its embrace of 
metrics of reflex and reaction time, Münsterberg’s aesthetic researches (like his well-
known The Photoplay, published in the year of his death) imagined a more universal 
perceiving subject.139 And moreover, the proposition that “the concept ‘architect’” and 
the vocational metrics that would attend that concept would be part of the 
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psychotechnical laboratory’s research was notably absent from Ladovsky’s laboratory’s 
inception. 
The idea of an architectural laboratory—though not a psychotechnical one—was 
first raised by Ladovsky in March 1921, in his “Program for the Working Group of 
Architects” at the aforementioned INKhUK, whose leadership was recently vacated by 
Vasily Kandinsky. INKhUK’s insistence on “objective analysis” over Kandinsky’s more 
intuitive and synesthetic version of perceptual psychology accounts for Ladovsky’s 
measured approach—something of a “less-excessive psychologism” to answer the 
potential charges of Kandinsky’s critics:  
The psychology of perception, which, in the end, the means 
of architectural expression rely on, cannot be ignored in the 
group research work. But the Working Group of Architects 
deems itself insufficiently competent on the issues of 
experimental psychology. In the cases when the issues of 
psychology will be included as one of the comparative 
research factors, the group will axiomatically take the 
existing data of psychology as science.140 
When Senkevitch describes Ladovsky’s reliance on “contemporary experimental 
findings,” he notes this same assumption of axiomatic givens. Even so, “the 
circumstances require establishing and organizing a laboratory, sufficiently extensive and 
equipped for conducting experiments” with resources for modelmaking, graphic work, 
and the production of the “approximate architectural settings needed for creating even an 
illusory representation of space, without which architecture is unthinkable.”141 Rather 
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than breaking down architectural perception into discrete, abstract tasks, as his eventual 
instruments would, this vision of the laboratory implies a kind of scenography whereby 
architectural judgments could be made within a semi-architectural setting. 
Five years later, Ladovsky prepared his initial announcement of the 
Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture, dated March 29, 1926, and its concerns were 
not far from those of the imagined laboratory at INKhUK. They were also largely parallel 
with his other essay in Izvestiia ASNOVA, “The Basics of Constructing a Theory of 
Architecture.” The expressiveness of architectural objects, not the individuated 
perception of architectural subjects, remained Ladovsky’s focus in 1926. (As Khan-
Magomedov has noted, an earlier manuscript begins with a moment of Kantian 
metaphysics that was likely edited out by Lissitzky: “Upon perceiving a material form, 
we see it not only as ‘the thing in itself’ but the reflection, as in a mirror, of the entire 
world.”)142 This initial vision of architectural psychotechnics assumes the potential for a 
correctness of form, again implying a laboratory equipped for the judgment of 
architecture (rather than aspiring architects) within an apparently architectural context. 
“How many misunderstandings the laboratory could clear up in assessing the qualities of 
architectural work, given the lack of shared terminology among specialists,” he writes. 
What follows surely evinces memorable frustrations on Ladovsky’s part: “The 
randomness of evaluating competition projects is well known. The passions that arise 
between students and teachers on the basis of mutual misunderstanding cannot be 
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eliminated until the laboratory has established a proper basis for work.”143 The function 
of the laboratory, as framed in March 1926, is a legitimation of formal authority, one that 
takes the principles of Ladovskian Rationalism as the basis of judgment. 
The laboratory began its work on February 15, 1927, nearly a year later. That 
May, the school published Arkhitektura i VKhUTEMAS, a collection of student work 
between 1920 and 1927 (famous as much for the cover by El Lissitzky as the contents). 
After a preface by the recently appointed rector, Pavel Novisky (a move that 
foreshadowed a number of changes that would soon be undertaken at the school), Nikolai 
Dokuchaev undertook a ten-page description of the school’s pedagogy and work, 
including extensive description of the school’s “psychoanalytical method” for 
understanding space. (Dokuchaev had been involved in Ladovsky’s “psychoanalytical 
method” from the beginning, having been a member of the INKhUK Working Group of 
Architects since its inception in 1920.) Under the heading of “Scientific Research Work,” 
Dokuchaev lays out three critical threads that would reverberate through virtually every 
later account of the laboratory: 
1) analysis of the elements of architecture (the impact of 
architectural form on the psyche; general and frequent 
properties of architecture; the composition of architectural 
systems; chiaroscuro, color, and facture of architectural 
form); 
2) organization and economy (architecture’s relation to and 
dependence on social and technical-material factors; the 
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problem of standards in architecture; the scientific 
organization of labor in architecture; scientific architectural 
terminology); and 
3) pedagogy (methods and methodologies of teaching 
architecture; psychotechnics and architectural education). 
Method of research: experimentation, analysis, 
psychoanalysis.144 
The first could be said to stand in for a set of characteristically Ladovskian concerns, the 
ones that shaped his borrowings from applied psychology to this point. The second was 
effectively a recognition of how psychotechnics were already being deployed elsewhere 
in Soviet life, promising economies and efficiencies of construction. An example that 
spoke to the “scientific organization of labor in architecture” was provided by a graduate 
student named Grudzinskii, who had presented to the laboratory in October 1927 on “An 
Experiment in the Rationalization of Drawing Techniques.”145 (Vitalii Lavrov refers to 
this as “the project of the reorganization of the ‘drawing table,’” implying a still more 
Gilbrethian intention—and one might note that many of Ladovsky’s instruments bear 
similarities to the drafting table an architect would work on.146 The Liglazometr is 
something like a Mayline, while the Ploglazometr operates as if a drawing surface.) 
Similar concerns, where the construction industry was concerned, can be found in the 
pages of Stroitel’stvo Moskvy, a journal in which many architects of the period published, 
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including texts from Ladovsky’s laboratory. Under the heading of “Psychotechnical 
Work and Construction,” a series of stick figures perform construction tasks in “correct” 
and “incorrect” ways.147 [FIG. 1.49] Within Dokuchaev’s list, only the third item offers a 
glimmer of what was to come, listed somewhat opaquely as “psychotechnics and 
architectural education.” The possibility of a science of vocational selection for architects 
themselves had not yet been fully articulated in May 1927. 
The transition that takes place in the nature of the laboratory’s work that fall is 
first registered in an archival typescript of Krutikov’s, in his capacity as the secretary 
responsible for recording a “Report of the First Year of Work at the Scientific Research 
Laboratory,” dated January 15, 1928. (Krutikov was embarking on his Flying City 
diploma project that same semester, and had presented to the laboratory in October on the 
topic of “The Staging of Experiments with Moving Elements,” presaging interests that 
would be developed in his research for the Flying City and after.)148 The laboratory’s 
primary role, in this document, “is aimed toward the improvement of the qualifications of 
the graduates of the architecture faculty.”149 This is new phrasing within the laboratory’s 
writings, and the focus on qualifications (rather than the comparison and judgement of 
formal arrangements) necessitated protocols of tabulation borrowed from 
psychotechnical-vocational systems. For the fall of 1928—the semester in which 
VKhUTEIN also established its Qualifications Committee for the architecture faculty—
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the second-year students were tested, and it was proposed that these tests would help 
guide admission and advancement within the school. In October 1928, the principles 
were developed enough—though the research limited enough—that Lavrov would report 
that “the insufficient number of persons who have undergone examination does not 
permit any general conclusions yet, but the materials available to the laboratory already 
indicate the possibility of obtaining interesting results.”150 Also tested in that same month 
was the architect Le Corbusier, visiting Moscow in October 1928 to work on his 
Tsentrosoyuz project. As the story goes, Le Corbusier’s stereoscopic vision (or, rather, 
lack thereof) was inadequate for the Prostrometr, having been afflicted with diminished 
vision in one eye a decade earlier, and he failed the test—the most iconic modernist of 
the twentieth century lacked the qualifications prescribed by the Psychotechnical 
Laboratory of Architecture.151 
 
 
Characteristics and Qualification 
Kvalifikatsiia, “qualifications,” is an English loanword that appears in Russian around the 
Russian Revolution of 1905, though primarily in a juridical context at first. It entered 
more substantively into Soviet life through psychotechnics, alongside the word 
kharakteristika, characteristics, the title given to the document in which Ladovsky 
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offered his evaluation of Krutikov. A typical example from the year 1922—the year of 
the translation of Münsterberg’s Grundzüge into Russian as Osnovy Psikhoteknika—
would be a book like Characteristics and Qualifications for the Professions of Tram-
Drivers and Water Transporters. Published by the Central Committee’s division on 
tariffs and economics, the book marks those two words, kharakteristiki and kvalifikatsiia, 
as centerpieces of a new system of Soviet vocational management, drawing on the 
science of work and perceptual-psychological testing being pursued in Germany and 
elsewhere.152 Tram drivers were perhaps the most familiar subject of psychotechnical 
inquiry (for more on this, see chapter two of this dissertation), given the clarity and 
eminent testability of the job’s perceptual needs—peripheral vision, reaction time, a 
quickness of eye in surveying the urban scene. In the case of the Soviet Union, this level 
of vocational inquiry spoke to an economy in desperate need of remaking after the grim 
but recently ended years of the Civil War and War Communism, leading to a partial 
embrace of Western, market-based economic practices—the occupational administration 
of “urban” professions like tram driving among them. As the 1920s proceeded, this kind 
of thinking spread still further into professions like teaching. 
Its apparently neutral objectivity notwithstanding, there remained an ideological 
dimension to the results of this occupational administration. Understanding such jobs as 
vocations to be awarded to “qualified” candidates possessing the correct 
“characteristics,” as opposed to class-based sinecures, had been a rallying cry of the 
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Bolsheviks since the revolution of 1905, and the educational system was a chief target for 
change. “When the bourgeois gentry and their uncritical echoers, the social-reformists, 
talk priggishly about the ‘education’ of the masses,” Lenin writes in a retrospective 
lecture on the events of 1905, “they usually mean something schoolmasterly, pedantic, 
something that demoralizes the masses and instills in them bourgeois prejudices.”153 In 
that sense, vocational qualifications were to some extent conflated with political 
qualifications, in that collectivity and socialism were to be ingrained in this educational 
method (an educational tendency that took a darker turn with the rise of Stalin’s cult of 
personality in the 1930s). 
To the extent that Lenin took an interest in matters of education, it was largely his 
wife and close colleague, Nadezhda Krupskaya, doing the talking. Krupskaya had long 
held education to be a principle tool of the Revolution; at their first meeting, in February 
1894, she recalled Lenin, less convinced of education’s role in their work, laconically 
saying that “if anyone wants to save the fatherland in the Committee for Illiteracy, we 
won’t hinder them.”154 As scholars like Christopher Read have noted, Krupskaya took a 
comparatively liberal interest in educational models from abroad, including that of John 
Dewey. Krupskaya also strove to establish the development of whole individuals as a 
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principle of Bolshevik governance. In 1922 she founded the journal Na pukyakh k novoi 
shkole [Towards a New School], which became a central site for educational debates.155 
Krupskaya was appointed to be Anatole Lunacharsky’s deputy in the Narodnyi 
Komissariat Prosveschcheniia, commonly known as Narkompros and translated most 
directly as the People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment (or Education).156 Lunacharsky’s 
pre-revolutionary thought had been heavily influenced by the organizational science of 
his brother-in-law Alexander Bodganov (promoted in his 1904 Short Course on 
Economic Science, among other texts), an object of some suspicion for Lenin though he 
held substantial affinity for Lunacharsky himself.157 If Lenin took scant interest in 
Proletkul’t, the Proletarian Cultural–Educational Association, or Narkompros’s division 
for the arts, Izo-Narkompros—a pulpit from which Lunacharsky exercised considerable 
authority over the goings-on at VKhUTEMAS—he was often represented by Krupskaya 
in a broader pedagogical arena, and she proved to be a committed promoter of rethinking 
Soviet educational life. 
Not long after Lenin’s death in 1924, the Soviet government’s Institute for the 
Organizers of National Education (TsIONP) was reorganized as the organizational and 
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instructional faculty of the Academy of Communist Education, named after Krupskaya. 
In the spring of 1927—a critical moment in the timeline of Ladovsky’s laboratory—the 
Academy began organizing “central courses” for “upgrading the qualifications” of 
employees engaged in sotsvos, an abbreviation for socialist education. (Lunacharsky was 
also actively involved in these debates, insisting on an understanding of “adult pedagogy” 
that asked how a properly revolutionary subjectivity might be cultivated not only in 
education but in work and everyday life, a project that the avant-gardes and the Academy 
of Communist Education were both interested in.) This was also the year in which 
Rudik’s book of psychotechnical tests was published. 
By the beginning of 1928, the terminology of kvalifikatsiia and kharakteristika 
had fully migrated from the perceptual fitness needed for tram drivers to the realm of 
pedagogy, culminating that January—the same month of Krutikov’s memo that first uses 
the term kvalifikatsiia in reference to the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture and 
first speaks of its newly constructed instruments—in the Institut Povysheniia 
Kvalifikatsiia Pedagogov (IPKP), the Institute for the Advancement of the Qualifications 
of Teachers. Over the following years the IPKP undertook the publication of a new 
journal titled Pedagogical Qualifications, which consolidated a range of debates 
stemming from this importation of psychotechnical thought into the educational 
system.158 (1927 through 1929 were also the years in which Alexei Kalashnikov’s 
Pedagogical Encyclopedia was produced; John Dewey attended a conference in Moscow 
1928 at the behest of Kalashnikov, who found his works immensely useful in the problem 
                                               





of socialist education.) The IPKP marked a consolidation of the selection and retraining 
of teachers, a mobilization of pedagogy in the name of a productionism that would take 
the form, later that year, of Stalin’s First Five Year Plan. 
Finally, this period was also marked by the distinctly Soviet science of 
“pedology.” The term had been introduced in the United States in 1893, as an effort to 
bring experimental laboratory psychology into contact with pedagogy, and was promoted 
by figures like Stanley Hall, though it never truly reached the status of a stable discipline 
in the U.S. or Europe. The possibility of understanding the giftedness of children 
empirically was welcome in the Soviet Union, however, and this dormant science was 
picked back up by figures like Alexandr Nechayev and Vladimir Bekhterev; the 
aforementioned Vygotsky was also vital to the establishment of testing protocols and 
norms for the giftedness of children in the late 1920s. On December 27, 1927—again, the 
precise moment of the turn in Ladovsky’s laboratory—Krupskaya convened the First 
Congress of Pedologists, attended by some 3,000 practitioners, with the aim of 
“providing a correct basis for the cause of education of the new individual.”159 The result 
was a vast state apparatus of testing and evaluation on psychotechnically-inflected lines 
and even the establishing of an “experimental school” by the name of MONO. 
(Krupskaya saw herself as a pedagogue rather than a pedologist, but embraced the 
movement as valid and valuable research nevertheless.) As with any science of 
normalization, pedology was also a science of pathologization, identifying “problem 
children” and positing deficiencies of intellect in strictly numerical terms. Pedology was 
                                               




banned as a “pedagogical perversion of Narkompros” in 1936, effectively bringing this 
belated version of an expired science to a second closure—in part because of a return to 
more traditional forms, in Soviet education and elsewhere, but largely because the 
designation of “giftedness” tended to concentrate among the children of a pre-
revolutionary intelligentsia that was at that time being driven from power. (It was 
remarked by a Soviet historian of the 1990s that Stalin’s son, Vassily, was “not found to 
be outstanding” in his own testing, possibly accounting for further layers of 
antagonism.)160 
This pedological moment, which occasioned the rise kvalifikatsiia as a figure of 
pedagogical thought, was the context for the remaking of VKhUTEMAS into 
VKhUTEIN in 1927—a context that has gone unacknowledged in most architectural 
histories, which tend to emphasize the many continuities between VKhUTEMAS and 
VKhUTEIN between 1920 and 1930. This was a reorganization that also enabled the 
delayed instantiation of Ladovsky’s laboratory. If the early statements of the laboratory 
evince something of a holdover from Ladovsky’s longstanding “psychoanalytical 
method” and the ideas he had been pursuing since 1920, the construction of his testing 
instruments beginning in November 1927 reflect something else—an imperative of 
qualification that was pervading other aspects of Soviet life, and which had only recently 
become a concern of pedagogy and pedology alike. The Qualifications Committee at 
VKhUTEIN was a mechanism of performative self-assessment as the school took stock 
of a changing state attitude toward professional and primary education, using the 
                                               




trappings of academic bureaucracy to demonstrate the suitable “characteristics” of its 
faculty. In that sense, the invention of Ladovsky’s instruments late in 1927, and his 
testing of students across the year 1928, can be seen as something of a displacement of 
anxiety—from a faculty demonstrating its own qualifications to the codification of 
qualifications for its students. 
 
 
Managerialism and Ideology 
This shift toward “qualifications” in the VKhUTEIN and the Psychotechnical Laboratory 
of Architecture also maps onto a dark moment in Soviet architectural history, told with a 
sense of operatic tragedy in Hugh Hudson’s Blueprints and Blood. “Like Faust,” Hudson 
writes, Ladovsky “was prepared to sell his soul to Mephistopheles to protect his 
power.”161 In 1923, his position as VKhUTEMAS’s premier modernist contested by the 
Constructivism of the Vesnin brothers and Moisei Ginzburg as well as independent studio 
run by Ilia Golosov and Konstantin Melnikov, Ladosvky embarked on years of bitter 
factional infighting (largely played out between ASNOVA and OSA). In the summer and 
fall of 1927—the months leading up to the laboratory’s turn toward “qualifications” and 
the creation of his testing apparatuses—Ladovsky joined forces with Karo Alabian, a 
student agitator for the newly formed VOPRA, in making opportunistic attacks on OSA. 
VOPRA’s aim (which Ladovsky himself fell victim to in the following year, as he was 
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deposed from his leadership of ASNOVA) was a Stalinization of architecture, in 
particular the deposing of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia that Lenin had more than 
tolerated.162 Purges ensued, the debates between the Rationalists and Constructivists were 
discredited as a kind of intellectualism. By 1929, discussions were afoot for the school’s 
closure and reorganization in 1930, and the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture’s 
work would not progress beyond what had been published in early 1929.  
Seen in the context of the vicious proletarianism fomenting within the 
VKhUTEIN student body (as elsewhere in the Soviet Union), these events open up a 
series of conflicting readings. On one hand, Ladovsky’s laboratory could be understood 
as a response to a widespread embrace of both political and economic Stalinism, an 
anticipation of a hard-nosed quantificatory mindset to come. In this respect, the 
psychotechnical laboratory of architecture could be another episode added to Boris 
Groys’ The Total Art of Stalinism, had it taken Ladovsky as a point of interest, as Groy’s 
text famously argues for an inherent totalitarianism within the Soviet avant-garde’s desire 
to reconstruct life at all scales.163 Certainly, Ladovsky’s unsavory alliances point to 
complicities with—or at best, an inadequate rejection of—Stalinist politics. The 
laboratory’s transition, late in 1927, from a primarily aesthetic project (the perception of 
form) toward an administrative one (the organization of students on the basis of “spatial 
giftedness”) could easily be taken as a prelude to totalitarianism. 
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And yet the laboratory itself, despite an apparent ethos of precision in determining 
vocational fitness, was premised on a generalist view of architecture. At a moment when 
the reorganization of Soviet society was pushing toward something like a Taylorism of 
intellectual labor—ensuring a uniform “correctness” of fields like urban planning and 
socialist housing—the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture was interested instead 
in developing the figure of the architect as someone equipped to think and see their way 
through a range of problems. Vitalii Lavrov, writing about (and on behalf of) the 
laboratory, makes this argument in October 1928: 
Narrow specialization, preached by some “practices,” 
creates the danger of cultural immobility, of being unable 
to sensitively resolve the numerous and varied issues put 
forward by our time. The breadth of such questions, in 
connection with the demand that we give our buildings a 
socialist character, prompts the need for a kind of 
“despecialization,” the need to have a sufficiently deep 
general theoretical basis in addition to narrow 
knowledge.164 
This was a response to the proposition, by those students who would go on to form 
VOPRA, that VKhUTEIN should be training its students for the particular needs of 
particular state bureaucracies. (Lavrov’s position on this point was one shared by 
Krupskaya, who advocated for the “whole student” in favor of over-specialization.) 
Further, the laboratory described its work far more often as a teaching aid—a composite 
picture of a student’s perceptual capacities aimed toward giving the faculty the means to 
develop those capacities—than a system of singular judgment. 
                                               




Moreover, implying that the Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture was 
reading the tea leaves (consciously or not) of Stalinism would mean accepting the 
laboratory as a strictly ideological project, a performance in the service of polarized 
debate—between Rationalists and Constructivists, between the liberalism of the New 
Economic Plan and the command economy of the First Five Year Plan. Recalling again 
Vygotsky’s description of psychotechnics as a science of great methodological 
importance while its “meaning is very close to zero” or Münsterberg’s claim to a science 
of means and not ends, any number of contemporary thinkers would argue that political 
meaning is not what was at stake in psychotechnics—and that supposed recusal of 
politics in the name of expertise is where its politics lie.165 What it represents instead—a 
point taken up in my conclusion through Foucault’s notion of a “grid of intelligibility”—
are the parameters for how economic subjects within these systems are rendered as the 
subjects of governance. Whether at Harvard, the Bauhaus, or VKhUTEIN, the methods of 
psychotechnics proved adaptable to a range of socioeconomic programs under the banner 
of “vocation,” a form of resiliency that amplified its usefulness in charged ideological 
contexts.  
This political ambivalence, or perhaps oscillation, did not go unobserved by the 
protagonists of Soviet psychotechnics. That Münsterberg’s approach was grounded in a 
distinctly American conflation of discourses was both noticed and welcomed by 
Ladovsky: “The first to have recourse to [psychotechnics] were representatives of the 
vast industrial and commercial companies of America.”166 It also sat well within a larger 
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cultural pattern of importing expertise; in the early 1920s, “Amerikanizm” was still 
embraced from Lenin downwards as being integral to the dialectics of industrial 
production, a necessary phase to be overcome. This was particularly evident in the Soviet 
predisposition towards Taylorism—“the last word of capitalism,” as Lenin called it, even 
as it was embraced for its communistic potentials. “Like all capitalist progress,” Lenin 
argued, the new science of industrial management was “a combination of the refined 
brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievements in 
the field of analyzing mechanical motions during work,” adding that “the Soviet Republic 
must at all costs adopt all that is valuable in the achievements of science and technology 
in this field. The possibility of building socialism depends exactly upon our success.”167 
Lenin’s brand of Americanism—certainly more mechanistic than Ladovsky’s more 
psychical version—would eventually be “self-correcting” in its transposition of capitalist 
means onto an entirely different set of political ends: “The Taylor system—without its 
initiators knowing or wishing it—is preparing the time when the proletariat will take over 
all social production.”168 Managerial techniques were understood to be the underpinnings 
of capitalism and communism alike, and Lenin’s writings on liberatory potentials of 
Taylorism’s “enslavement by the machine”—a continuation of means and a reversal of 
ends—are vital to understanding how psychotechnics were so fluidly transposed between 
political systems. 
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Münsterberg, Meyer, and Ladovsky each had their own definition of “the concept 
‘architect,’” to use Krutikov’s phrase a final time, but what they shared was a sense that 
“architect” was a concept that required definition to begin with—a foundational 
assumption of vocational bureaucracy, and one which places architecture in dialog with 
occupations that were far more commonly understood to require particular spatial 
abilities or physio-cognitive attributes. The modernity of modern architecture, then, 
might be conferred not by the kinds of formal or technological criteria being debated 
across the 1920s, nor necessarily the proclaimed social and political aims of the architect 
(vital though they are to that history), but rather by the discipline’s participation in a vast 
remaking of professional life. This was a remaking that stemmed from the advent of 
applied psychology—a distinctly twentieth-century configuration and expansion of 
nineteenth-century epistemologies of human capacity—and, for these thinkers at least, it 
inscribes modern architecture within an expansive system of educational biopolitics quite 







Infrastructures of Attention: Perceptual Management and the Motor City 
 
 
   
 
 
“For a long time I have had in mind to speak to you when occasion served about a 
psychological experiment that I should like to see attempted if it seems to you 
practicable.” So begins a brief correspondence that passed in the winter of 1910 between 
two colleagues at Harvard University. The writer is Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., son of 
the renowned landscape architect and the founder of the first professional program in 
landscape architecture, inaugurated at Harvard in 1900. The recipient is Olmsted’s 
colleague Hugo Münsterberg, taking a year’s leave from his work at the Harvard 
Psychological Laboratory and in the midst of founding the Amerika-Institut in Berlin. 
Olmsted continues with a touch of flattery: 
It has seemed to me that it might be practicable for an 
ingenious and experienced experimental psychologist, after 
travelling with the purpose in mind over a given stretch of 
railroad such as the main line of the New York, New 
Haven, and Hartford, or the Pennsylvania between New 
York and Philadelphia, to frame a set or sets of questions 
which might be distributed to passengers on certain trains 
at a certain point or points by the train crews, and the 




not a little light, if competently analyzed, upon the actual 
reactions of the passengers to the stimuli of the advertising 
signs. I am inclined to think that the officers of the railroads 
could be interested to cooperate in such an experiment.1 
Olmsted’s interest in the attitudes of railroad passengers looking at billboards was 
inspired in part by a letter circulated by Massachusetts congressman Frederick H. Gillett 
and published in the Springfield Republican Daily a year earlier. Gillett, “rudely shocked 
and upset” by the proliferation of advertising along the train tracks of the Northeastern 
corridor, arrives at the idea of staging principled boycotts against companies who 
participated in this “obtrusive defacement of Nature.” [FIG 2.01] “I organized myself into 
a wrathful society of one,” he writes, “to abstain relentlessly from the use of the 
obnoxious articles.” (Gillett was partial to organizing societies of one, later earning a 
certain notoriety for being the lone congressional vote against granting statehood to New 
Mexico.) “If everyone who feels as I do would adopt the same determination,” Gillett 
continues, “I think we could speedily bring them to terms.”2 
Olmsted likewise decried the prevalence of advertising along such corridors, 
though his soberer proposition was that the sponsoring corporations might simply be 
dissuaded from the practice if they believed that their campaigns had negative effects. His 
letter to Münsterberg continues: 
I am not at all clear as to the probable outcome of such an 
experiment; I am not as confident as Mr. Gillett appears to 
be that a large proportion of the public is influenced 
adversely to the advertisers. I hope so; but I do not readily 
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satisfy myself that the advertisers are so largely mistaken. 
But clearly it would be interesting to know more about it 
and, if possible, to use the results of the experiment to 
check an essentially obnoxious form of advertising.3 
Might the tools of applied psychology, characteristically harnessed to the ends of industry 
and advertising, be used to curtail them? It seemed a tidy and telling experiment to 
Olmsted, the psychotechnical analysis of the survey becoming a form of activism against 
the perceptual pollution of exurban environments. 
Münsterberg responds just before Christmas, pointing to the methodological 
issues with Olmsted’s proposal along with the counterintuitive nature of how advertising 
leaves its impressions. 
It might well be that a large majority of travelers would 
truthfully report that they have come into an adverse mood 
from the advertisement and yet the advertisers may reap all 
the profit from their expense. This adverse mood involves 
an emotional accentuation of the impression by which the 
idea is much more firmly impressed upon the memory. 
What the advertiser needs is not so much a loving 
infatuation with the object as a ready reproduction of the 
name, whenever the situation demands it. The dislike which 
the scandalous destruction of the landscape awakes in a 
decent man is as surely forgotten as seasickness when the 
voyage is over and the barbarous firm has impressed its 
name on the passive imagination. If advertising were 
merely a question of liking or merely a question of 
memory, we could easily transform the whole problem into 
a neat laboratory experiment. But it is just the combination 
of these two elements which makes it extremely difficult to 
devise experiments which would do justice to the real 
situation of practical life.4 
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This last point reflects Münsterberg’s consistent interest in what he called “higher mental 
processes,” which understand apperception as a complex that should not be divided into 
discrete attributes, as much of the previous psychophysical research had done (and as 
many psychotechnicians continued to do). Münsterberg’s response further emphasizes 
that advertising was not a discipline aimed at questions of meaning or judgment, so much 
as one that oriented itself towards a subtler form of subconscious recall, one framed by 
familiarity and habit. This was a reflexology of sorts, where the source of stimulus was 
the ambient environment of the early twentieth century metropolis—received, as Walter 
Benjamin famously put it in a text that owes many of its insights to contemporaneous 
psychotechnical thought, in a state of distraction.5 
Olmsted was not wrong, however, to see the connections between Münsterberg’s 
work and the landscape he was observing—the railway and the advertising surrounding it 
were eminently psychotechnical sites.6 The newness and intensity of both railway and 
advertising, as part of a broader perceptual landscape, were both widely interpreted as 
demonstrations of the German concept of Nervenleben, literally “nervous life.” The term 
grew out of nineteenth-century psychology but had taken on a distinctly metropolitan 
character by the early twentieth-century, most famously formulated in Georg Simmel’s 
1903 essay on “The Metropolis and Mental Life.” “The psychological foundation of the 
metropolitan type of individuality is an intensification of Nervenleben, which follows 
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from the swift and incessant change of outer an inner stimuli,” Simmel writes, describing 
the “rapid crowding of changing images, the abrupt discontinuities within what one sees 
at a glance, the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions.”7 This sense of onrushingness 
should be read literally, in that the metropolis is encountered with a certain velocity (the 
velocity of train travel among them), as should the jarring discontinuities of the urban 
observer’s glance, emblematized by the chaotic crowding of advertisements in the city. 
Simmel continues: 
As the metropolis brings about these psychological 
conditions—with each crossing of the street, with the 
tempo and great varieties of economic, vocational, and 
social life—it demands of us, in the sensory foundations of 
psychic life, at the quantum level of consciousness, our 
organization as differentiating beings [Organisation als 
Unterschiedswesen], which strongly contrasts with small 
town and country life, with its slower, more familiar, 
evenly flowing rhythm of their sensory-mental life picture.8 
Simmel’s text is a diagnosis, and yet the concepts through which he undertakes that 
diagnosis—tempo, the scene of the street, vocational life, organization, the human’s 
capacity for endlessly rapid perceptual differentiation—would end up becoming precisely 
the subjects of psychotechnical study, an active program of intervention in the face of the 
Nervenleben of the metropolis. 
This urbanism of velocity and discontinuity, particularly as it pertains to train 
travel and advertising, constitutes the first three minutes of Walter Ruttmann’s classic 
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film Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Großstadt (1927), the film that gives the “city symphony” 
genre its name. The sequence begins with a series of abstract, graphic white bars in 
motion on a black background, through which flickers an equally abstract circle, which 
indicates something like a sunrise or, as it turns out, a railway gate lifting. Springing 
suddenly from animation to film, what follows is a scene of rapid and repetitive 
intercutting, of blurred motion, in which the viewer observes, and observes from, a train 
hurtling toward Berlin. The camera also rigorously records the advertising that lines the 
tracks as one approaches the city.9 [FIG 2.02] Pushing this trope still further, Dziga 
Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera, released two years later, includes an image of his 
brother and cinematographer, Mikhail Kaufman, mounting a camera to the nose of a 
locomotive, an alliance of transportation and image production that foregrounds the 
cinematic derring-do of capturing the speed of modern experience. [FIG 2.03] 
Or one might think of László Moholy-Nagy’s “Dynamik der Gross-stadt,” also 
from 1927, a graphical assembly across seven spreads that claim to comprise “sketches 
for a manuscript of a film,” and which stands as a canonical touchstone of the New 
Typography. On the first spread, the reader/viewer receives a similar introduction to 
Berlin (it has been speculated that Ruttmann knew of and was inspired by Moholy’s 
script). [FIG 2.04] As with Ruttmann, there is a segue from abstract forms to film: “First, 
animated images of moving dots, lines, which, seen in totality, appear (photographically) 
as the building of a zeppelin,” Moholy prescribes. “TEMPO TEMPO TEMPO TEMPO.” 
On the right side of the page, a director’s note reads “this passage as a brutal introduction 
                                               





to the breathless race, the hubbub of the city,” and the spread is rife with railroad 
imagery—photographs and diagrams of train signaling systems (“very clearly—up 
high—railway signals [closeup]”), arrows indicating the rhythm of crossing guards 
raising and lowering (“all automatic, au-to-ma-tic in motion”), and a textual invocation of 
the same shunting yards and rail sidings that appear in Ruttmann’s opening.10 On the 
following spread, he imagines a shot of “the belly of the train, as it passes, taken from a 
trench between the rails … the train from below: something never experienced before.”11 
In short, the railway, for Moholy and Ruttmann as for the broader field of 
psychotechnics, was a primary site for plumbing the perceptual nature of the early 
twentieth-century metropolis. 
Moholy’s “Dynamik der Gross-stadt” can also be taken as a remarkably concise 
account of the various strands that weave together in what could be called the 
psychotechnics of the city. The script goes on to visit such scenes as the Girlkultur of 
mass entertainment, the psychological effects of intercutting and closeups, the 
management of urban infrastructures, and a continuous vehicular experience of the city. 
If Moholy’s invention in the script of an “Association for Laborious Telephoning” is a 
touch of comic relief, he is nevertheless referring to the work of the 
Reichspostministerium that oversaw Berlin’s telephone operators and which was 
explicitly Münsterbergian in its administrative and training methods—the image 
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accompanying this quip is a number grid of the sort used to test potential operators for 
their quickness in number matching.12 In his contemplation of advertising, among the 
fields in which psychotechnicians had particular influence for typographers in the 1920s, 
he advertises himself through “illuminated advertising [Lichtreklame] with lit words that 
vanish and reappear: YMOHOLYMOH.”13 Berlin was something of a paradigmatic case 
in the psychotechnics of the city—a moment of embrace between civic government and 
vocational bureaucracy, documented particularly in the scholarship of Andreas Killen.14 
That this over-stimulating urban milieu brought anxiety and neurasthenia to a newfound 
prominence is implied in a photocollage like “Our Unnerving Metropolis [Unsere 
irritierende Grossstadt],” created in 1925 or 1926 by Moholy’s student Marianne Brandt. 
[FIG 2.05] Moholy’s “Dynamik der Gross-stadt,” by contrast, revels in it—assuming all 
of these strands of modern life to be sites for scientific and artistic invention, an approach 
shared by the psychotechnicians of the time. 
For his part, Münsterberg, despite suffering from nervous ailments of his own, 
had little time for how “society today”—singling out American society but certainly in 
tune with what was happening in Germany—“imagines itself to be the pitiable victim of a 
miserable disease—general nervousness.” His litany of urban stimuli could pass for 
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Simmel’s: “Every new invention and every discovery has hastened the whole rhythm of 
our life. And with the haste has come the noise. The metropolitan who has to think while 
the telephone rings and the elevated roars and the typewriter hammers must be a wreck 
before he is through with his work.” And yet, Münsterberg argues, “the miller does not 
hear the noise of the mill. No one of us feels the touch of his clothes”—an argument not 
far from Simmel’s proposition that a “blasé attitude,” or “the blunting of discrimination” 
was the human response to an intense sensory environment.15 The inherent adaptability of 
the human psyche enables him or her to adjust to metropolitan life—as does correct 
vocational placement and a tailoring of vocation to the sensitivities of the individual 
sensorium, as demonstrated by the primacy of occupation as a motivating locus for such 
experiences. 
Münsterberg was no urbanist—and yet, within his body of thought, something 
like a theory of the city emerges. It is not a theory of city form, or the embellishment of 
its spaces, but rather a theory of administration, one that takes the city’s citizens and 
workers to be objects of potential calibration, sortable and trainable in a manner that is 
not simply adjunct to the spatial functioning of the city but a central part of it. The final 
statement of this Münsterbergian strand of urban thought, though not its origins, might be 
found in Tomorrow: Letters to a Friend in Germany, published at the end of his life in 
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1916. Münsterberg describes the managerial milieu that would take root upon the close of 
the First World War, a tendency that was not confined to ideological battles but was 
rather something of an epistemological foundation on which those competing ideologies 
were constructed, whether in the United States, the Soviet Union, or Germany. Tomorrow 
is a strange and misguided book, certain in its faith that the United States would not 
intervene against Germany—Münsterberg was a vociferously pro-German correspondent 
of both Theodore Roosevelt’s and Woodrow Wilson’s—and that the existing forms of 
European governance would be kept in place after the war as they were the “outgrowth of 
historic conditions,” that “a president would fit into Petrograd as badly as a czar in 
Washington.”16 But his prognostications are somewhat more apt as he imagines a postwar 
world governed by the managerial fruits of the war: 
This war is first of all a war of technique and that means of 
science. The laboratory has equipped the armies and has 
triumphed on land, in the sea, in the air, and even in the 
ether which carries the wireless. But it was and is not only 
the war of physics and chemistry; the problems of 
economics and geography, of hygiene and medicine and—
if we take it with a grain of salt—of international law, that 
have called the scholars into the foreground. National 
efficiency can never again be severed from scientific 
thoroughness.17 
This relationship between applied science and a national welfare would become a 
common trope, taken up by figures like the Gilbreths as well (as will be discussed in 
chapter three). Münsterberg later describes this “scientific thoroughness” as a reform-
minded proposition, a tool through which to address “the problems of labor, of capital”—
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characteristic subjects of the science of work in the preceding decades—but also “of 
women, of the child, of sex, of vocation … the city problem, the rural problem.”18 This 
entwining of the political and the scientific would no longer pertain only to geopolitical 
conflict, and they were explicitly related to the administration of national and urban 
space. The machinery and techniques honed by years of mechanized warfare would now 
be applied to other fronts, particularly those of the domestic economy and the 
management of cities. This moment of demobilization, rarely looked with the attention 
given to mobilization, was of critical importance to the changing stakes of vocational 
management among other forms of urban administration. 
The experience of “total war,” then, might lead to a “total peace.” To put it this 
way would be anachronism, but revealingly so—as Paul K. Saint-Amour has 
documented, the term “total war,” though coined in 1916, was primarily debated in the 
interwar period. The qualities that describe total war had, of course, been present in many 
conflicts before the First World War, but it was the managerialism and top-down view 
enabled by aerial warfare that brought it into conceptual focus.19 Ostensibly referring 
both to the war that had been recently concluded and the seemingly inevitable war to 
come—the so-called “interwar” period was entirely conscious of itself as being just 
that—the concept concretizes distinct temporal categories of wartime and peacetime as 
well as the spatial categories of metropole and colony, with air-power theorists of the era 
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hoping to limit bombardment of the former while still utilizing bombardment to control 
the latter.  
What aerial bombardment revealed, if obliquely, was an emerging understanding 
of metropolitan modernity. Saint-Amour cites one Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, 
who describes the inevitable bombing of “those nerve ganglia of national morale—the 
great cities,” a phrase that seemingly inverts Simmel’s idea that the metropolitan subject 
internalizes the city through nervous perception, offering a tantalizing image of the city 
as a composite of nerves itself, a transfer from biology to technology that would be taken 
up by the cyberneticians of decades after the next world war. Summoning another 
apposite image, he describes the British military theorist Basil Liddell Hart’s vision of a 
“model-train England whose complexity, interdependence, and total visibility are also the 
conditions of its vulnerability as target”—as clear an articulation of “total peace” as 
any.20 The concept of total war, then, requires an image of urbanism that understands the 
city as a densely configured site of management and nervous perception—an urbanism 
that largely conforms to the dictum of “scientific thoroughness” of both vocation and city 
posted by Münsterberg. And indeed, one might imagine that a during-the-war vision of 
total peace like the one Münsterberg so vividly describes might even be the foundation 
from which military theorists could only then contemplate the category of total war, 
instead of the other way around. 
The First World War has long been seen as a proving ground for the managerial 
intellect, with Germany serving as a notable test case. What could be more symptomatic 
                                               




of this turn than Ernst Jünger’s notion of “Total Mobilization,” which famously and 
polemically argued that industrial mobilization had in fact elided the very distinction 
between war and peace, or a figure like Walter Rathenau, whose involvement in prewar 
German industry, then in the war ministry, and then as Minister of Reconstruction in 
1921 tracks the same administrative ambivalence between total war and total peace that 
Münsterberg noted in 1916. A more laconic take on this new model of militarism can be 
found in Siegfried Kracauer’s writings: “I recall the days of mobilization,” Kracauer 
writes, “when the minister of war, thanks to the organizational miracle of deployment 
plans prepared in advance, sat in his peaceful office with nothing to do while outside his 
troops were on the march. Admittedly, the war itself was then lost.”21 Indeed it was, but 
one could amend Kracauer’s conclusion slightly, to say that while Germany lost the war, 
the “organizational miracle” it embraced (and which was drawn in no small measure 
from American industrial science) ultimately emerged victorious, on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
Nor was this dynamic confined to the capitalisms of the Progressive Era United 
States and Weimar Germany. This administrative remaking of the city was likewise 
pursued in the Soviet Union as it emerged from world war, revolution, and civil war, 
where managerialism quickly transformed into the ideology of the plan—“plan” as an 
idea about economic organization, but one with immense implications for the literal 
planning of cities. Already in March 1918, as Russia was working towards disengaging 
itself from combat with Germany, Lenin was addressing the 7th Extraordinary Congress 
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of the Russian Communist Party in language that echoes Münsterberg’s future of 
“scientific thoroughness.” Lenin tells of “the transformation of the whole state economic 
mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that will work in such 
a way as to enable hundreds of millions of people to be guided by a single plan, such is 
the tremendous organizational task which lay on our shoulders.”22 This was a problem 
that animated the Soviet architectural avant-gardes as well—if organization is the 
paramount mandate of the state, what could designers do to “organize” architecture, in its 
disciplinary structures of qualification (addressed in chapter one) but also its urban 
forms? 
This chapter explores the importance of psychotechnics and railway 
psychology—later highway psychology—for how the urban street was understood as a 
landscape that simultaneously managed perception and managed risk. The episodes 
involved show an obsession with an urban subject moving at a certain velocity, casting 
the figure of the driver as a central protagonist of modernist urbanization, whether in 
Münsterberg’s interest in streetcars and streetlights or the work of Nikolai Ladovsky’s 
students at VKhUTEIN on the new Soviet city of Avtostroi, a name for which “Motor 
City” would be as good a translation as any. In relocating the lessons of organizational 
thinking and psychophysiology from the front lines to the city and framing them as 
contributors to a vocationally- and perceptually-managed “total peace,” one could say 
that Münsterberg (alongside Soviet psychotechnicians like Ivan Diakov and Nikolai 
Petrovsky and architects like Ladovsky) recast the urban environment as a battleground 
                                               





of sorts, a redeployment of Münsterberg’s “war of technique” on ostensibly peaceable 
grounds, with everyday metropolitan life cast as a kind of perceptual trauma to be 
ameliorated through design.  
 
 
Streetcars, Streetlights: Psychotechnical Landscapes of the City ca. 1913 
Frederick Law Olmsted’s intuition about studying the effects of advertising from passing 
trains, methodologically unsound though it may have been, proved doubly appropriate in 
that the railway had long been a privileged site of psychotechnical inquiry. For a sense of 
how expansive this interest was, the psychotechnical service of the German railways, 
under the auspices of the Berlin-based psychotechnician Walter Moede, tested over 
17,000 workers across the 1920s.23 Given the rise of vocational testing encountered by 
train engineers and conductors across the first decade of the twentieth century, who better 
to deputize as clinical assistants in the laboratory of interurban travel? And what could 
offer a more appealing scientific basis for understanding human interventions in the 
supposedly natural landscape of the exurban Northeast—at a moment when the 
professional norms of both applied psychology and landscape architecture were similarly 
just beginning to be established—than the experimental principles of psychotechnics? 
For the field of experimental psychology, the otherwise distinct actions of driving 
a streetcar or looking at an advertisement were both opportunities to confirm a particular 
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model of subjectivity tied to the human sensorium. “Consciousness is regarded as a field 
of vision,” as Wundt puts it in his Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie:  
Objects enter it and are at first only obscurely and 
indefinitely perceived, as those visual objects whose 
images enter the field of the eye at the sides of the retina. 
Time is required for the objects to arrive at the spot of clear 
vision … where discerning attention is bestowed on them 
and they are apperceived.24 
If “perception” describes the sum total of raw impressions that enter into our sensorium, 
“apperception” is our mind’s method of sorting those stimuli, by which objects in our 
Blickfeld, our “field of view” in Wundt’s terms, are summoned into our Blickpoint, the 
area of our eye which allows for sharp focus and clarity—an idea demonstrated by 
Wundt’s diagrams of the human eye and its varying registers of perception.25 [FIG 2.06] 
This is what Simmel meant in describing the human as a “differentiating being,” and the 
mechanisms (optical, nervous, and volitional) that cause us to bring objects into that 
Blickpoint was a question of the psychotechnical laboratory that applied to advertising 
and tram drivers equally.  
In 1913, three years after Olmsted’s letter, Münsterberg would write chapters on 
both “Experiments on the Effects of Advertisement” and “Experiments in the Interest of 
Electric Railway Service” in his Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, alongside entries 
on attention, economic psychology, telephone operators, sailors, and the economy of 
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movement—a familiar cohort of occupations and practices for psychotechnical study, 
“since we must recognize any science as technical if it teaches us to apply theoretical 
knowledge for the furtherance of human purposes.”26 In this text, he insists that the 
psychotechnician is “not entangled in the economic discussions of the day … He is 
confined to the statement: if you wish this end, then you must proceed in this way; but it 
is left to you to express your preference among the ends.”27 This is a common refrain of 
Münsterberg’s, imagining that expertise could be held above the fray of politics, a desire 
that becomes particularly palpable in his attitude toward advertising. But the application 
of psychotechnics in the varying economic contexts of the United States, Germany, and 
the Soviet Union does not demonstrate its neutrality. Rather, it shows the extent to which 
psychotechnics subtended them with an epistemic conception of economic subjectivity. 
Münsterberg’s comments on advertising and display align with the tenor of his 
response to Olmsted. Advertising, he writes, “is such an extremely trivial thing and so 
completely devoted to the egotistical desire for profit that it seems undignified for the 
scientist to spend his time on such nothings and to shoot sparrows with his laboratory 
cannon-balls.” And yet the concepts through which advertising operates—their embedded 
memory-value, attention-value, and suggestion-value, as opposed to what consumers 
think they think about them—offer avenues for exploration by laboratory scientists, 
whatever the outcomes. “The psychotechnical scientist cannot be blamed if the results of 
his experiments are misused for immoral purposes, just as the chemist is not responsible 
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if chemical knowledge is applied to the construction of anarchistic bombs.”28 If what 
follows in Münsterberg’s text concerns itself primarily with the most effective size and 
location of print advertising, the principles are applicable to other spatial encounters than 
the one that takes place between a reader and a printed object. Though Münsterberg was 
not inclined to push the issue, “memory-value” and “attention-value” also became 
internalized as concepts for urban perception, whether in the urbanism of Ladovsky or 
psychology-influenced postwar urban thinkers like Kevin Lynch.29 If there is indeed an 
“image of the city,” to use Lynch’s well-known term, the scientific grounds for 
understanding that image were not the analyses of art history but the experimental 
findings of psychotechnicians, in the sense that it is not meaning at stake in Lynch’s idea 
(which would implicate only monumentality as the basis of the city’s imagability) but 
rather the subconscious recall of more everyday environs. 
Münsterberg’s tests for the operators of the electric railways that traced their way 
through many cities of the early twentieth-century offer more direct insights into a 
psychotechnical understanding of metropolitan perception. (As Blatter has documented, 
the streetcar was something of a nemesis for Münsterberg in his early years at Harvard, as 
Dane Hall sat near Harvard Square, then a junction of several streetcar lines—a noisy 
impediment to psychological research that necessitated Emerson Hall’s quieter site on 
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Quincy Street.)30 “The problem of securing fit motormen for the electric railways was 
brought to my attention from without,” Münsterberg begins, and at the heart of this 
commissioned research is the responsibility that accrues to any system of urban 
administration. While some incidents were easily assignable to neglect on the part of the 
tram driver, in most cases they remained “accidents,” though different employees had 
substantially different track records at avoiding such accidents. In the case of lesser 
employees, “they can hardly be blamed, as they were not careless,” writes Münsterberg, 
“and yet the accidents did result from their personal qualities; they simply lacked the gift 
of instinctive foresight.”31 Münsterberg’s attempt at understanding what comprised that 
gift of instinctive foresight and how it might be measured—a gift which one might also 
think of as an advanced form of urban perception and pattern recognition—says much 
about how his psychotechnics understood the stimuli of the city. 
Münsterberg begins with two caveats about what this science of kinetic urban 
perception was not. Firstly, singularly-measured attributes like reaction time—the 
seemingly obvious candidate for a metric of suitability—prove less useful in this setting. 
This was in part because certain “indispensable single functions” like vision and reaction 
time were already being screened by such companies (removing truly inadequate 
candidates from the pool, which left the companies unable to judge between candidates 
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who met their minimums of acceptable vision). But this pointed to a larger problem, 
which was that the complexity of stimuli in the city is difficult to break into elementary 
perceptual acts. “I found this to be a particular complicated act of attention,” Münsterberg 
argues, by which “the manifoldness of objects, the pedestrians, the carriages, and the 
automobiles, are continuously observed with reference to the rapidity and direction in the 
quickly changing panorama of the street.” The job of the experimental laboratory was to 
duplicate that uncontrolled manifoldness in the context of controlled experiment—a 
charge which calls the architectural psychotechnics discussed in chapter one into 
question, given their abstraction of spatial perception into discrete components.32 
Münsterberg’s second caveat: “One might naturally think that the experience of a 
special industrial undertaking would be best reproduced for the experiment by repeating 
the external conditions in a kind of miniature form”—in essence, a table-top train set (the 
“model-train” urbanism described by Hart in the context of aerial warfare). Precisely 
such a test would be devised a decade later by Hermann Pautze in Germany, in which the 
testee surveys the city from above, scanning the changing scene and reacting accordingly. 
[FIG 2.07] (The appearance of projected media in this drawing of Pautze’s will be taken 
up in a later section of this chapter.) For Münsterberg, this would be a “decidedly 
inappropriate” approach, since models “arouse ideas, feeling, and volitions which have 
little in common with the processes of actual life,” a point that he illustrates with the 
struggles of experienced naval helmsmen in recreating incidents through models in naval 
                                               




courts. The immersed viewer responds differently from the removed one, thus implying 
either the use of perspective or the duplication of its perceptual effects by other means.33 
What, then, might represent the conditions of perception for a metropolitan 
worker in the confines of the laboratory? A good test, for Münsterberg, was one that 
“vividly aroused in all the motormen the feeling that the mental functions which they 
were going through during the experiment and the greatest possible similarity with their 
experience on the front platform of the electric car.”34 In the research of the Harvard 
Psychological laboratory, this took the form of a series of gridded cards, nine squares 
wide and twenty-six squares tall, with the vertical center stripe (with letters from A to Z) 
representing the road. Flanking this road were numbers, gridded four deep on either side. 
Black numbers represented cars (3), horses (2), and pedestrians (1) which were moving in 
parallel with the tram, while red numbers represented those moving across the track. (In a 
version of this test later drawn for Morris Viteles’s Industrial Psychology, the red 
numerals were provisionally replaced with bold numerals.)35 [FIG 2.08] The numbers 
indicated how quickly the given obstacle would move, the numeral three implying that 
the car would move three squares by the time the tram arrived there—a pedestrian (1) 
that was in square adjacent to the track, for example, was a threat, since he or she would 
intersect with the tram’s path, whereas a car (3) in the adjacent square would have moved 
three squares by the time of the tram’s arrival and cleared the track. The testee would turn 
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a handcrank which moved a viewing window up the card, and was expected to call out 
the letters of each row where an accident would occur. The goal was to crank one’s way 
through a deck of twelve of these cards in as little time as possible, with each omission 
accruing a ten second penalty. 
Münsterberg proclaimed the examination a success, though some of his 
observations prompt skepticism from the contemporary observer—particularly the detail 
that none of his own students in the laboratory scored worse than 275, an exceptionally 
quick time with few mistakes, while none of the tram drivers tested, even those 
recognized as being superlative at their craft, mustered better than 290. The clearest 
indication of the test, then, was a familiarity with laboratory protocols, a test of one’s 
facility with testing. (Such findings also recall the famous “Hawthorne experiments,” a 
decade later, by Elton Musk, which found that social formations, camaraderie, and a 
feeling of participation were far more effective in spurring productivity than the usual 
“human factors” methods to produce better results.)36 Likewise, to achieve the desired 
differentiation between the test subjects who were known to be excellent tram operators 
and less experienced ones, Münsterberg was obliged to weight their times for age—a 
somewhat perverse adjustment for a reaction-based job requirement. Further, the test’s 
duplication of a spatial-kinetic environment on a strictly numerical basis clearly has its 
limits (a tram driver suffering from mild dyscalculia would score terribly but might 
operate a vehicle admirably). And yet Münsterberg’s vocational claims were of a far 
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more limited scope, aiming simply to weed out the bottom quartile of applicants, those 
who genuinely struggled to adjust themselves to spotting hazards. 
The psychotechnical vision of the city, seen here in the form of cards where 
hazards lurk but can only be identified through registering their speed and coordinates 
together, is a minefield of potential accidents, one that requires a particular aptitude in 
selecting those objects in one’s field of view that require apperceptive focus. This test 
also speaks to the view that an orderly metropolis requires orderly and predictable 
movement (it might be noted that Münsterberg’s test makes no provision for a car or 
pedestrian who does not move at the prescribed speed and in the prescribed direction). It 
is in this spirit that the streetcar makes a cameo in Max Weber’s famous “Science as a 
Vocation” speech. “Unless he is a physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has no idea 
how it happened to get into motion … He is satisfied that he may ‘count’ on the behavior, 
and he orients his conduct according to this expectation.”37 If Weber is referring to the 
functioning of the various mechanisms through which overhead electricity is converted 
into forward motion, this passage nonetheless speaks to an urbanism in which objects, 
piloted or not, are expected to “behave.” Weber’s point, though framed as a philosophical 
one, speaks equally to the regimes of management (of trains and of the citizenry in and 
around them) expected of the early twentieth century metropolis. 
There is a particular vision of “responsibility” at stake in these tests, one 
articulated by Münsterberg as the obligation for authority (whether corporate or 
governmental) to identify those individuals with the “gift of instinctive foresight,” a 
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recognition that administration is at the core of managing risk on the streets, just as the 
First World War would be the first war of risk management.38 In the case of 
psychotechnical testing, this specific vision of urban safety can be periodized, as the 
flourishing of vocational psychotechnics required a particular moment of sociotechnical 
development—an industrial city that necessitated things like factories and telephone 
exchanges before their eventual automation, a society that relied on infrastructures like 
streetcars before the privatization of transportation in the form of the automobile. If the 
“nervous system” of cities are increasingly said to flow independently of the nervous 
systems of their operators in today’s era of ostensibly smart cities, psychotechnical 
urbanism assumes instead their total congruence—where “automation,” to return to 
William James’s writings on habit, is internalized in the metropolitan subject’s behaviors 
(on the street or at the front of the tramcar) rather than externalized into the managerial 
environment of computation, even as that demand for “automation” on the part of the 
city’s subjects paves the way for an urbanism predicated on an ever-finer grain of control. 
Münsterberg published his Psychology and Industrial Efficiency in 1913, the year 
in which the first mass manufactured cars, the Ford Model T, began rolling off the 
assembly line. The automobile was already challenging some of the working assumptions 
about the responsible management of the city’s infrastructures, and the increasing 
ubiquity of the car was sure to accelerate such changes. The safety of streetcars was a 
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question of vocational fitness; the safety of a street increasingly filled with drivers posed 
different ones. The advent of licensure applied a level of testing to the driving public, 
some of which was derived from psychotechnical examination. (In the United States, the 
first licensing law for chauffeurs was New York’s in 1910, and the first overall licensing 
law was New Jersey’s in 1913.) Licensure, however, as with Münsterberg’s observation 
about most existing testing for tram drivers, involved only establishing bare minimums 
that had little to do with understanding the varying degrees of skill found with individual 
drivers. It was clear early on that cars would increasingly become the purview of citizens, 
not chauffeurs, meaning that vocational testing would no longer be the principal means of 
administering drivership. Thus psychotechnics turned to questions of the urban 
environment, rather than the qualifications of its inhabitants—resulting in a newfound 
interest in streetlighting on applied psychological terms. 
Streetlighting had become a public concern in the seventeenth century, 
particularly under absolutist governments, with lanterns migrating from individual houses 
into the public streetscape. With the advent of the spectacularly bright electric arc-light in 
the 1880s, American cities began experimenting with lighting towers, often called “moon 
towers,” that cast an evenly diffused light across the city. (Even into the early twentieth 
century, the actual moon was considered a participant in urban lighting, and electrical 
lighting was adjusted according to its phase of brightness—an understanding of the 
nighttime street as a variable and not fully controllable visual landscape.)39 The city of 
Detroit provided the most expansive example of this idea of night lighting: “The press of 
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the country has uniformly conceded the city to be the best-lighted of any in the world,” 
writes Fred H. Whipple in his exceedingly thorough Municipal Lighting of 1888. “All its 
streets, yards, alleys, back-yards, and grounds are illuminated as effectually as by the full 
moon at the zenith. The blending of light from the mass of towers serves to prevent dense 
shadows.” That this was something of a utopian gesture can be seen in a testimonial, 
cited by Whipple, in which the Flint, Michigan city council called their towers “the poor 
man’s light, for, by reason of its penetrating and far-reaching rays, the suburbs of the city 
will be equally well lighted with the more central portions … brilliant light will penetrate 
the most distant parts of the city.”40 
By the 1910s, advancements in incandescent lighting and widespread 
electrification made possible a proliferation of more localized and easier to maintain 
streetlights, along the lines of the ones still used today. Among the benefits of this new 
approach, from Münsterberg’s point of view at least, was the kind of visual attention that 
such lighting produced. “Offhand and without having carried on any experiments 
whatever,” he writes,  
I should be inclined to say that a uniform illumination like 
that of Detroit would be unfavorable for the attention. It 
would produce a hypnoid state. Our attention is naturally 
fluctuating and will be best kept awake, if the illumination 
produces an alternation between tension and relaxation. 
This demands that there be darker regions between the 
lighted spots.41 
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Monotony, as Münsterberg observed in no shortage of experiments, is different from 
fatigue.42 In framing driving as a sustained pattern of action and attention—like any 
number of industrial vocations that benefited from the introduction of variety for the sake 
of increased productivity—the driving environment became the subject of calibration by 
designers, working in concert with psychotechnicians. Further, this dynamic of tension 
and relaxation proved central to the psychotechnical approach to urban life explored 
under the plans of Soviet socialism, to be discussed shortly. 
Münsterberg’s comments on Detroit were in a report sent to the National Electric 
Light Association’s Street Lighting Committee, which listed Münsterberg among its 
advisory committee. In its meeting minutes of April 7, 1914, which were circulated to its 
advisors, the Street Lighting Committee announced the selection of Intervale Avenue, in 
the Bronx, to serve as a psychological testing ground, outlining a series of subjects 
(policemen, chauffeurs, citizens, college students, illumination experts) as well a program 
of testing.43 These individuals would first take written surveys on their thoughts about 
lighting as a way of controlling for existing preferences, and then a series of tests for 
“discernment” under the conditions of streetlighting—discernment of vehicles, 
pedestrians, objects in the road and the change of surface conditions, and so on. 
Münsterberg responded with a three-page report, which, characteristically, begins 
by arguing that “the discussion of the electric lighting problem seems to me to have 
suffered so far from a neglect of the higher mental process involved.” Simply measuring 
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light levels, or taking isolated measurements of perceptibility, would imply only a form 
of technical evaluation—one example of which is Detroit’s photographic studies of its 
nighttime streetscapes, in which black squares, inset with white, are meant to register 
viewing conditions. [FIG 2.09] Similar, though non-photographic, “visual acuity” tests 
would end up being used on Intervale Avenue. Münsterberg continues: “The mere 
possibility of visual discrimination does not ensure comfort and still less safety on the 
street. The most essential point is to have an illumination by which the attention is kept 
vivid and all the mental functions active.”44 This is a question of design as much as of 
visibility—discrimination is a lower-order task than attention, for Münsterberg, and the 
production of attention is the unspoken but vital role of a street-lighting plan. He 
proposes a regime of testing on the experimental half-mile of Intervale Avenue that 
includes “mere vision”—the discrimination of form, color, movement, and distance, from 
sidewalk, street, near lanterns, between lanterns, after ten minutes, after an hour, &c—but 
also on questions of attention. [FIG 2.10] “I should think that such tests ought to be 
carried on, perhaps for a period of six weeks under the guidance of at least two well-
trained young psychologists; and I should think that the night hours in the summer 
months would be most advantageous.”45 
Münsterberg was able to send one such well-trained young psychologist, his 
student Harold E. Burtt. Burtt’s experiments—demanding no small inventiveness to bring 
the laboratory instrumentation he was accustomed to onto a public street—are 
documented in the work of Jeremy Blatter, and his conclusions bear reiterating. Across 
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the summer, the engineers despaired of all of the groups who were being tested, save 
one—the illumination professionals themselves. These same illumination experts were 
bemused, if not dismissive, of Burtt’s own experiments—showing the degree to which 
the management of the city was the province of specialists, as much as the 
psychotechnician sought to approach a question like streetlighting from a broader 
viewpoint (mirroring in a sense Münsterberg’s own discovery that his assistants were the 
ones who excelled most at the tram-driving test, not the tram drivers). Moreover, though, 
what was remarkable about the Harvard Psychological Laboratory’s work on Intervale 
Avenue was that it required leaving the laboratory behind for the actual space of the city, 
full of complications that could not be controlled for. (Among Burtt’s frustrations was the 
fact that stores and houses have lighting of their own which bleed into the urban scene 
and make conclusions difficult to draw; less frustrating, though notably a departure from 
laboratory life, were the onlookers who were genuinely concerned when witnessing 
Burtt’s “reaction to danger” test.)46 For all the frictions of bringing laboratory tests to 
bear on a city street, however, the case of Intervale Avenue illustrates one of the 
ambitions of psychotechnics that would be more fully explored in Soviet urbanism—the 
calibration and management of urban perceptual life. 
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Perceptual Housekeeping: The City Foreshortened 
As with the Greek word oikos, the Russian khosiaistvo is a noun that refers to both 
economy and housekeeping, an evocative twinning of concepts that has, especially in the 
case of oikos, informed the historicization and interpretation of how citizens participate in 
that economy. In the case of khoziaistvo, a term which had been used since Tsarist Russia 
but which took on vital new valences in the era of the Plan, it came to stand for a 
particular kind of socialist construction.47 In a communist society—particularly one 
transitioning out of the semi-capitalist New Economic Plan, and looking to consign the 
ravages of the “war communism” period to the immediately post-revolutionary past—the 
state’s housekeeping responsibilities sometimes took literal form, as in the case of what 
has been called Bolshevik feminism, meant to liberate women from the appropriated 
labor of child-rearing and maintenance of the household.  
Among the institutions responsible for this housekeeping was the Moscow 
Municipal Administration, Moskovskii Kommunal’nое Khoziaistvo, commonly 
abbreviated as MKX. The psychotechnical laboratory of the MKX, run by Ivan Diakov 
and Nikolai Petrovsky, was among Moscow’s premiere institutions of vocational testing, 
and published prolifically. The psychotechnician Pavel Rudik—who, as posited in 
chapter one, offered one vector between psychotechnics and the architectural circles of 
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Moscow, given his involvement in the “spatial arts” division at the State Academy of 
Artistic Sciences, GAKhN—collaborated with the MKX, and was well acquainted with 
Diakov and Petrovsky. The three had been students together of Georgy Chelpanov at the 
Psychological Institute, a figure who constitutes perhaps the most significant link 
between psychotechnics and Soviet administration. Having spent two years studying in 
Germany under Wundt among others, Chelpanov also visited Münsterberg in the United 
States in 1911 (alongside E.B. Titchener and James McKeen Cattell) as he prepared plans 
for the Psychological Institute, which would open its doors in 1912. Wundt wrote 
Chelpanov with pride that this “first psychological institute in Russia may be considered 
as an offspring of the Leipzig Institute.”48 Rudik, Diakov, and Petrovsky were also all 
affiliates of the laboratories of the State Central Institute of Physical Culture, among 
other institutions, and the three wrote a book together, in 1926, concerning their research 
(conducted under the auspices of Chelpanov) into the psychotechnics of chess, 
undertaken at an international tournament held in Moscow in 1925.49 Diakov and 
Petrovsky embraced the “authority” of Münsterberg—offering critique for Isaac 
Spilrein’s methods of labor organization—and, through the MKX, pursued a wide-
ranging program of research on tram drivers and chauffeurs as well as students and 
teachers. 
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Diakov and Petrovsky’s tram driver apparatus, despite their avowed embrace of 
Münsterberg’s methods, proved to be something of a departure from aspects of his ethic 
of testing. Their attention to the scenography of the testing environment included not only 
the controls but the entire front end of a streetcar—cultivating a sense of role playing, 
where Münsterberg would prefer a process that duplicated mental functions but not direct 
associations. [FIG 2.11] (The line selected for this stationary tram booth was 34, which at 
the time ran from the Yaroslavsky train station to the soon-to-open Central Park of 
Culture and Leisure, another site of spatial-psychological inquiry, as documented in the 
work of Alla Vronskaya.)50 Among the illustrations of the device proudly published in 
their book of 1928 was an electrical wiring diagram that explains how the various 
incidents that would take place on the streetscape were triggered—a diagram which 
implicates both tester and testee in this network of wiring, each as nodes in a coordinated 
temporal relay. [FIG 2.12] The least Münsterbergian feature, however, is what takes 
place in the tram driver’s field of view—a device they termed an “experimental ekran,” 
or “screen” (a word that in today’s Russian connotes the same thing “screen” does in 
English—a threshold that can be seen through, as in a window screen, as well as interface 
with computer technology). The field of the test is a surprisingly bourgeois streetscape, 
perspectivally flattened to have the appearance of recessing in space. A series of 
characters—some of them pathos-laden, as in a male figure who has fallen across the 
tracks—pop out of the urban landscape, from between buildings, behind streetlights, and 
in the street at large. [FIG 2.13] Though these hazards are all, in a literally sense, the 
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same distance away from the testee, given the flatness of the ekran, the image of the 
receding street suggests different urgencies of reaction, and thus different intensities of 
action to be taken on the part of the driver.  
Münsterberg, in 1913, sought to recreate the “manifoldness” of sensations on the 
urban street as well as something of the experience, for the driver, of their interface with 
the machine they were guiding. And yet he eschewed both the distancing of a model-train 
apparatus and the immersion of simulacra (whether through cinematography or the kind 
of urban tableaus devised by the MKX). His methods instead abstracted the functional 
needs of the task at hand into forms of numerical pattern recognition, assuming that 
questions of spatial experience and scale were, in fact, extraneous to the real 
characteristics being tested. In the mid-1920s, however, as influential as Münsterberg’s 
thought and writings still were (he is credited as the source of vocational testing in 
virtually every book on the operation of vehicles in this period), the instruments being 
developed in German laboratories (like Pautze’s) and Soviet laboratories (like the MKX) 
hinged instead on understanding an occupation like the tram driver’s as being resolutely 
perspectival.  
The importance of linear, one-point perspective in such instrumentation is made 
most vivid by a German apparatus for testing tram drivers, cited as a precedent in Diakov 
and Petrovskii’s book.51 The testee stands, in full uniform, at a table outfitted with the 
controls of the tramcar and looks at a framed composition whose vanishing point is at his 
approximate eye-height. [FIG 2.14] In the upper right, outside of this frame, are 
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directional instructions—in this particular image, “Gerade halten,” or “keep straight.” A 
white surface with lines representing tram tracks, and black vertical bars noting buildings 
(and thus openings between them) complete the scene. Functionally, this device served as 
a model for the MKX’s testing station, though its abstraction makes clear that 
verisimilitude is not at stake in its testing of apperception and reaction. That this 
apparatus could pass for an elementary exercise in perspectival massing, or one of 
Malevich’s sets for “Victory Over the Sun,” or, indeed, implies something of the 
uncompromising rigor of urban form sought by designers like Ludwig Hilberseimer, 
shows the extent to which the psychotechnical understanding of urban perception was to 
be denatured of “content”—relying instead on rhythm and the pace at which forms 
approach and recede in linear perspective. 
It is at the very least suggestive that these instruments were being created in the 
same years as the writing of Erwin Panofsky’s well-known Perspective as Symbolic 
Form, published in 1927 on the basis of lectures from 1924–1925 at the Warburg 
Institute. Panofsky begins by affirming that his definition of perspective is, effectively, 
Dürer’s, from the sixteenth century—the flattened representation of space as though we 
are looking through a window. He contrasts this necessity of a frame to “mere isolated 
objects, such as houses or furniture,” being “represented in ‘foreshortening.’”52 This 
much-remarked on insistence on the window of perspective takes on a particular interest 
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for its psychotechnical adoption.53 Virtually any theoretical or artistic take on modernist 
perception in the city (whether Lissitzky’s 1925 essay “A. and Pangeometry,” any 
number of Futurist representations, or the polyphony of Moholy’s “Dynamik der Gross-
stadt”) insists on a disorderly complexity, or a newly rational but ungrounded form of 
vision defined by axonometry, that relegates the seeming knowability of perceptive to the 
past.54 The perception of the tram driver, on the other hand, is described by vocational 
psychology as being framed and directed—and, insofar as the tram was running on fixed 
and often straight tracks—directed in recession toward a vanishing point. It is “screened,” 
to use the MKX’s formulation of the “ekran” once more. The new visual episteme 
imagined by the avant-garde, one might say, is tamed and tempered by the exigencies of 
the infrastructures of urban mobility. 
Despite his invocation of Dürer’s definitions, by the sixth paragraph Panofsky has 
moved into a discourse that was distinctly not Dürer’s, a turn toward the developments of 
experimental psychology that are plain in Panofsky’s thesis: “Perspective transforms 
psychophysiological space into mathematical space.” Where the perspectival spaces of 
Dürer and Alberti assume a Cartesian manner of observation, Panofsky here insists on the 
particularity of subjective perception. This transformation is not without its biological 
limitations: 
It forgets that we see not with a single fixed eye but with 
two constantly moving eyes, resulting in a spheroidal field 
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of vision. It takes no account of the enormous difference 
between the psychologically conditioned “visual image” 
through which the visible world is brought to our 
consciousness, and the mechanically conditioned “retinal 
image” which paints itself upon our physical eye … 
Finally, perspectival construction ignores the crucial 
circumstance that this retinal image—apart from the fact 
that the eyes move—is a projection not on a flat but on a 
concave surface. Thus already on this lowest, still 
prepsychological level of facts there is a fundamental 
discrepancy between “reality” and its construction.55 
Such details were certainly the province of psychotechnics and the psychophysics that 
came before it. That we are not experientially aware of these psychophysiological 
dilemmas is, for Panofsky, precisely the point, as “that too is surely in part due to our 
habituation,” whether in drawings or photographs, “to linear perspectival construction: a 
construction that is itself comprehensible only for a quite specific, indeed specifically 
modern, sense of space, or if you will, sense of the world.”56 
Panofsky’s debts to thinkers like Ernst Cassirer and physicians like Hermann von 
Helmholtz are often noted; less frequently summoned is his close reading of the 
experimental psychologist Erich Rudolf Jaensch’s On the Perception of Space of 1911, 
which he relies on for many observations on perception, and also disputes at length in a 
footnote on the matter of these various distortions.57 For all of Panofsky’s interest in what 
were effectively sciences of the long nineteenth century, his conclusion, that perspective 
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represents “an objectification of the subjective,” also carries with it something of the 
psychotechnical worldview. (That the emplaced vision of perspective lends itself to an 
objectification exists in tension with its elevation of subjectivity as a singular 
phenomenon.) If Albertian modernism already posited the rationalizations of the grid—
the knowability and transmissibility of coordinate systems, represented polemically by 
Moholy’s so-called “telephone paintings”—Panofsky’s psychophysiology points to an 
added dimension. His interest is not in the modernity of representation but, rather, how 
that rational and orderly world interfaces with its inhabitants, who come equipped with 
their own psychophysiological apparatus:  
Thus the history of perspective may be understood with 
equal justice as a triumph of the distancing and objectifying 
sense of the real, and as a triumph of the distance-denying 
human struggle for control; it is as much a consolidation 
and systematization of the external world, as an extension 
of the domain of the self.58 
Panofsky, as he was writing these words, was surrounded by psychotechnics—the claims 
made on its behalf, the bureaucracies that were deploying it in the name of urban 
management—whether or not he explicitly registers it as a part of his own historical 
moment of visuality. This ambivalence between the distanced objectification of view 
outside the window (of the painting or the tramcar) and the “distance-denying struggle 
for control” is made evident in the apparatuses of the psychotechnical laboratory—and in 
the mid-1920s, unlike the mid-1910s, linear perspective was their preferred device for 
mediating human organization and the individual’s sensorium. 
                                               




Perspective’s mediated exchange between objects (in psychotechnics, urban 
objects arrayed in front of the viewer) and the subject (the mobile inhabitant of the city, 
possibly driving a vehicle, and certainly taking visual stock of the dangers of the street) 
was an opportune tool for the emerging Soviet psychotechnical management—
housekeeping—of the urban environment. Given the city’s reframing through the 
apparatuses of vocational testing, what might this mean for the psychotechnically-minded 
designer of cities? In Moscow, it was the Nikolai Ladovsky—and, perhaps moreover, his 




In October 1928—the month that marked the official beginning of the First Five Year 
Plan—Vitalii Lavrov published an article in Stroitel’stvo Moskvy titled “On the Recent 
Work of the Architecture Faculty of VKhUTEIN.” “In the present transition period, when 
the reconstruction of the economy and its technical base is a principle requirement,” he 
writes, “the struggle for raising the level of knowledge among specialists acquires special 
significance.” As discussed in chapter one, Lavrov’s text was a stand against “narrow 
specialization”—going so far as to argue for a kind of “despecialization”—while still 
advocating for newly rigorous forms of specific disciplinary knowledge. That blend of a 
generalist’s breadth and a specialist’s depth, for Lavrov and for his colleagues 
VKhUTEIN, was exemplified by the idea that the retooling of the economy implied by 
the Five Year Plan would also result in the remaking of cities. In the academic year of 




assignments oriented around the needs dictated by the ‘current moment’ in construction,” 
he continues, the architecture faculty “considered it necessary to impose as a theme for 
the diploma projects the resolution of the ‘problem of the new city,’” problem novogo 
goroda.59 (Lavrov’s own diploma project, recently finished in the spring of 1928, went by 
that same title—Novyi Gorod, “The New City,” as did a project by Trifon Varentsov.)60  
In a typewritten report documenting VKhUTEIN’s progress during the First Five 
Year Plan—alongside pointedly “raising the question” of the school’s capital needs—the 
school’s administration proudly announced the addition of a number of new fields of 
study aimed toward the production of that New City: 
In 1929–30, the following specializations were introduced: 
1/ housing and social buildings,  
2/ factory fabrication and industrial construction,  
3/ the layout of settlements.  
In 1930–31, the following specializations were introduced: 
4/ agricultural buildings, 
5/ kino-architecture.61 
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The first four items were characteristic of VKhUTEIN’s retooling to meet the Soviet 
Union’s vast ambitions to transform its cities, industries, and countryside on the basis of 
an ever-more-efficient complex of architecture and the construction industry—
imperatives that were delivered directly from the People’s Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs, as Hugh Hudson has documented, and which will be discussed further shortly.62 
The fifth item on the list, however, stands out in this context. What is kino-architecture, 
and what might it bring to bear on the question of Novyi Gorod? 
This question marks the entrance into the Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture of the Tashkent-born Uzbeki Viktor Kalmykov, who followed in Krutikov’s 
footsteps as one of Ladovsky’s favored students. Like Krutikov, Kalmykov had a 
penchant for the anti-gravitational. He completed drawings in one of Ladovsky’s 1930 
studios for a proposal titled “Saturn,” also known as the “levitating city,” perhaps since 
“flying city” had already been taken by Krutikov. Likewise a fantasia of rocketry and 
structural heroics—though the massive arcing structure is, at the least, grounded—
Kalmykov’s drawings contain a panoply of the sorts of dynamically Rationalist forms, 
serialized into urban assemblages, that much of the ARU’s urbanism was comprised of. 
[FIG 2.15] But Kalmykov followed Krutkov in another respect as well. In the same 1928 
article in which Lavrov discusses VKhUTEIN’s reorientation of the diploma projects 
towards the Novyi Gorod (also the same article in which he itemizes Ladovsky and 
Krutikov’s research on the psychotechnics of architecture and the experimental testing of 
spatial capacity), Lavrov lists a third Ladovskian project in the Psychotechnical 
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Laboratory of Architecture—“using kino equipment to evaluate volumetric and spatial 
solutions of complex designs,” pursued by Ladovsky and Kalmykov.63 
Little evidence suggests that this project bore particular fruit in 1928 or 1929, 
though it suggests an evident interest in the use of the cinema as a psychotechnical 
science, which would get taken up again by the laboratory two years later. Benjamin’s 
interest in the psychotechnics of cinematography have already been discussed in my 
introduction; Münsterberg’s work on The Photoplay offers directions as well, which 
could easily be extrapolated into architectural thought. That the cinema could be both a 
psychotechnical science—bringing forth a reflexology of viewership—as well as 
documenting that science was explored in the previous years in Moscow by the 
filmmaker Vsevolod Pudovkin, whose 1925 Mechanics of the Brain documented the 
work of Ivan Pavlov, its own creation and editing having been inspired by that work 
(alongside texts like Münsterberg’s Photoplay and Sergei Eisenstein’s “Montage of 
Attractions,” published in LEF).64 Another dimension, however, can be found in the 
integration of cinematography into psychotechnical instrumentation itself, motion picture 
apparatuses put in the use of vocational testing. 
It will not be surprising that this lineage begins with Münsterberg. Between 1911 
and 1913, the popular press was fascinated by the possibility that his vocational testing at 
the Harvard Psychological Laboratory included “cinematographic nerve tests” for 
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chauffeurs and pilots that used immersive projected film in conjunction with devices to 
record reaction times. Münsterberg, as Blatter has shown, disavowed this possibility, 
calling it “one of the many fake reports concerning my laboratory.”65 And yet, in his 
Grundzüge, he writes that “it has even been suggested to use cinematographic images as 
stimuli” for apparatuses that test braking reaction time. “If you do not have a certain 
natural ability to react, you should not receive a license to chauffeur,” he writes in a 
phrase that he had issued several variations on in previous texts, adding that similar tests 
would be applicable to locomotive engineers.66 (Along with his psychotechnical study of 
cinema in The Photoplay, his preferred engagement with film, Münsterberg also worked 
with Paramount Pictographs to assemble a series on “Testing the Mind,” one of his many 
popularizations of vocational testing methods.)67  
But the “cinematographic nerve test” was taken up by others. Hermann Pautze, in 
the model train apparatus previously discussed, used projected media—temporally 
synchronized with both the model train in motion and the records of the testee’s 
reactions—to create “incidents” on an otherwise orderly streetscape. More dramatically, 
however, the possibility that the popular press projected onto Münsterberg’s laboratory 
was, in essence, realized in a test for chauffeurs, built by the MKX in 1927 or 1928. [FIG 
2.16] The prospective chauffer sits with a steering wheel and pedals in front of a canted 
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surface, sloped downward to increase its perspectival effect of the road’s recession. The 
projector, again synchronized with the record of the driver’s actions, simulated (though 
again, at a somewhat elevated remove) the experience of driving through traffic. As with 
the electronics diagram of the MKX’s tram test—or even “web of electric wires” that 
unified time in side of Münsterberg’s Emerson Hall—the synchronization of film and 
reaction is a part of the distinctly psychotechnical process of coordinating time. Whether 
or not Ladovsky and Kalmykov were using film equipment in 1927–28 to evaluate 
“evaluate volumetric and spatial solutions”—a question that an absence of archives 
requires us to leave to the side—it was certainly being used in 1927–28 at the MKX, a 
development that Ladovsky would likely have followed with interest (possibly through 
Diakov and Petrovsky’s own book, published in 1928, when this idea makes its first 
tentative appearance at VKhUTEIN). And the Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture would, in fact, return to the question in 1930. 
1930 was a year in which many of the fault lines within Muscovite architecture 
circles began to rupture. The issues of Sovremennaia Arkhitektura of this year evince that 
split, with some spreads illustrating the fabled speculative projects of Ivan Leonidov, 
while others were filled with charts, tables, and an increasing economic rationalization of 
architecture. With the rise of VOPRA the year before, and the foundation of VANO, the 
All-Union Architectural Scientific Society in 1930, the political stakes of architectural 
design and its ideological correctness grew ever hotter. On May 16, 1930, the Communist 
Party mandated that architects should be gearing their designs toward the “reconstruction 




Leonidovism—“censuring the ‘half-fantastic’ plans for the great leap to communism.”68 
This imperative was particularly evident in a series of competitions in this period 
organized around the planned construction of an industrial economy, and with it the 
planned construction of new cities. Such cities were often framed as laboratories—not 
only because they were sites of experiments in living, but, perhaps more importantly, 
because they were sites where the environmental control characteristic of the laboratory 
could be effectuated in urban space (an idea that recalls Burtt’s frustrations about doing 
psychological research on an at least partially unmanageable street). 
Lenin famously claimed that “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification 
of the whole country.” Electrification of course, also meant the rise of industrialization 
outside of existing urban areas, which led, during the First Five Year Plan, to a range of 
settlements being proposed—Dnieprostroi in the Ukraine (a vast hydroelectric project on 
the Dniepr River),69 Magnitogorsk (a mining operation that produced a number of well-
known urban plans, including Leonidov’s),70 and manufacturing-specific cities like the 
self-evidently named “Traktorostroi” near Stalingrad, literally “Tractor Works.” Each of 
these sites, it should be added, hosted representatives of American industrial expertise in 
the 1930s. Traktorostroi, in particular, was the scene for a noted moment in the Soviet 
antiracism movement, when two American mechanics attacked the only black worker at 
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the plant, also an American émigré.71 In 1930 these projects would be joined by a 
competition for the new planned settlement of Avtostroi, to be decided between six 
organizations, the ARU, OSA, and a team from VKhUTEIN (abbreviated at this moment 
as VKhTI) among them. Avtostroi, “auto works,” was destined for a site outside of 
Nizhny-Novgorod on a flat plain near where the Oka River flows into the Volga—the 
neighborhood still bears the name “Avtosavodskii.” 
The OSA’s intentions were published in an article by Mikhail Zhirov in a 1930 
number of Sovremennaia Arkhitektura, and this piece explains something of the scope of 
the competition, as well as the kind of imperatives that all of its entries addressed, 
couched as they were within factional flavors. The settlement was starting from scratch, 
which meant not only the possibility of a total urban design, but a “socialistic 
organization of society … in which all aspects of the social services and upbringing of 
children” were a part of the architect’s purview—“in the process of the alteration of 
everyday life we move with speed toward the elimination of the family,” Zhirov writes.72 
This is the khoziaistvo, in the simultaneous sense of “economy” and “housekeeping,” 
pursued by the administrative state of the period, which here imagined that children 
would be gathered into their own “towns” and raised collectively. The workers 
themselves were to be similarly managed. The residential quarters proposed by the OSA 
were dubbed “factories of sleep and hygiene,” in which the metrics of existenzminimum 
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would be deployed in the creation of maximally efficient, maximally “healthy” residence 
halls.73 [FIG 2.17] That Zhirov’s phrasing evokes Konstantin Melnkov’s famous 
“Laboratory of Sleep” from his 1929 “Green City” plan for Moscow, published in 1930 
in Stroitel’stvo Moskvy, shows the extent to which Melnikov’s proposal might not be as 
fantastical as its interpreters would imagine, even if Melnikov’s version carries the seeds 
of implicit critique.74 [FIG 2.18] 
Little mention is made in the OSA proposal about the automobile itself—
Avtostroi was simply taken as the occasion for the creation of a new city (just as the 
design of Magnitogorsk was not “about” iron ore), and thus a moment to articulate a new 
urbanism for the Five Year Plan at large. For the “ARU Brigade” however, a team 
comprised of Georgy Krutikov, Vitaly Lavrov, and Valentin Popov (likely led by 
Krutikov, given that he was the one to author the most substantive text on the project), 
the autos of Avtostroi were the drivers of the urban form. Certainly, the prominent 
inclusion of a test track in the composition—a long and skinny one with tight radii at the 
ends, not unlike the canonical test track on the roof of Giacomo Matté Trucco’s Fiat-
Lingotto factory—speaks to the car’s privileged presence within the urban assemblage. 
[FIG 2.19] As mandated, the scheme provides for the socialization of domestic life. In a 
critique of linear planning principles, the ARU scheme “is developed using the maximum 
possibilities of the groundplane.” If “a chaotic web or an indifferent mechanical grid” is 
“characteristic of the capitalistic city, arising and developing spontaneously in conditions 
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of capitalist life, the planned organization of the territory of the socialist urban complex 
involves instead a certain equilibrium of its constituent parts.” In keeping with the 
precepts of psychotechnics, which insisted not only on studying work but studying 
fatigue and its recovery, this sensibility of equilibrium is not only compositional but 
responds to the temporal cycles of the worker’s experience: “The architectural 
composition of the plan is based on the opposition, and at the same time unification in 
one complex, of the main moments of the settlement: work–rest.”75 That this opposition-
equilibrium was precisely the subject of the psychotechnical interest in focus and 
fatigue—the “alternation between tension and relaxation” that Münsterberg defined as the 
ideal conditions for attention—shows the centrality of psychotechnical thought to the 
emerging forms of life under the guidelines of the Five Year Plan. 
On first glance the car does not pay a particularly important role in the designs of 
the VKhUTEIN team—directed by Ladovsky, though the principle work that was later 
published came from Kalmykov, whose proposal consisted of an almost whimsical array 
of housing forms (he supplied several ideas for zhilkombinat, or housing complexes, for 
100, 400, or 700).76 [FIG 2.20] The largest of the housing structures take the form of 
twisting towers; others are playfully parabolic mounds, parabolic arches, or linear 
apartment blocks that step upwards and downwards as they progress. In terms of its sheer 
variousness, the proposal accords with Kalmykov’s “Saturn” project of the same year, 
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though his prolifically inventive forms are here arrayed in a parabolic urbanism of the 
type being developed by Ladovsky. [FIG 2.21] But the automobile enters in a more 
curious way, in the lessons of perception that are learned from the car, through the 
instrumentation of the Psychological Laboratory of Architecture. 
In an article in Sovetskaia Arkhitektura on his recent planning work, Ladovsky 
begins his section on Avtostroi with this claim: 
In carrying out the project of planning the Avtostroi 
settlement in 1929–30, in my capacity as a teacher at 
VKhUTEIN, among other things I put forward the idea of a 
new, more modern method of depicting projects, one that 
takes into account the coordination of time—kino-
projection. This method is especially important for the 
architect-planner, who must demonstrate on to others (and 
before that, verify for himself) the organization of space in 
time. 
The problem of “time coordination”—aligning subjective experience with the external 
world—is at the core of a lineage that begins with the “personal equation,” pulses 
through the web of wires that synchronized time throughout Münsterberg’s laboratory at 
Emerson Hall, and continues in the temporal circuitry of Pautze, Diakov, and Petrovsky’s 
cinematographic testing. Ladovsky’s development is to understand it as a question for the 
design of cities, not just the operation of vehicles within them. He continues: 
In this respect, none of the representational methods 
available in the existing visual arts can compete with kino-
projection. Kino-, foto-, and blueprinting should be 
introduced as standard means in the development of a 
project’s architectural design in the beginning of the 
process in support of creative work, and then for conveying 
and popularizing the architecture to the masses.77 
                                               




As with Pudovkin, who saw cinema as a practice that could both utilize the precepts of 
experimental psychology and document them, Ladovsky’s kino-urbanism was both 
evaluative (studying urban form in the ways that it marshals an economy of perceptual 
energy) and communicative. 
Ladovsky and Kalmykov’s interest in the using the tools of the cinema dates to 
1928, the same year that the MKX’s “kino-apparat” for chauffeurs was published for a 
public interested in psychotechnics. It seems, though, that it was not until Avtostroi that it 
was put into effect. Though few archival traces remain of the Psychotechnical Laboratory 
of Architecture’s work, a receipt from April 1930—as Kalmykov is working on his 
student entry for Avtostroi—documents the requisitioning of a 1,000 watt “Osram” lamp 
from Sovkino, the state organization for the production and distribution of film, for use in 
the laboratory’s own “kino-apparat.”78 The result was a roughly five minute film 
prepared by Kalmykov and a cameraman by the name of Shibanov that intercut between 
footage moving through Kalmykov’s model—as the MKX’s chauffeur test moved 
through an imaginary city—and footage taken from the construction site, a form of 
montage (rather than the typical architectural collage) that inserts the architectural vision 
into its prospective environment.79 
What was published of this process were only photographic stills. [FIG 2.22] But 
in describing the perceptual experience of this city, the design intention behind 
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Kalmykov’s variety of objects comes into focus. “Our builders and ideologues make a 
mistake,” Ladovsky argues, “in identifying ‘construction’ and social types of housing. 
The same or different social types of housing, for example, individual apartments, 
dormitories with varying degrees of socialization, can be successfully resolved in both a 
skyscraper and in all the previously known building types: a block, lines of buildings, 
or”—here Ladovsky coins a term that appears nowhere else, in reference to Kalmykov’s 
parabolic mounds—“a pavilion-bush (suiting spatially disparate bedrooms connected 
around the socialized part of the dwelling into a whole complex-bush).”80 The numerical 
facticity of construction proposed by the urban ethics of the Five Year Plan (and his 
Constructivist colleagues), he argues, substitutes an image of rationality for the 
possibility of entirely rational arrangements within a rubric of entirely inventive form—
which, in keeping with the precepts of Rationalism, would have its own “rationality” of 
perception. This inventiveness and variety is at the heart of Kalmykov’s Avtostroi, a city 
that already understands the potential monotony of a numericized architecture of 
“socialist life”—a psychical inefficiency for the psychotechnical architect as much as it 
was for the psychotechnican interested in the stimulation of streetlighting on one’s 
attention. Ladovsky coins another phrase for this. He insists that Avtostroi is not simply a 
city where “work” and “rest” are scheduled according to the timetables of production—as 
intimately as the city’s life is indeed timetabled—but that the city itself, as a complex of 
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forms perceived in time and at velocity, defines something he calls organizatsiia 




“Recently I witnessed a strange occurrence at Riverside Drive and One Hundred and 
Twentieth Street,” wrote a correspondent of the New York Herald in 1921, an episode 
then published in the Literary Digest. Two chauffeurs were driving limousines, heading 
north. The second chauffeur, moving at a somewhat faster rate of speed, calmly drove 
into the rear of the first, who was still moving at his original pace in their shared lane. “It 
was absurd,” the correspondent recalls. His hypothesis for what had taken place: “The 
colliding chauffeur had been gazing steadily at the bright, streaming roadway flowing 
smoothly beneath him. Its monotonous sameness concentrated his mental faculties to the 
point of inducing momentary self-hypnotism.”81 This episode is held as the origin of the 
idea of “road hypnosis,” later more commonly known as “highway hypnosis,” though the 
thinking is entirely in line with Münsterberg’s on monotony from the decade before—not 
to mention hypnotism, which he took a lively interest in. For all of Münsterberg’s public 
                                               
81 “Car Drivers Who Suffer from ‘Road-Hypnotism,’” Literary Digest 69, no. 10 (June 4, 1921): 
56–57. The article goes on to propose a rather elaborate safety mechanism: “So far it has not 
been possible to synchronize the human soul with steel and iron and rubber so that our 
subconscious senses will operate to stop the flight of a sleep-controlled car or the sweep of an 
unrestrained locomotive. Yet, fanciful as it may sound, I believe it is within the scope of an Edison 
to harness the pulse or register the variant blood-pressure or measure the muscular reflex as 
soon as sleep takes possession of the body, and by utilizing a delicately attuned apparatus to 
cause these involuntary body reactions to sound a waking alarm to the drivert or actually to work 




fame before the First World War, his presence had virtually vanished in the United States 
in the 1920s (thanks both to his German sympathies but also a mode of psychological 
proclamation that many found unnecessarily totalizing), central though his thought would 
still be in Europe. 
The questions of psychology and urban perception that he had embarked on 
would be taken up by others in America, like the Stanford experimental psychologist 
Walter Miles, who documented more precisely the nature of vision, attention, and 
tiredness. “It is commonly supposed that sleep begins with the closing of the eyelids,” he 
writes in 1929. “Actors represent it so and children do the same.”82 These are acts of 
voluntary sleep, however, not the “overtaking” kind—a condition that Miles explores by 
tracking the movements of the eye at various tasks by recording the position of the eye 
every hundredth of a second. As with Münsterberg’s work on courtroom psychology, 
there is an evidentiary aspect to this.83 “Just because we can see the open eyes of a person 
is no reason,” Miles concludes, “why we should testify in court that ‘he was wide-
awake.’”84 Moreover, though, the fruits of Miles’s tests sketch out the character of an 
ideal observer, whose eyes flick with quickness and accuracy to scan right and left. In the 
same year that Soviet architects like Melnikov, the ARU Brigade, and the OSA’s Zhirov 
were seeking to rationalize sleep itself, Miles was looking to understand the links 
between sleep and the perceptual labor involved in navigating the city. 
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The experiment marked A in his Marey-esque graphs represents “the typical 
movements and pauses of the eyes of an individual who is looking back and forth before 
crossing the street.” [FIG 2.23] B, C, and D are instead in the space of the laboratory, a 
kind of agility training for the testee’s alert focus as it moves between two objects. D was 
an exceptionally quick focuser: “Not many individuals can move the eyes as rapidly as 
did this man.” (Strips F, G, H, and I show the increasing sleepiness of a tired typist—the 
drooping of the eye at the point marked 14 is an example of a moment when the eye is no 
longer perceiving, as in a case of road hypnotism, thus “sleeping with the eyes open.”) 
The valorization of a kind of perceptual productivity in such experiments is plain. 
They are also the ideal evidence, however, for the Soviet desire to rationalize 
vision on the urban scale. The strip marked A is a diagram of the metropolitan 
Nervenleben, a disorganized rush of differentiation and apperception that was reliably 
described by Krutikov (in keeping with the preferred rhetoric of the time) as a capitalistic 
chaos—it is not difficult to imagine the many points on the graph as moving vehicles, 
advertisements, passing people, each demanding a flicker of attention. B, C, and D are 
the fruits of rationalization, a “hygiene of perception,” as it was put in both Germany and 
the Soviet Union. Had Ladovsky and Kalmykov had access to tests like these in the 
planning of Avtostroi, one suspects they would have operated the test in reverse, 
diagraming an ideal procession of perceptual focus and designing accordingly. The 
laboratory, in its ability to abstract and idealize the act of perception, becomes the model 
for a city. 
The example of road hypnosis affirms something else as well—the relocation of 




fabled streetlighting of Detroit or the psychotechnically-inflected designs for Avtostroi, 
the interurban highway managed perception through the calibration of its environment, in 
this case in the name of managing risk. As Miles’s research implies when understood in 
the context of urban and landscape design, highway psychology began to intersect with 
aesthetic agendas. To take an example that involves a notable confluence of figures: In an 
early attempt at organizing what would later become the German Autobahn—formulated 
in 1926 as the “Hafraba,” connecting the Hanse cities of Lübeck and Hamburg with 
Frankfurt and Basel, giving the imagined road its abbreviation—the garden architect 
Alexander Schimmelpfennig proposed planting the road with “signal trees” to warn 
drivers of dangerous curves. While some critiqued the scheme’s reliance on non-native 
plants, it was Ludwig Mies van der Rohe who expressed reservations about “the 
readability of such botanical signals,” as the historian Thomas Zeller puts it.85 
Nevertheless, the possibility of articulating the idea that the landscape and its plantings 
could be objects of communication and study for safety placed perceptual psychology in 
a new relationship to the construction of territory. 
In the construction of the Autobahn that followed on the Hafraba proposal, the 
topology of road layout—and more specifically the debate between sinusoidal layouts 
and that of straight lines connected by radiused arcs, which was the model used for laying 
out railways—similarly brought engineering, aesthetics, and psychotechnical principles 
into conversation with each other.86 If the highway engineers preferred the technical 
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simplicity of lines and arcs, the “landscape advocates” who were appointed to each 
segment of the Autobahn—participants in the process whose job it was to help navigate 
the topographies and panoramas of the terrain, and to emphasize what was seens as a 
distinctly Germanic expression of landscape design—preferred the more seemingly 
“natural” routings. (Zeller notes that the New Jersey Turnpike was built as straight as 
possible in the name of safety; since then, it has become a commonplace that straight 
roads are the most accident prone.) What eventually secured support for sinusoidal 
layouts on the Autobahn was an alliance of aesthetics—the picturesque mode preferred 
by the landscape advocates, who, surely, could have counted Frederick Law Olmsted 
among their number—and applied psychology, which raised the questions of attention 
and perceptual fatigue that had, by this point, been explored for twenty years. In 1935, 
the Autobahn’s directorate issued guidelines that straight sections could only extend up to 
four kilometers before being interrupted with a curve, staving off monotony while giving 
the landscape designers opportunities to work. 
To some extent, then, this psychotechnical urbanism finds its end in the same 
place where it didn’t begin—the space of interurban travel whose testing and visual 
regulation was proposed to Münsterberg by Olmsted. The advent of the highway, whether 
the German Autobahn or, particularly, the Interstate Highway System of the United 
States, effected a decentralization of population—its most frequently discussed 
architectural consequence—but also of a decentralization of responsibility, away from 




urban plans (toward a systematic logic of specification and regulation).87 The spatial 
research of the “laboratory phase” of psychotechnical urbanism produced a vision of its 
ideal inhabitant—whether the expert tram driver or the urban citizen whose eyes flickered 
across an ordered cityscape—as well as an understanding of urban design according to 
the precepts of experimental psychology, a brief collision of discourses that produced 
novel plans like that of Avtostroi (or, perhaps, produced a novel means of post-
rationalizing an urban schema that was already of aesthetic interest to its designers). That 
science’s transition into highway psychology would, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, splinter into the fields of ergonomics and infrastructure. The interurban 
highway would soon become a space of standards which proceeded largely independently 
of the landscape itself—standards of safety (in the equipment of the car), standards of 
signage (a regulation of information that would have been welcomed by Frederick 
Gillett), and standards of road alignment (which assign speeds to viable radii), each of 
which owe something of their foundation to the psychotechnics of the urban landscape in 
the 1910s and 1920s. 
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Modernity Rehabilitated: László Moholy-Nagy’s Occupational Therapy at the School of 





Nearly fifty years after László Moholy-Nagy’s death in 1946, his daughter, Hattula, 
wrote a brief remembrance of her father, already middle-aged in her earliest memories. 
She describes a charismatic and striking figure, “portly, always well-groomed and neatly 
dressed. He had a full head of dark hair with a remarkable white streak down the center 
and a wide smile that showed many teeth.” [FIG. 3.01] But Moholy’s physique bore a 
memorable imperfection as well, a lone visible trace of the geopolitical entanglements 
that defined his early adulthood. “His left thumb was permanently bent and thickened 
from a wound he had received as an artillery officer in World War I,” Hattula recalls. 
“After that happened, his left hand never appears in photographs.”1 
An officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army before even turning twenty, Moholy 
spent a considerable time at the front, suspending his law studies and learning instead the 
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techniques of military map-making—his first draftsmanly endeavors. Confronted with the 
brutality of mechanized warfare and trench life, he turned to art during his rehabilitation, 
clean-lined cartography giving way to a more subjective reckoning with the war’s effects 
on humans and landscapes. “He started with poetry, and continued with drawings,” 
explains Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, his second wife, documenting the war-ravaged bodies of 
soldiers as well as “the tragic line of barbed wire” that marked the front—a line that may 
well have been built from his own maps, and was certainly recorded in them.2 [FIG. 3.02 
and 3.03] He was shot in the hand in 1916, and he spent the remainder of his service in 
field hospitals in Italy. Moholy was treated for shell shock, a psychological affliction so 
poorly understood at the time that the cures were often worse than the malady, as well as 
the wounds that impaired, however subtly, his left thumb. 
“Is it right to become a painter in times of social revolution?” Moholy asked in a 
notebook entry from May 1919, not long after his recovery and return to Budapest, where 
he had begun taking evening painting courses from the Hungarian Fauve Róbert Berény. 
“I have seen what is needed beyond food. I have finally learned to grasp what is 
biological happiness in its complete meaning … I can give life as a painter.”3 This idea of 
“biological happiness” would trace through the rest of Moholy’s career—being stated as 
a “biological bill of rights” in his posthumous Vision in Motion—and it was this life-
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giving impulse that led to his embrace of Constructivism.4 Like many artists of the 
period, Moholy’s work was neither a lament against the machinic milieu that pervaded an 
industrializing Europe nor a symptom of the “reactionary modernism,” to use Jeffrey 
Herf’s term, that seemed to lead inextricably to fascism.5 His art and pedagogy called 
instead for a reconciliation between technical progress and biological happiness, and a 
principled opposition to the geopolitical ends to which “the machine” had been recently 
harnessed. This was an attempt at reconciliation already well underway elsewhere—it 
had taken hold in the field of architecture to some extent, but more notably in the rise of 
an alliance between psychology and the administration of urban life that was being 
pursued across a number of disciplines. 
In a 1922 edition of the Hungarian magazine Ma, Moholy published 
“Constructivism and the Proletariat,” a text whose socialist radicalism would gradually 
fade from Moholy’s thinking, or at least from his rhetoric. In it, he describes his idea for a 
“socialism of vision” that seemed to be something of an answer to his rhetorical question 
about the rightness of painting during social revolution. “Constructivism is not confined 
to the picture frame and the pedestal,” he writes. “It expands into industrial design, into 
houses, objects, forms. It is the socialism of vision—the common property of all men.” 
On some level this is simply Moholy’s take on the “art into life” dictum common to the 
era, familiar especially in the countries of Eastern Europe bearing intimate witness to the 
Soviet experiment. But the phrase already lays the groundwork for his coming interest in 
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the psychotechnical unity of sociopolitical organization and the individual’s perceptual 
abilities, a particular strand of the “unity of science” being sought by the logical 
positivists of the era. This search for an emotional and perceptual fullness—an applied 
science to the core, indebted to both American pragmatist philosophy and its European 
psychologist followers—was a continuing refrain in Moholy’s work, even as his 
preferred terminology ebbed and flowed with the times. “The process and the goal are 
one,” he writes—“the spiritual conquest of a century of technology.”6  
For Moholy, early abstractions like “The Peace Machine Devouring Itself” and 
“The Machine of Emotional Discharge,” both 1920, make the stakes of his own art 
therapy quite clear, with their playfully pseudo-mechanistic depictions of political and 
psychological processes.7 [FIG. 3.04] That these drawings find something of a forebear in 
diagrams like Wilhelm Wundt’s “Schema of the Hypothetical Connections of the 
Apperception Center” in his Grundzuge der Physiologischen Psychologie (1874) has less 
to do with a shared formalism of lines and circles than a shared sense that perception and 
subjectivity were grounded in psychophysiological relays. [FIG. 3.05] (It is telling that 
Wundt diagramed the human sensorium and his machines for testing that sensorium in a 
parallel manner).8 Wundt’s insistence on plumbing the interface between interior life and 
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external stimuli was taken up by Moholy in these early diagrams and his later 
pedagogies, and the fact that this particular diagram of Wundt was a speculative 
abstraction, relying “upon conjecture and tentative hypothesis” since “physiology 
furnishes us with nothing more than the general principles of nerve mechanics,” makes 
the distance between it and Moholy’s artistic creations less daunting still.9 
Moholy’s notion of “spiritual conquest,” meanwhile, can be seen at the core of the 
cultural recovery being undertaken at places like the Bauhaus. His career and thought 
were bracketed and informed by the two world wars, even more so than most of his 
fellow artists and architects occupying that temporal frame we imprecisely refer to as 
“interwar modernism.” The Great War (and the “century of technology” it sat squarely 
within) was a defining experience for a cadre of modernists who rose to prominence in 
Weimar Germany, with postwar urban recovery as a visible fact of daily life, and Moholy 
was not alone among his colleagues in using art to work through the war’s aftermath. 
Oskar Schlemmer had also served as a military cartographer, in Alsace, after being 
wounded on the Western Front, his wartime diaries and letters moving between the 
anxieties of war and a commitment to artistic life.10 Likewise, the political stridency of 
the theater director Erwin Piscator, with whom Moholy collaborated on several stagings 
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across the 1920s, stemmed from an epiphany Piscator experienced in the trenches at 
Ypres in August 1914—“something was shattered forever: illusion. The curtain 
separating life from stage was torn away.”11 Walter Gropius, the founder of the Bauhaus 
whose architectural practice was interrupted when he was called to the front less than a 
month after the famed 1914 Werkbund exhibition in Cologne, earned two Iron Crosses as 
a sergeant, having survived an airplane crash, been buried alive in a building collapse, 
and seen heavy casualties in his four years of combat.12 These are not war stories told in 
the name of propping up heroic personal narratives, nor to further valorize an institution 
that has been over-privileged in historical narratives, since its exhaustively publicized 
beginnings, as the supposed epicenter of artistic modernism. They remind us, however 
anecdotally, that understanding the feverish creativity of the Bauhaus and Weimar 
Germany more generally as a peacetime interlude misses the critical continuities—
technoscientific, political, aesthetic, economic, and indeed psychological—between the 
war and its tentative, overdetermined peace.13 
The curriculum of the Bauhaus was described and diagrammed as an integrated 
totality. It is the very picture of wholeness, with Bau, building, occupying the core and 
the introductory courses [Vorlehre] surrounding and perhaps attempting to contain an 
unruly gathering of disciplines and materials that might otherwise escape the 
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gravitational center of architecture. The Bauhaus’s own building in Dessau, designed by 
Gropius in 1925 and completed the following year, performs the same sleight of hand. If 
the plan aspires to a kind of centrifugal dynamism, pinwheeling outward, its effect in the 
end remains that a self-contained and seemingly total object, visually reconciling the 
vicissitudes of art, craft, and life itself behind a tightly articulated façade of glass and 
reinforced concrete. The tensions implicit in the gathering of disciplines and ideas under 
one roof, conceptually and spatially, never approached resolution. As many of its 
protagonists immigrated to the United States and began schools of their own, the fault 
lines that had always run through the Bauhaus became more evident as its curriculum was 
divided into constituent parts. Black Mountain College (under Josef Albers), the 
Graduate School of Design at Harvard (under Gropius), and the Department of 
Architecture at the Illinois Institute of Technology (under Ludwig Mies van der Rohe) 
each laid claim to the pedagogy of the Bauhaus. So did Hannes Meyer, as he embarked 
with his cadre known as the “Red Bauhaus” to participate in Soviet construction.14 Each 
garnered starkly different results, and the very failure of the school to maintain its 
bounded completeness might be seen a counterintuitive but critical aspect of its legacy. 
What grew out of the First World War, then, was dispersed by the prelude to the 
Second. But this conceptual fragmentation was also a moment of clarification. The 
Second World War offered an occasion to examine again just what was at stake in the 
Bauhaus pedagogy to begin with, returning, despite the scatteredness of its personnel, to a 
project of exploring the human stakes of technological change through design—an 
                                               
14 Daniel Talesnik, “The Itinerant Red Bauhaus, or the Third Emigration” (PhD dissertation, 




inevitably compromised project, whose pursuit at the original Bauhaus was always mired 
in the school’s self-presentation within the still nascent discourse of modernism, but a 
project that resonated in unexpected ways as the Bauhaus Americanized and adapted 
itself to an emerging disciplinary and geopolitical order, one defined by a biopolitics of 
economic subjectivity that was advanced by psychotechnics. 
It was Moholy’s School of Design in Chicago, founded in 1937 as the New 
Bauhaus, that made the most of this heritage. (The writer E.M. Benson had called for an 
American Bauhaus in June 1934, presciently comparing Moholy—the Bauhaus method’s 
“most passionate expounder”—and his “relevantly concrete statements” in The New 
Vision to the “flaccid shibboleths” emanating from the Academy of Art at Cranbrook. 
“What we need are not more second-rate hothouse easel painters—we have many more 
than we know what to do with at present—but many more crackerjack industrial 
designers.”)15 The “New Bauhaus” moniker had been adopted with Gropius’ blessing, 
before being renamed not long thereafter when its original backers, the Association of 
Arts and Industries, withdrew their support.16 The School was renamed again as the 
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Institute of Design in 1944, a marked turning point in its administration and pedagogical 
mission. (This chapter focuses primarily on the period of the early 1940s, and will use 
“School of Design” throughout.) Moholy adopted the Bauhaus’ curricular diagram as 
well as its logo, designed by Schlemmer in 1922. [FIG. 3.06] And among the ex-
Bauhäusler, it was also Moholy who took most seriously a possible rapprochement 
between the effects of war and the creative and productive demands of life under 
technological industrialization—a possibility that required Moholy to undertake a second 
rapprochement between his socialist principles and the corporate capitalism of the United 
States. 
The School of Design was on a war footing from its earliest days, embracing with 
Moholian verve the constraints and opportunities of military mobilization. Metal 
shortages led to patents for wooden bedsprings; a market for governmental 
communication led to public graphics projects, including a course on War Displays and 
the “War Art” show; fears of aerial bombardment led to a camouflage workshop under 
György Kepes and architectural theses on air raid shelters. Student projects during the 
wartime period ranged from the fantastical to the pragmatic, but focused relentlessly on 
finding productive sympathies between industry, design, and the war effort.17 Most 
remarkably, and most tellingly of his interest in psychotechnics and the rehabilitory 
complex it was being brought to bear on, Moholy committed the school to the task of 
occupational therapy for veterans and training therapists in the techniques of art 
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education. Knowing full well what it meant to adjust to life after the front, he sought to 
create a laboratory environment in which that transition would be abetted and improved 
in the face of the extensive physical and psychological barriers to resuming simple 
“normalcy”—a project in helping you return from the war, as J.D. Salinger’s Esmé 
memorably put it, “with all your faculties intact.”18 
“Faculties” was just the word. In the case of Moholy’s occupational therapy, the 
term’s connotation of abilities and dexterity (facility, facile, the Latin root facere 
meaning “to make or construct”) operated precisely in tandem with its reference to 
branches of disciplinary knowledge, the bridging of disciplinary faculties described by 
the Bauhaus’ curricular diagram. And for Moholy, the returning veteran was the figure 
through which the question of faculty might be most urgently addressed. Indeed, his 
mission was to exceed mere “intactness,” working instead towards “the physical and 
mental vitalization of the handicapped by an indirect and subconscious ‘education,’” 
accompanied by multi-faceted vocational training, that would leave the wounded veteran 
(or the injured industrial worker, or the disabled more generally) “better than before.”19 
In this regard, Moholy’s pedagogical work offers a point of confluence between 
the artistic practices of the Bauhaus diaspora and the contemporaneous concern of 
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psychologists and psychotechnicians with hands, eyes, and the praxis of working life. 
This marks the School of Design as a participant in a broader social history, one 
grounded in a configuration of sympathetic but seldom conjoined discourses—American 
industrial and managerial psychology; the German concept of Krüppelfürsorge, or the 
welfare of the handicapped, which often focused on twinned concepts of vocational 
guidance and vocational training; pragmatist philosophy and developmental theories of 
subjectivity; and the artistic imperatives of Constructivist-inflected modernism. It was 
within these preoccupations—with epistemological roots in the nineteenth century which 
had been gathered into a distinctive constellation in the early twentieth—that Moholy 
sought his socialism of vision and his technospiritual conquest of the hopefully postwar 
world, and around which his pedagogy revolved. 
Moholy’s open-ended but analytical commitment to the rehabilitation of veterans 
was arguably at odds with his refusal to allow photography of his left hand. His right 
hand was one of the most visible of the modern movement. In an iconic Bauhaus-era 
portrait by his first wife Lucia, Moholy smiles and reaches forward to block the camera 
lens—a moment of candid self-deprecation, perhaps, but also the prominent display of a 
strong and dexterous hand. [FIG 3.07] Among the magic tricks of the photographic 
negative is its reversibility; where a left hand suited the composition of a 1931 cover of 
Foto-Qualität (attributed to Moholy), he simply reversed the right hand of his 1926 
“Photogram with Hand.” [FIGS. 3.08 and 3.09] Further, the hand-eye nexus was the 
prevailing concern of the School of Design’s pedagogy. If “having a good hand” had, in 
the arts, previously implied giftedness and an ability to draw, the turn toward vocational 




were bearers of training rather than talent, and moreover that they could be different, an 
egalitarianism that sat well at a place like the School of Design. As this chapter will 
argue, this differential attitude toward the question of dexterity was crucial in Moholy’s 
rehabilitory pedagogy. 
That Moholy would not explicitly frame his work as psychotechnical (though he 
had ample acquaintances and affinities with psychotechnicians) shows the degree to 
which the language and methods of applied psychology—along with its premise that the 
“administration” of life was a central tenet of modernity—had percolated throughout the 
architectural discipline and become central to a generation’s worth of work. Moholy’s 
incorporation of the precepts and instruments of physiological psychology into the 
“laboratory” environment of art, beginning in his time at the Bauhaus, was in a certain 
sense belated. Zeynep Çelik Alexander, in her work on the epistemology of “kinaesthetic 
knowing,” documents how the promise of an “aesthetics from below” (a term coined by 
Gustav Fechner)—or the idea that artistic production could be fruitfully and objectively 
guided by research into the reception of sensory stimuli—had generally been discredited 
by end of the first World War.20 But that war also marked a shift in the ends to which 
physiological psychology was put, with the question of rehabilitation and urban 
administration now entering into the formerly idealist space of experimental aesthetics. 
This pragmatic and administrative turn was defined by the appearance of psychotechnics, 
in particular its alliance between academic laboratory and governmental and industrial 
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bureaucracies, and this new tendency can be seen in Moholy’s only apparently untimely 
interest in psychophysiological methods. 
In looking at Moholy’s interest in occupational therapy, then—a brief run of 
courses, research, and articles that might otherwise seem incidental to his decades of art 
and teaching—we might more clearly cast the Bauhaus diaspora as a participant, if a 
sometimes tentative one, in a growing discourse around rehabilitation and vocational 
management. Moholy’s occupational therapy also marks its own endpoint for that 
generation, I argue, as the coming decades saw the rise (in architecture as in the sciences 
more broadly) of fields like ergonomics, environmental psychology, and behaviorism, 
each a specialized offshoot of psychotechnical thought—a post-World War II transition 
in the nature of the academic-military-industrial complex discussed at greater length in 
my introduction, and which took some of its shape, to an extent that has not been fully 
recognized in the field of architecture, from post-World War I thinking on disability and 
rehabilitation. This chapter explores Moholy’s School of Design as moment of transition, 
in some sense a second closure of the Bauhaus idea, and a moment of confluence—a site 
in which to think about the intertwined histories of artistic institutions, rehabilitory 
practices, and the demands of pedagogy, in wartime and in peace. 
 
 
“Commercial Battles of Self-Support” 
A year before the end of the First World War, the architect Albert Kahn delivered an 




concluded. Kahn was not shy about the business potentials to be found in the rebuilding 
of European cities. “All possible assistance,” he tells his audience of Detroiters, should 
“be given fairly and honorably, not without profit, but certainly without excessive 
profits.” This was a common refrain, with many prominent architects, Le Corbusier 
among them, arguing similar points—down to a shared advocacy for one of the founding 
materials of modern architecture. “Of the many and varied structural materials required 
for the reconstruction of the devastated areas of Europe,” Kahn announces, “none will 
play a more important part or be made to serve more generally than reinforced concrete.” 
But here Kahn makes a somewhat startling turn: “The labor required for reinforced 
concrete work is largely unskilled. Even the maimed and crippled soldier may be made 
use of.”21 
Kahn’s language sounds callous to the twenty-first century ear, especially in his 
call to rehabilitate nations and cities while assuming that the war-wounded were useful 
only for comparatively menial labor. Architectural damage is reversible, he implies, 
while mental and bodily damage is not. (That Kahn actively promoted the deskilling of 
construction—if not of deskilling of architecture itself, given the internal logics of his 
own office—warrants some scrutiny in this regard.) But Kahn’s thoughts were of a piece 
with the prevailing mindset about the status of the veteran towards the close of World 
War I, and he was not the only architect to suggest the employment of wounded veterans 
in the creation of housing. Adolf Loos’s Friedenstadt, for example—literally “Peace 
City,” so named by Hans Kampffmeyer, a German advocate for Garden City principles—
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provided housing for the war-wounded while asking for their participation in its 
construction. (Kampffmeyer’s treatise on Die Friedenstadt, like Kahn’s speech, dates to 
1918.)22 This turn toward providing not just accommodation but vocation was a 
significant advance. At that time, given a medical and still-young psychological 
profession relatively unequipped to deal with new forms of war casualties, many 
wounded veterans were simply warehoused or taught skills that have since become 
synonymous with functional uselessness—notably basket-weaving, images of which 
appear in countless texts on the care of the handicapped. “Many red-blooded men were 
seriously taught to make baskets, wonderful baskets,” complain the efficiency experts 
Frank and Lillian Gilbreth in an article from 1917, “that all possible customers could 
easily go without.”23 
But the war also marked a turning point for veterans in two interrelated ways, 
both of which were linked to the early stirrings of what would come to be known more 
broadly as psychotechnics. The first was an increased attention to prosthetics, as their 
production became standardized, their design became medicalized, and their appearance 
became increasingly realistic. Here, Europe was catching up with the United States, 
which had long led in the field of artificial limbs (in no small part due to the fact that 
some 35,000 Union veterans of the Civil War received a “limb allowance” to help their 
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recovery and to stimulate a nascent prosthetics industry). World War I also saw dramatic 
changes in this field with the institution of the Army’s “Limb Lab,” which exists today, 
and a newfound interest in how artificial limbs and the imperatives of industrial 
management intersected.24 
In Germany, prosthetics became an integral part of the cultural and artistic 
imaginaries of the moment, changing the lives of their recipients, to be sure, but also 
refiguring the era’s understanding of bodies and work. The suggestively symbolic quality 
of prosthetics, particularly as rendered in modernist and Dadaist artworks, set the stage 
for prosthetics to play a central role in the artistic and architectural theory of the 1990s, 
generally as a psychoanalytical trope of supplementation rather than a material alteration 
of the human/work exchange.25 But beneath the expressiveness of these bodily alterations 
one also sees the literal retooling of a vast population of workers, a recalibration of the 
human machine.26 (It’s telling that a prosthetic aimed at aesthetic verisimilitude was 
known in Germany as a Sonntagsarm, “Sunday arm.” Monday through Saturday were 
reserved for a more productivist form of prosthesis.) The cultural theorist Peter Sloterdijk 
describes this new figure in his Critique of Cynical Reason (1983):  
The great machine does not ask whether it is “individuals” 
who are here active for it, or units of human and artificial 
limbs. A man is a man. In the textbooks on the maimed and 
the writings of the medical-technical industry, a highly 
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apposite image of the human being emerges: Homo 
prostheticus, who is supposed to say a wildly joyful Yes to 
everything that says No to the “individuality” of 
“individuals.”27 
The historian Mia Fineman makes use of an image that bears repeating, a plaster 
cast of a classical statue outfitted with a metal prosthesis—the so-called “Spitzy statue” 
of the Viennese orthopedist Hans Spitzy. [FIG. 3.10] “Rather than restoring the lost 
wholeness and organic self-sufficiency of the human form,” she writes, the prosthetic 
“functions as a conspicuous token of irreparable lack.”28 This “lack” was precisely what 
was meant to be erased in the process of postwar recovery. “Rehabilitation,” writes 
Henri-Jacques Stiker, “marks the appearance of a culture that attempts to complete the act 
of identification, of making identical. This act will cause the disabled to disappear and 
with them all that is lacking, in order to assimilate them, drown them, dissolve them in 
the greater and single social whole.”29  
For Fineman, this fragmented and supplementary function of prostheses becomes 
an integral part of many paintings and collages of the period—most of all, Moholy’s 
conceptualization of the “photo-eye,” in which the camera is cast as a kind of optical 
prosthetic, and whereby the aesthetic practices of the modern responded to “the 
weakened obsolescence of the human sensorium.”30 The systemic rationalization of 
artificial limbs and their function brought with it the possibility of rationalizing and 
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augmenting perception itself. No longer “whole”—a wholeness which Moholy held to be 
a bounding limit rather than an ideal—this prosthetic imagination implied a new human 
sensorium and skillset, beyond mere perfectibility. The “socialism of vision,” then, and 
Moholy’s notion that the wounded veteran would emerge “better than before,” evince a 
revised idea of rehabilitation, one that might not be merely compensatory but productive 
of a newly artistic-political subjectivity. 
The second change in how veterans were perceived in the aftermath of the First 
World War was the rise of vocational rehabilitation, in which the “will to victory” of war 
was replaced, particularly in Germany, with a “will to work,” in the belief that the 
industrial workplace, despite its hazards, remained the proper place for the kind of young 
men who would have been conscripted for combat.31 This was not a postwar phenomenon 
but an extension of the lessons learned from the care of the many workers injured by 
industrial accidents (which led to the development of modern orthopedics toward the end 
of the nineteenth century). And its determinism was also an outcome of the psychological 
sciences of the previous century as well, seen in discourses like Fechner’s 
psychophysics—“an exact theory,” as he describes it, “of the functionally dependent 
relations of body and soul or, more generally, between the material and the mental, of the 
physical and psychological worlds.”32 It is not incidental that Fechner is said to have 
conceptualized the link between physical stimuli and mental sensations during his own 
rehabilitation from an eye disorder, having spent too much time staring at the sun through 
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colored glasses to do research on afterimages. His ensuing withdrawal and seeming 
depression saw him delve deep into religious and metaphysical questions, which led him 
to connect soul and stimulus so vividly—another reminder that such sciences often had 
rehabilitory origins.33  
The pre-war foundation in 1909 of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Krüppelfürsorge 
[German Association for the Care of the Handicapped] marked the increasing influence 
in Germany of the work of Konrad Biesalski, an orthopedist and social advocate who 
began studying the problem of industrial labor before later turning to the combat-
wounded after World War I. Known for his call to “treat not the single foot, but the entire 
man,” he proposed a legal right to public assistance in “de-crippling,” Entkrüppelung. 
Biesalski’s texts make clear the ways in which “cripple” was framed as not as a strictly 
biomechanical or physiological phenomenon but an economic category, representing a 
lack of self-sustaining income—an imperative of an ever-more consolidated global 
capitalism. (Economic agency remains one of several categories explored in 
contemporary disability studies; the literature around it in the United States saw particular 
flourishings after 1945 with the conclusion of the second World War, and after 1990’s 
passage of the American with Disabilities Act.)34 In a diagram of what such a public 
bureaucracy might look like, he outlines a tripartite scheme of orthopedics, education, 
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and vocational training, pointing to this broader and only partially medicalized 
understanding of what it meant to be handicapped in the industrial age.35 [FIG 3.11] 
While this remained a largely mechanistic and tool-oriented view of the problem—as the 
images of vocational training with prosthetics in his Grundriss der Krüppelfürsorge 
evince—Biesalski’s advocacy was a step in understanding prosthetics not only as 
supplements to the functioning of the human body, but as an interface between the 
individual and the realm of economic vitality (a vitality, it should be said, that had gender 
and racial implications).36 [FIG 3.12] 
Here the United States had lagged behind Europe prior to the First World War, 
having long been known for dealing with veterans through generous pensions. But by 
1916, the cost of Civil War pensions had outstripped the original cost of the war itself, 
and as the federal government again faced the likelihood of large-scale casualties—at the 
height of the Progressive era and its “efficiency movement”—it became clear that change 
was in order. Woodrow Wilson’s amendments to the War Risk Insurance Act 
(particularly Public Law No. 65–90 of October 1917), followed by the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act of June 1918, marked a shift from the assumption that the wounded 
veteran would be supported by the state in the form of a pension (though pensions did 
continue in reduced form) to the belief that the state might provide the necessary care, 
equipment, and retraining to allow the veteran to return to a more “normal,” which is to 
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say “self-supporting,” life.37 Even as Germany and the United States were fighting on 
opposite sides of the trenches of Europe, the closing years of the war found them in 
alignment as homo prostheticus became a subspecies of homo oeconomicus—an idea that 
will be taken up in the conclusion—thanks in large part to the incredibly active German-
American exchange in the fields of applied psychology and industrial management in the 
years prior to the war.38 
Frank and Lillian Gilbreth had embarked on their interest in the handicapped 
(likewise drawing on injured workers initially) well before the United States had even 
entered the war, seeing that population as an especially thorny issue in their crusade for 
efficiency, a crusade that equated motion studies with “an increase in national wealth.”39 
“Before the breaking out of the European War,” Frank Gilbreth wrote in 1914, “this age 
might well have prided itself upon being an age of waste elimination.”40 (He had spent 
several of the months leading up to the beginning of World War I in Berlin, working with 
the psychotechnician Georg Schlesinger and pursuing efficiency consulting contracts.)41 
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The “industrial cripple” was already a familiar figure in America as in Germany, and the 
nature of mechanized warfare was such that vast casualties were expected even before 
American intervention began—to the point that the Gilbreths had some pause about 
publicizing their thoughts on the matter. “This is not the time to bring the problem of the 
war cripples before the youth of the nation in such harrowing form as to prevent 
enlisting,” they wrote in 1917, “or in anywise diminish the militant spirit that must exist 
if our national plans are to be successfully carried through.”42 But the urgency of finding 
answers for the human costs of war outweighed the potential negative effects of their 
publicity. In a letter to Hugo Münsterberg, who seems not to have written back, Frank 
Gilbreth ponders the immense task of “preparing the injured soldiers for their commercial 
battles of self-support, when the war is over, and all the countries have discovered that 
they will be unable to pension the great numbers who have been mutilated or 
incapacitated.”43 As with Biesalski before him, what the Gilbreth looked to rehabilitate is 
not just injury but economic subjectivity. 
Frank Gilbreth’s ideas about efficiency were entangled with architecture from his 
days as a teenaged bricklayer, developing into a series of patents and designs for brick 
and concrete construction and eventually culminating in his Concrete System of 1908. 
(The Gilbreth System and the Kahn System frequently show up on parallel pages of trade 
journals in these years, particularly those specializing in reinforced concrete 
construction.) Here Gilbreth positioned himself as both inventor and contractor, only later 
turning the experimental fruit of this research—motion study—into a form of 
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consultancy. That transition also marks a break from a more doggedly materialist 
Taylorism, as Gilbreth (now joined by Lilian) asserted the social interest of their 
Progressive-era rationalism and began taking more of an interest in the so-called “human 
element” in 1914, the same year that Münsterberg codified the idea of psychotechnics. 
The Gilbreths’ work on industrial efficiency was easily translated into these 
“commercial battles of self-support,” bolstering and extending some of their already 
existing core beliefs—among them the promise of specialization. “The more work is 
specialized, the more quickly he can be so assigned,” they write in an essay on “the 
problem of the crippled soldier” that predates the United States’ entry into the war, “and 
the more thoroughly he can get satisfactory results.”44 Workers, in this sense, can be 
understood in the same manner that discrete motions were understood in the Gilbreths’ 
earlier motion study research on bricklaying—adding up to something composite, with 
ideal methods and tooling happening on a more specific basis.  
 Despite their insistence on listening to soldiers—“what the man himself thinks,” 
as Lillian writes decades later—their assumption is not that of an open-ended 
rehabilitation but rather the assignment of specific tasks, a tendency that fit naturally with 
the rise of vocational bureaucracies in the early twentieth century.45 (This is also a 
presupposition that stems from pursuing research on behalf of a corporate and industrial 
clientele.) Frank Gilbreth’s advocacy and research had a way of drifting into something 
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closer to labor brokerage: “I am wandering [sic] if you want an outlet for your wounded 
soldiers,” he writes to one William Stewart Ayars, a Canadian practitioner of motion 
study. “I have a client in Canada who is interested in the making of certain articles out of 
cotton cloth, and I think that he could use all the cripples that you could turn over to 
him.”46 Their employment-specific texts are marked by a language of mutual benefit and 
a focus on growth industries, including a tract on “The Conservation of the World’s 
Teeth.” There is a theatrics to this, with the Gilbreths relying on a sense of improbability 
to demonstrate their genius—“we are prepared to furnish at cost to Teachers of Cripples, 
standard micromotion studies of a one-armed, one-eyed, legless dentist, cleaning teeth 
with most satisfactory results.”47 That the patient was obliged to assist by using their own 
hand to hold open their mouth was little impediment to showcasing the virtuosity of this 
particular dentist, and by extension the virtuosity of the Gilbreths’ methods.48 [FIG. 3.13] 
What exactly is being “conserved” here”? In an oft-repeated story, Frank Gibreth 
was once asked: “What do you want to save time for? What are you going to do with it?” 
His response: “For work, if you love that best. For education, for beauty, for art, for 
pleasure.”49 But as he knew well, given his stated aim to improve the “national wealth,” 
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what is being conserved is not simply time nor teeth nor the bodies and psyches of 
wounded soldiers, but rather labor, viewed primarily with regard to its incorporation into 
the national economy. In a preface to Motion Study for the Handicapped, Colonel W.O. 
Owen of the U.S. Army extolls the Gilbreth’s invention of the “time and distance moving 
picture” and the “animated diagram” as devices for the treatment of the injured veteran. 
He continues:  
They are both world propositions, and the country which 
realizes this fact and makes these two methods a part of 
their national life, not only for their handicapped but for 
their school children in the primary schools, in the 
secondary schools, and in the post graduate schools, will be 
the country that will be best prepared in that center of all 
things human, for it will be the center of human 
intelligence—far better than being the center of banking, 
merchandize, or any other single thing, for it embraces 
them all.50 
A “world proposition” vital to a national interest, a centering of human intelligence—this 
is as precise a formulation of any describing the vocational-administrative complex that 
was being outlined by psychotechnicians and efficiency experts, and it illustrates the 
urgencies that underpinned this proposed remaking of rehabilitation as the remit 
“occupational therapy”—a new field, if one that consolidated a number of existing 
variations—in the aftermath of the First World War. (An early and frequently cited 
definition of the field of occupational therapy was George Edward Barton’s Teaching the 
Sick of 1919, a text that both the Gilbreths and Moholy-Nagy drew on.)51 And Gilbreth’s 
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aims were an equally natural outgrowth of the “dietetic” aspects of Pragmatist 
philosophy, to borrow a word used by the psychologist G. Stanley Hall, “efficient for 
living, working, and thinking,” a directness of approach that Hall contrasted to the 
“toilsome reading of Wundt’s ponderous tomes.”52 What distinguishes the 
psychophysiology of the psychotechnician is its application to the ends of vocational 
management. 
A world war later, Lilian Gilbreth was among the listed speakers in Moholy-
Nagy’s course on occupational therapy at the School of Design in the fall of 1943, 
alongside other individuals who will figure in Moholy’s thinking on occupational 
therapy—the psychologist Franz Alexander, for example, and Dr. Conrad Sommer, the 
chief medical officer of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare. [FIG. 3.14] One might 
imagine that Lilian Gilbreth’s remarks were approximately in line with her article from 
earlier that same year titled “The Place of Motion Study in Rehabilitation Work.”53 She 
begins by noting some of the differences in the European and American methods for 
dealing with veterans in the First World War. “The Europeans emphasized a study of the 
impairments of the individual, and supplied him with mechanical limbs … which would 
make it possible for him to function in the manner he did before he was handicapped,” 
she writes. The problem with this method, she argues, is that “these mechanical adjuncts 
were expensive and complicated and difficult to keep in repair” and that the veteran’s 
reincorporation into the work force only worked well when the requirements of the job 
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itself hadn’t changed—though “new machines, tools, or methods might have become a 
part of the operation.” The U.S. version, at least as it was envisioned by those concerned 
with motion studies, instead looked at “the job itself in order to adapt it to the capabilities 
of the returned handicapped worker,” with their “mechanical adjuncts” more of “a matter 
of psychological satisfaction” than a necessity for employment. This squares with the 
Gilbreth’s larger thoughts on specialization—rather than following Bielaski’s dictum to 
“treat not the single foot, but the entire man,” this more strictly occupational view asked 
instead what kind of jobs could be performed adequately (though like Bielaski, it 
envisioned employment-specific “tooling” of its workers). Lilian Gilbreth acknowledges 
in this text that the medical field will have its own interests in the care of the injured 
veteran, that occupational therapy alone is inadequate—but frames her advocacy within a 
cadre of industrialists as a means “to integrate the services of the different groups 
involved so that we shall have so far as the individual handicapped is concerned one 
adequate, remedial program based upon consideration of his past, his present, and his 
future.”54 Equally important in this emphasis on an economic interface with industry—
and also vital to Moholy’s own conceptualization of rehabilitation—was Gilbreth’s 
contrast of this American model to the European desire to “make it possible for him to 
function in the manner he did before he was handicapped.”  
The European model she describes is a restorative ethos, one that was often 
implied in discussions of postwar rebuilding (whether of cities or bodies), a conversation 
less necessary in the context of a United States fighting remote wars. By contrast, the 
                                               





“return” to a wholly integrated body—even if it admits to its prosthetic supplementation, 
as in the case of the Spitzy statue—is framed by Gilbreth and Moholy alike as a rearguard 
aspiration, a nostalgia for “before” that belies the potential productivity (whether 
industrial or creative) that stems from the remaking of the self implied by this 
understanding of rehabilitation. In Moholy’s “Better than Before,” an essay published in 
MIT’s Technology Review that describes his work on occupational therapy at the School 
of Design, he frames his rehabilitory model as a “new technique” that “can awaken 
hidden capacities,” rather than merely “restore the patient to the level of his normal 
status.”55 Following those who saw unchecked modernization as a kind of degeneration 
of the species (“in the nineteenth century the mental health of the people deteriorated as a 
consequence of rapid industrial development,” Moholy avers), the text begins as a 
characteristic call for an integration of biological, physiological, and psychological needs, 
of a piece with his longstanding organicism.56 This positions the war as a particular state 
of urgency, but one which is part of a larger transformation in modern life—implying a 
broader need for rehabilitation than the immediately war-wounded.  
Like the Gilbreths, Moholy derides the “arts or crafts milieu” into which the 
rehabilitating veteran was frequently placed, “a short-term program that does not take 
cognizance of modern technological developments,” a kind of “diversional therapy” in 
which “‘expression’ is stimulated as entertainment for the sake of killing time.”57 Like 
                                               
55 Moholy-Nagy, “Better than Before,” 47, 21. 
56 Moholy-Nagy, 21. 
57 Moholy-Nagy, 21. Also like the Gilbreths, Moholy imagined a progression through tasks like 
blind typing and blind reassembly of objects—two areas of study that had particularly interested 
the Gilbreths in the 1910s, including Frank Gilbreth’s creation of exercises in the blind reassembly 




both the Gilbreths and Bielaski, Moholy bemoans the administrative barriers between 
aspects of veteran care, in which “occupational therapy—a kind of ‘repair therapy’ 
during hospitalization—does not include planning for vocational rehabilitation which 
may follow hospitalization.”58 And in keeping with the Gilbreths’ belief that industrialists 
were to be the main vector of establishing this kind of vocational rehabilitation—just as 
they were to be the main conduit of funding for the School of Design—there is an 
economic mandate to Moholy’s vision, though he moderates it relative to the more firmly 
efficiency-minded Gilbreths. “Compensation,” he writes of pensioned soldiers, 
although it guarantees only a minimum existence for the 
handicapped, often leads to passivity. In destroying the 
initiative to return to normal life, this well-deserved 
compensation sometimes proves a disadvantage to the 
handicapped. Without invalidation of the practice of 
financial compensation, the new idea of constructive 
rehabilitation may be understood as a new social ‘reward,’ 
infinitely more valuable than the small monthly allowance 
paid by the insurance companies or by government and 
state agencies. 
Moholy is quick to add that this is not “an attempt to relieve public and private agencies 
of their financial obligations toward the handicapped” but is rather the “reincorporation 
of the handicapped as a creative and responsible member into society.”59 
This integrationist outlook is an evidently worthy one, and has come to be 
accepted as a fundamental tenet of disability rights and equality—but also points to the 
rise of the vocational state and the model of economic subjectivity it entails, granting it a 
place in the aesthetic and artistic life of the soon-to-be-“postwar” United States. That this 
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remains a prevailing attitude toward disability has more recently been marked by the 
concept of “ablenationalism,” a continued valorization of the laboring body as that of the 
“proper” citizen.60 Moholy’s own artistic self-rehabilitation, later expressed as an urge to 
find a “usefulness” for painting in the aftermath of war, certainly guided Moholy’s 
interest in seeing art education as a kind of reconstructive metaphysics—but as he tried to 
institutionalize his occupational therapy methods and bring them into contact with state 
bureaucracies, the concepts and language of industrial efficiency (a field that was 
emerging in the First World War and had been largely consolidated by the Second) were 
unavoidable. If the epistemologies that grounded these discourses stemmed largely from 
a nineteenth-century experimental psychology that had since been cast into doubt, they 
nevertheless took on new forms as they intersected with the politics and historical 
experience of the wars of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, making Moholy’s occupational 




Object Psychotechnics and the “Basicworked Hand” 
In classic Moholian language, the School of Design’s 1941–42 brochure, well before the 
war had overtaken the School’s pedagogical efforts, offers a peculiar description of the 
production of architecture. Underneath an abstractly Vitruvian figure which is 
                                               





superimposed over a lightly drawn floor plan—a naked, ten-handed body with 
outstretched arms showing range of motion, its head replaced with a single collaged-in 
eye, the monocular vision of the camera-eye, perhaps—one finds the following caption: 
“Build … The eye visioning, the townplanning brain, the basicworked hand, synthesize 
new life forms for today’s man.”61 [FIG. 3.15] 
The perceptual complex of sight, touch, and thought was central to Moholy’s 
interest in technical prostheses, and it was common to both the materialist and 
metaphysical versions of spatial experience, a shared assumption between 
psychotechnicians and philosophers. To that extent, the synthesis he describes is a 
familiar one, as the concepts underpinning the physiological psychology of the nineteenth 
century had, by the beginning of the twentieth, seeped their way into the most broadly 
theoretical texts of other fields. To take the example of Georg Simmel’s short essay titled 
“The Handle” (1900)—a text often cited by writers interested in objects and, more 
recently, the notion of “thing theory”—one encounters this triangulation of eye, brain, 
and hand as they frame the body’s relationship to its “adjuncts” (to borrow Lillian 
Gilbreth’s term). Simmel describes this relationship as a sort of conduit through which 
the “unanalyzable secret of life” is able to flow. Sandwiched inside a paragraph that is 
ostensibly out to consider the organic unity of vessel and stem in certain shallow bowls, 
he writes: 
The tool, as such, has been characterized as an extension of 
the hand or of human organs generally. In effect, just as the 
hand is a tool of the soul, so too the tool is a hand of the 
soul. Although the fact that it is a tool divorces the hand 
from the soul, it does not prevent the process of life from 
                                               




flowing through both in intimate unity; their being both 
apart and together constitutes the unanalyzable secret of 
life. But life reaches out beyond the immediate 
circumference of the body and assimilates the “tool” to 
itself; or better still, a foreign substance becomes a tool in 
that the soul pulls it into its life, into that zone around it 
which fulfills its impulses. The distinction between being 
external to the soul and being within it—simultaneously 
important for the body and of no significance—is, for the 
things beyond the body, both retained and resolved in a 
single act by the great motif of the tool in the stream of a 
life that is unified and transcends itself.62 
The human body, in this description, provisionally incorporates its tools, rendering them 
both of the self and of the world. The “integral self” is no longer the classical body that 
ends at its skin, but rather a mutable assemblage that absorbs technology as it suits the 
needs of action and perception. If the psychotechnical understanding of hands, eyes, and 
minds was a pragmatic one—willing to assume that the interface of hand, eye, and tool 
simply worked, and could be studied empirically—it relies to some extent on an idea that 
is articulated with particular eloquence by Simmel, that “distinction” (of inside and 
outside, of self and other, of body and technology) might be “of no significance” in the 
making of modern subjectivity. And it explains something of the eye / brain / hand nexus 
that Moholy describes in the School of Design’s catalog as the locus of building.  
Psychotechnics only officially arrived on the Bauhaus Lehrplan under the 
directorship of Hannes Meyer, by which point Moholy had moved to London. [FIG. 3.16] 
But Moholy had an active exchange with the psychotechnician Fritz Giese during his 
time at the Bauhaus and was steeped in the precepts of perceptual psychology. Giese 
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wrote advertising copy for Moholy’s “Painting Photography Film,” complementing him 
for “merging ideas and mentalities that one suspects will provide fifty years of 
foundations and building blocks for developments in the Bauhaus.”63 Moholy-Nagy 
returned the favor by writing a thorough synopsis of Bauhaus pedagogy for Giese’s 
encyclopedia on the economy of work. Recognizing his audience, he extolls the scientific 
principles of industrial education, while adding that “the technical knowledge of material, 
function, and construction—however refined—is not enough. There remains a certain 
sense,” he writes, “for the imponderables of design.” These imponderables mark a certain 
limit in Moholy’s embrace of psychotechnical thought, an insistence on a metaphysics at 
the heart of Gestaltung that evades the rigors of technical thought. At the Bauhaus, he 
continues, “this sense is rooted in talent, on the one hand, and on the other, in teachings 
that cultivate relational information in all directions.”64 The idea of “talent” would be 
excised from Moholy’s thinking by the time he arrived in Chicago, or, rather, would be 
expanded to assume spatial talent as a fundamental property of the human—but it is the 
latter part of the sentence that here complements talent, and later supersedes it. It 
describes an expansion of the human’s capacities beyond talent as such, a search for 
connections between bodies of knowledge that refigures the nature of artistic work. 
“Relational information in all directions”—this was a distinctly modernist ethic of 
perception, concisely captured by Simmel’s axiom, in “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” 
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that “man is a differentiating creature,” and which sat alongside the essentially 
comparative model of perceptual analysis that grounded Fechnerian psychophysics.65 A 
mental state attuned to relational information, Moholy here implies, is what was being 
cultivated in the “collective-synthetic work” of the Bauhaus. 
As Frederic Schwartz has described, Bauhaus psychotechnics often revolved 
around questions of advertising and the distracted perception of signage in the city. This 
interest is palpable in the overlaps between a graphical project like Moholy’s Dynamik 
der Großstadt (1927) and Giese’s book Girlkultur (1925), with its “long, ecstatic 
passages on the rhythm and tempo of the metropolis … indeed, both were working in a 
contemporary genre that cut across media in the attempt to represent urban modernity 
through the complex interplay of body, machine, and movement.”66 (Anson Rabinbach 
has contrasted this book with Giese’s later turn, in the 1930s, toward an embrace of “the 
new body culture valorized by the Nazis,” while he also “exempted attributes such as 
courage and nobility—the masculine virtues—from psychotechinical analysis.”67 
Moholy’s interests in Giese predate this shift.) At the core of each is attention, the 
understanding of which was being sought in typography studios and psychological 
laboratories alike.68 Schwartz rightly notes that “we need to attend to the divergences 
rather than take at face value the protagonists’ own word on the importance of this 
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alliance of artistic and laboratory expertise”—the latter being centered around the 
problem of fatigue, a concern that the former seemingly had little need for. 
But if Moholy rarely conceived of the eye as a thing that tires, another influence 
of Giese’s may have extended more fully into Moholy’s later interest in occupational 
therapy, which in turn stems from a longstanding interest in the hand—and not the eye 
alone—as an object of thought and study. (It is seldom noted that the camera, a pivotal 
prosthesis in Moholy’s thought, engages both vision and dexterity.) His otherwise 
mystifying term “basicworked hand,” then, would seem simply like idiosyncratic English 
were it not for its reference to Giese’s coinage of a similar word in his Psychologie der 
Arbeitshand (1928), literally translated “Psychology of the Workinghand.” Giese’s book 
offers a detailed analysis of the dexterity demands of a wide range of professions, in 
parallel with the Gilbreths though grounded in physiology rather than motion study. The 
book is also a veritable catalog of hands in different states of deformity, injury, and 
aptitude. [FIG 3.17] Moholy’s Constructivism would have been gratified by Giese’s 
foreword, which argues that psychology had fallen far behind engineering in thinking 
through the problem of the hand and had much to learn by combining the psycho- with 
the technical.69 Moholy’s bent and thickened left thumb, meanwhile, would have been a 
worthy subject of inquiry for Giese, confirming the psychologist’s claim that the First 
World War had brought the hand into sharper focus. (Giese himself worked as a military 
career counselor during the war and later as the head of the Laboratory of Brain Injuries 
                                               




in Halle, a reminder of the centrality of wartime bureaucracies in establishing the systems 
of this emerging vocationalism.) 
And in a move that aligns substantially with Moholy’s interest in industrial 
design, it was Giese who first proposed, in another book from the prolific year of 1928, 
that one might move from “subject psychotechnics” to Objektpsychotechnik, prefiguring 
what would come to be more commonly known as “ergonomics” after the close of World 
War II. If the subject was studied by means of psychological testing for the purposes of 
occupational selection [Eignungsauslese] and training [Anlernung], this turn to the object 
understood that our practical interface with the world—the “internalization” of tools on a 
provisional basis that Simmel describes—is best grasped as an encounter between subject 
and object.70 
The Arbeitshand, then, was a fruit of the occupational therapy that stemmed from 
the First World War, and Moholy’s “basicworked hand” is more than an echo of the 
military-psychological complex that brought a combination of physiology and 
psychology to bear on the question of vocational fitness, for combat or otherwise. This 
aspect of Moholy’s engagement with Giese in the late 1920s only becomes fully visible a 
decade later, as he becomes tasked with articulating the meaning of Bauhaus pegagogy in 
Chicago. What is notable about this engagement is that Moholy keeps much of the 
language and the ideas while reversing the polarity of psychotechnical work—this is not 
a science of selection, in Moholy’s version, so much as using the tools of selection to 
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demonstrate plural (and often unique) forms of capacity. The language of the school’s 
catalogs states this directly: “Our concern is to develop a new type of designer, able to 
face every requirement, scientific and technical, social and economical, not because he is 
a prodigy but because he has the right method of approach.”71 Or: “Space experience is 
not a privilege of the gifted, but is a biological function. Thus, the fundamentals of space 
experience can be taught.”72 This is a stand against the Beaux Arts equation of personal 
genius with exquisite draftsmanship, certainly, and something of a modification of his 
earlier statements on talent at the Bauhaus. But it is also an embrace—if a tentative one, a 
borrowing of techniques while redirected their ends—of a regime of aptitude testing that 
was becoming increasingly common to military and civilian employment alike. 
In an essay titled “Education and the Bauhaus,” written in the immediate 
aftermath of the first year (and subsequent closure) of the New Bauhaus in Chicago, 
Moholy railed against the specialization implied by so much vocational training: 
Today, the accent lies on the sharpest possible definition of 
the single vocation, on the building up of specialized 
faculties; the “market demand” is the guide. Thus a man 
becomes a locksmith or a lawyer or an architect or the like 
(working inside a closed sector of his faculties) and is at 
best a happy exception if, after he has finished his studies, 
he strives to widen the field of his calling, if he aspires to 
expand his special sector. 
At this point our whole system of education has hitherto 
been found wanting—notwithstanding all our vocational 
guidance, psychological testing, measurement of 
intelligence. Everything functions—and functions alone—
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on the basis of the present system of production, which 
recognizes only motives of material gain.73 
Leaving to the side the class implications of his locksmith–lawyer schema, this article is 
as strong of a critique of industrial capitalism as one finds in Moholy’s U.S. years, down 
to its dismissal of those “industrialists” who “set up specialized schools to produce 
quickly the badly-needed specialists.”74 (One imagines that “enlightened” industrialists 
like Walter Paepke, who would sign on shortly thereafter to support the remaking of the 
New Bauhaus as the School of Design, were excepted.) 
As clearly as this reads as a repudiation, Moholy’s objection to the triumvirate of 
“vocational guidance, psychological testing, measurement of intelligence” as a merely 
functional understanding of the vocational subject also serves to indicate his keen interest 
in precisely those same fields, each of which would be represented at the New Bauhaus 
and the School of Design, just as they were quietly present at the Bauhaus before. 
Moholy contests the ends but never the means of psychotechnical thought, insisting that 
those very techniques and mechanisms can be put to creative, affirming, and self-
improving ends—“Not the Product, but Man, is the End in View,” reads one of his 
subheadings. “We are faced today with nothing less than the reconquest of the biological 
bases of human life,” he continues. “Only when we go back to these can we reach the 
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maximum utilization of technical progress in the fields of physical culture, nutrition, 
housing, and industry—a thoroughgoing rearrangement of our whole scheme of life.”75  
Passages like these make plain the biopolitical nature of the psychotechnical 
project, one that Moholy hoped to bend toward his own utopian aims. And indeed, they 
were explicitly that. At the end of his Vision in Motion, Moholy imagines the 
construction of a “parliament of social design” aimed at the youth of America, in which 
the idea that the social is a thing that can be designed is taken for granted. Moholy’s text 
is illustrated by drawings for “A Cultural Work Centre” by John J. Kewell, a student at 
the School of Design. “It could translate Utopia into action,” he writes in the closing line 
of the book.76 Moholy’s pedagogy embraced and in many ways grew out of the emerging 
fields of study whose norm-making tendencies are critiqued in his article on “Education 
and the Bauhaus,” bending them to the “biological happiness” that he had long been 
committed to and grounding the intellectual framework of the New Bauhaus and the 




Applied Psychology and the “New Bauhaus” 
Lecturing at the Stedelijk Museum in 1934, the same year that E.M. Benson wrote about 
the need for an American Bauhaus, Moholy revisits some of the ideas he was developing 
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in the 1920s while making clear the approach that he would take as the director of a 
school: “We must make applied science our tool, its mastery the essence of art education, 
its transcendence the prerogative of the creative person.” Where “physical-analytical 
research” was far advanced, Moholy argues, “research into the physiological and 
psychological properties of the media of artistic creation is still in its elementary 
stages.”77 There is an aesthetics to this, if not a sense of poesy—speaking of film, Moholy 
describes “a wealth of undreamt-of optical experiences that will be profoundly stirring to 
our emotions.”78 But in Chicago, Moholy intersected with an intellectual community that 
likewise sought to redirect education along the premises of applied science, offering him 
a new set of interlocutors with whom he could continue cultivating the interests in 
psychology and vocational aptitude that had begun in the 1920s with his exchanges with 
Giese and others.  
Moholy-Nagy had long been a part of proselytizing the Bauhaus after his own 
departure (following Gropius), making him a fairly evident choice for the directorship of 
the New Bauhaus. In the catalog for the much-trafficked Bauhaus: 1919–1928 show at 
New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), in a section titled “spread of the bauhaus 
idea,” he is a constant presence in the litany of exhibitions undertaken to promote its 
thinking: displays for the Building Unions Building Exhibition in Berlin with Gropius 
and Bayer (1929); a Werkbund Exhibition in Paris (1930); frequent exhibitions of his 
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Light-Space Modulator; an aviation exhibition in London (1936). By the time that we 
arrive at a page announcing the New Bauhaus, Chicago, it is clear that the exercise is a 
teleological one, marking MoMA’s role in importing the Bauhaus idea to the United 
States. [FIG. 3.18] (MoMA’s “International Exhibition of Modern Architecture” opened 
in a gallery of the Sears, Roebuck, and Co. store in Chicago in June 1932, a year after the 
Arts Club in Chicago had hosted its own exhibition on the work of the Bauhaus in 
Dessau.)79 It is often, and rightly, added that this act of translation was an act of 
depoliticization, in that the socialism of the Bauhaus—whether Gropius’s lukewarm 
concessions to Constructivist rhetoric or Hannes Meyer’s more pointed Communism—
was erased both from its history, as exhibited at MoMA, and from its pedagogy as it 
landed on American soil. It can certainly be charged that this was the case with Moholy 
in Chicago, given the school’s affiliation with industry. And yet, in exploring his 
experiments in occupational therapy, something of his “socialism of vision” can still be 
detected in Moholy’s later pedagogy, as removed as it was from the interwar ideologies 
of Germany and Eastern Europe. 
The New Bauhaus began with a building. In 1936, the investment banker (and 
heir of the eponymous department store) Marshall Field III donated a stately mansion at 
1905 South Prairie Avenue to the Association of Arts and Industries for the purposes of 
establishing a school of design. The New Bauhaus also began at a turning point in 
American art education, as the optimism spurred by the New Deal’s Federal Art Project 
began to wane (with reductions beginning in 1937 and further congressional reductions in 
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1939).80 The Association approached Gropius, who recommended Moholy to become the 
new director, and the New Bauhaus launched in October 1937 with the intention of 
offering a six-year education—a “preliminary course” modeled on the Bauhaus’s, three 
years of specialized training one of six workshops (as at the Bauhaus), and finally two 
years of architectural training, the Bau at the center of the Bauhaus diagram, which was 
never entirely taught under Gropius’s directorship. The initial faculty was comprised of 
Moholy, his Hungarian compatriot Gyorgy Kepes, the Bauhäusler Hin Bredendieck, and 
James J. Sweeney giving lectures in art history. Moholy’s school was never quite at home 
in the Marshall Fields residence, and it succumbed to financial difficulties within a year. 
(This was not the first time the Association of Arts and Industries had withdrawn their 
support for a venture, having briefly funded a School of Industrial Art at the Art Institute 
of Chicago.)81  
The New Bauhaus’s lone year of existence, however, was a moment for 
consolidating Moholy’s intellectual foundations. These included the pragmatist 
philosopher Charles W. Morris and the recently emigrated Rudolf Carnap, both of whom 
pursued the Unity of Science as an epistemological project. (During the New Bauhaus’s 
existence, both were in the thick of collaborating with Otto Neurath on a multivolume 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, the first treatise of which was published 
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in 1938.)82 Carnap lectured at the New Bauhaus on May 16, 1938, almost ten years after 
his much-discussed lecture at the Bauhaus in Dessau, on the subject of “The Task of 
Science.” Morris’s participation at the New Bauhaus was more sustained. He taught a 
course on “Intellectual Integration” during this period and wrote approvingly of “the 
dovetailing of Bauhaus plans with Dewey’s Art as Experience.”83  
As Peter Galison has noted, Moholy’s analytical approach and faith in artistic-
scientific integration is part of a long history that links the Bauhaus approach to design 
with the Vienna Circle, particularly its focus on linguistic analysis.84 Morris’s interest in 
protocol sentences and the reduction of language to its fundamental, Wittgensteinian 
“building blocks” were of a piece, Galison observes, with Bauhaus principles of 
elemental forms. This was a matter of “uniting in its students the attitudes of the artist, 
scientist, and technologist”—the very “intellectual integration” Morris taught.85 Moholy 
also took an interest in the field of “general semiotics,” represented at the New Bauhaus 
in a lecture by S.I. Hayakawa. Hayakawa would go on to be of considerable importance 
to Moholy’s colleague and fellow Hungarian Gyorgy Kepes, as evinced even in the title 
of Kepes’s Language of Vision—terminology familiar from the early promotional 
materials of the School of Design.86 Under the heading “education of the eye,” the 
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School’s 1939–40 catalog describes “a genuine ‘language of the eye’ whose ‘sentences’ 
are the created images and whose elements are the basic plastic signs, line, plane, 
halftone, gradation, color, etc.”87 (Not incidentally, this page is illustrated not with eyes 
but with hands.)  
But in his text titled “The Intellectual Program of the New Bauhaus,” Morris also 
saw another connection between design and science, one he detected in Moholy’s belief 
“that all materials,” as Morris puts it, “may possess properties which the artist-designer 
can bend to his purpose.” For Morris, this meant a study of the “sciences which have 
made possible these materials,” but it also speaks to a notion of capacity—variable and 
particular capacities, to be drawn out by scientific study and iterative experimentation—
that Moholy was steeped in.88 This places materials and individuals in a similar register. 
Had Morris written “people” rather than “materials,” this sentence could have easily been 
found in one of Moholy’s prospectuses. Moholy’s interest in the psychotechnical sciences 
of capacity and aptitude in the human, harnessed to the cultivation of possibility rather 
than a bureaucracy of selection, were vital to his pedagogical project, and Morris likewise 
identifies the physical stuff of artistic creation working in concert with the study of those 
creators themselves as a part of the New Bauhaus’s supposedly scientific method. In this 
regard, two other participants in Moholy’s lecture series of spring 1938, the 
psychophysicist Louis L. Thurstone and the psychoanalyst Franz Alexander, help expand 
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our understanding of the New Bauhaus beyond its affiliation with logical positivism and 
the Unity of Science movement. [FIG. 3.19] 
Thurstone lectured on the measurement of intelligence. Originally trained as an 
engineer—he taught geometry and drafting at one point—he later studied psychology, 
though from a perspective that allowed him to maintain something of a geometrical 
mindset. He founded both the journal Psychometrika and the Psychometric Society in 
1935, around which time he also instituted his laboratory at the University of Chicago 
and published The Vectors of Mind, which he would have likely lectured from at the New 
Bauhaus. This text, after a “mathematical introduction” to the matrices and complex 
geometries that his methods required, began with something of a philosophical reflection 
on “the nature of science.” “It is the faith of all science that an unlimited number of 
phenomena can be comprehended in terms of a limited number of concepts or ideal 
constructs,” he writes. “To deny this faith is to affirm the primary chaos of nature and the 
subsequent futility of scientific effort.” This seemingly straightforward defense of 
scientific law and theory was then brought to bear on his systems of mental classification: 
If abilities are to be postulated as primary causes of 
individual differences in overt accomplishment, then the 
widely different achievements of individuals must be 
demonstrable functions of a limited number of reference 
abilities. This implies that individuals will be described in 
terms of a limited number of faculties. This is contrary to 
the erroneous contention that since every person is different 
from every other person in the world, people must not be 
classified and labeled … A study of people does not 
become scientific because it attempts to be complete, nor is 
it invalid because it is restricted. 
Those primary mental abilities or “reference abilities” were verbal comprehension, word 




reasoning. An individual, he goes on, is like an explosion or a thunderstorm—“no 
physicist can write equations to cover all of the detail … and yet the constructs of physics 
are applied.”89 
Little evidence suggests how Moholy responded to Thurstone’s schema, though 
its relation to Moholy’s known coordinates are plain to see. Thurstone, like Moholy, was 
grounding himself in a nineteenth-century epistemology of measurement while 
simultaneously contesting the tendency toward reduction that Fechnerian psychophysics 
often entailed.90 Thurstone was responding particularly to the work of Charles Spearman, 
an English psychologist who had studied experimental psychology under Wundt and 
gone on to develop what was known the “general factor in human intelligence,” which 
also went by the letter “g.” This “g” was something like a horsepower of the intellect, a 
singular attribute allowing the comparison of individuals.91 Thurstone’s disagreements 
were phrased in largely statistical terms, but they also carry a certain philosophical 
import. Though he worked within a similar genealogy of experimental testing as 
Spearman did, and though he held a similar faith in the potential of metrics, Thurstone 
sought differentiation within his seemingly endless matrices, an iterative and patterned 
vision of intelligence that was integrative rather than linear. (That he believed 
“achievement” could be correlated with innate intelligence, rather than with social 
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environments and other influences, evinces the same blind spots as many of these 
vocational–psychological sciences.) Moholy’s own experimental pedagogies were at 
home with matrices and plot graphs, as his famed “tactile charts” attest, and the rigorous 
particularization of Thurstone’s methods sit well with the ethos of measured possibility 
that ran through Moholy’s later work in occupational therapy. 
Franz Alexander, meanwhile, had followed a path to Chicago that would have 
been familiar to Moholy. Born in Budapest in 1891, the city in which Moholy first 
encountered him, he moved to Germany after serving in the First World War and studied 
at the Berlin Psychoanalytical Institute. Though Alexander’s thought was principally 
Freudian—the two visited frequently in Vienna before his emigration—it was paired with 
a sense of mental energetics that linked psychology and physiology. (Alexander was also 
keenly interest in psychosomatism; in a notorious lecture from 1930, during his brief and 
tumultuous tenure at the University of Chicago before founding his own Psychoanalytic 
Institute, he claimed that he cured a woman’s constipation by instructing her husband to 
bring her roses.)92 During his time in Chicago he became known for developing the idea 
that analysis should lead to a “corrective emotional experience”—an all-too-tidy outcome 
that one psychologist considered “magic psychotherapy” (though it has since become a 
commonly if loosely used term), but which nevertheless illustrates the rehabilitative 
impulse behind his outlook on psychotherapy.93 
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Alexander gave two lectures, each on “Dynamic Psychology,” inaugurating what 
would be a sustained series of encounters with the School over the next five years.94 
Alexander’s dynamic mediates between a human tendency toward inertia—regressions to 
childhood and a preference for maintaining equilibrium—and an opposing tendency 
toward growth, invention, and reproduction. This is to some extent a reiteration of 
Freud’s theory of the life and death instinct, Alexander explains, though “the view 
proposed here is admittedly more descriptive and has less metaphysical depth.”95 (Freud 
had warned that emigrating to Chicago would “ruin Alexander” with what he saw as a 
kind of New World materialistic sensibility, which might explain the “admittedly.”)96 He 
goes on: “The energy-saving principle accounts for adaptive behavior and regression and 
the principle of surplus energy for all progressive trends … the advantage of our 
formulation lies in its strict correlation with the biological process.”97 Something of a 
caloric model of the mind, the human psyche obeying the logics of the human motor in 
orienting its own psychology around a kind of conservation, Alexander’s approach 
brought therapeutic strategies into contact with the psychotechnical milieu in which both 
he and Moholy were operating. 
The ideas pursued during the New Bauhaus’s single year of existence would 
continue to reverberate in its reformulation as the School of Design, which opened in 
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February 1939 with 47 students (the first full academic year would see enrollment of 
122).98 The school had traded its stately manor for a more workshop-like atmosphere at 
247 East Ontario Street, an unprepossessing concrete warehouse between a skating rink 
and the back exits of a night club—one journalist noted that the School of Design shared 
the building with a maker of corned beef and cabbage.99 For all of the intellectual 
continuities, there were nevertheless some important shifts. In working directly with 
corporate leaders (notably Walter Paepke) rather than a mediating institution like the 
Association of Arts and Industries, the pressures of utility weighed more heavily on 
Moholy and the School. That change was further amplified by the United States’ military 
engagements abroad and a need to demonstrate relevance to the war effort. In terms of 
the School’s interest in applied psychology, however, the war marked instead something 
of a return, a demonstration of what was at stake in the psychological–vocational 
understanding of the perceiving subject in the first place. 
If World War I found the medical profession largely unprepared to deal with its 
psychological effects, by World War II the precepts of applied psychology were 
developed to the point that they could be deployed in advance of combat as well as after. 
In December 1942, Myron Kozman—one of Moholy’s favorite students and later an 
instructor—sent Moholy a letter, which he asked to be posted on the bulletin board at the 
School. “My first day in the Army was nothing but mental examinations,” Kozman 
reports of his enlistment after being called up, noting that his IQ score of 172 resulted in 
his transfer to a company of potential officers—one of many ways that the military 
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operated according to the methods of vocational placement, methods which had 
themselves been previously developed in wartime. (The potential benefits of these 
“mental examinations” led the military to anticipate fewer “neuropsychiatric disabilities” 
from the Second World War, compared to the first, because of the presence of applied 
psychology before, during and after deployment.)100 Kozman parenthetically brags, “no 
need to state how I fared,” despite knowing full well that such a claim runs counter to the 
principles of experiment without prejudgment that Moholy embraced—but his 
confidence could also be taken as an indication of his familiarity with the foundational 
protocols of this form of testing, a known terrain to those using them for artistic 
creation.101  
Kozman’s letter goes on to describe the School of Design’s utility in his army 
training. His first weeks: “Know how to roll a field pack, pitch a tent, crawl on the 
ground, dig a hole, and camouflage it.” This last, camouflage, was a military technique 
that was being taught at the School of Design in workshops by Kepes. “Then first aid, 
aircraft identification, map reading, and map making.” These were skills that Moholy had 
picked up during his own military service, and they can also be seen as a subset of 
Moholy’s call for the “education of the eye,” based as they are in cartography, pattern 
recognition, and a familiarity with the Gestalt of aerial warfare (airplanes in formation 
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are a constant thread in the graphical language of modernism). Indeed, during the year 
before being drafted, Kozman completed a thesis on aerial bombardment, experimenting 
with forms and material assemblies that would deflect or cushion explosions. [FIG. 3.20] 
Moholy pleaded with the Selective Service to defer Kozman’s enlistment, on the grounds 
that “the Chicago area is rather unaware of the potential dangers of air attack” and that 
his thesis could further important developments in the typology of the air raid shelter—
and yet Kozman’s letter also seems to suggest precisely why the Selective Service, if 
only they’d known how seemingly beneficial the School’s pedagogy was to a budding 
officer, would have been reluctant to let him go.102 
In short, Kozman was primed to translate the School of Design’s pedagogy to his 
military training. “I taught the Lieutenant in Charge a few things,” he adds, giving the 
curious impression that the famed “preliminary course” might be a preliminary to war as 
readily as it was a preliminary to Bau. He then sketches a diagram of his recent successes 
as a marksman: “I’m getting mighty handy with the rifle, too. Can you picture that?”103 
[FIG 3.21] Moholy’s letter back responds to this last point with a kind of avuncular pride 
but also a striking view on the fruits of artistic education: “You should not wonder that 
you have a good aim in firing a rifle. Abstract painting means the sharpest discrimination 
for the smallest value, distance or shape. Do you not think so?”104  
Discrimination, differentiation, the comparison of value, of distance, of shape—
these were the aspirations of the Bauhaus curriculum, these were the privileged 
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characteristics of psychotechnical testing for vocational aptitude, and these were skills 
that the U.S. Army hoped would help win the war. In his chapter for Giese’s 
Handwörterbuch, Moholy describes how in undertaking the Bauhaus’ two-semester 
Grundlehre, 
the intellectual foundation of the Bauhaüsler is outlined and 
reinforced. It conveys to them the basic elements of a 
versatile knowledge; their attitude toward their 
environment [Umwelt] is clarified; their often-dulled 
sensory activity [Sinnestätigkeit] is awakened, sharpened, 
and guided toward freely initiated self-verification. This is 
joined with the teaching of the contemplation of nature, of 
color, surface, form; of space, material, function, 
proportion, and construction.105 
This versatility, to be found in the attunement of sensoriums and Umwelt relations alike, 
was the principle outcome of a distinctly twentieth-century field of inquiry that has come 
to be known by many things, “design thinking” among them—and which continues to be 
prized across disciplines in the twenty-first century, whether Silicon Valley 
entrepreneurialism, academic discourse, or a continued interest on the part of the military. 
Its embrace of generalism means that what one cultivates through this method is not a 
profession, as a more bureaucratic strand of vocational thought (or the occupational study 
of the Gilbreths) would have it. What Moholy’s pedagogy stands for is instead the 
cultivation of a perceptually-equipped self for whom this sensorial sharpening could be 
both education and rehabilitation at once. 
 
 
                                               





Design as Occupational Therapy 
Early in the summer of 1943, the Saturday Evening Post visited the School of Design. 
The resulting article calls the School “a cross between kindergarten, Santa’s toy shop, 
and an institution for occupational therapy.”106 This description is meant to be taken in 
jest, as though the students were either children, elves, or patients—the popular press 
tended to view the School with bemused condescension and no small sense of ain’t-it-
crazy incredulity—though it also speaks directly to the School’s intellectual 
precedents.107 In his essay for Giese, Moholy compares the Bauhaus’s methods to those 
deployed in Fröbel and Montessori’s educational models, which included the 
Kindergarten, calling the Bauhaus of 1927 a “link in the chain” of their “development of 
the individual within a framework of collectivity.”108 John Dewey, who had been 
recruited to the “sponsor’s committee” of the School of Design, was instrumental in 
formalizing the study of kindergarten education at the University of Chicago. And the 
produce of preliminary course’s woodcutting exercises certainly had a toy-like aspect. 
Early photographs of the New Bauhaus’s produce show all manner of blocks, springs, 
and spirals, all ready to the hand.109 But moreover, the school had, at the moment of this 
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article’s writing, just adopted occupational therapy as one of its central missions, an 
outcome of the Bauhaus pedagogy that might not be as unexpected as it would initially 
seem. 
“The Second World War, of course, was a disaster for our school,” recalls Sibyl 
Moholy-Nagy, in that many of the school’s students and faculty, not to mention its raw 
materials, were pressed into military service. (Despite the School’s loss of 30 students 
and faculty, Moholy reported that the fall of 1943, which marked the height of the 
School’s wartime effort, nevertheless had a higher enrollment.)110 She describes how 
Walter Paepcke threatened to close the entire operation, relenting only on account of 
Moholy’s hastily-assembled “three-point emergency program” that would guide the 
School’s work—occupational therapy, camouflage, and the creation of wood-based 
replacements for products like metal bedsprings that relied on war-requisitioned steel.111 
(It is doubtful that the School’s recentering arose from such a singular epiphany, given 
that the program in camouflage began well before there is any mention of occupational 
therapy in the School’s archives or promotional materials. As I will argue later in this 
chapter, it took Moholy’s engagement with MoMA to arrive at his rehabilitation 
pedagogy.) But the war also provided Moholy an opportunity to test out a number of the 
applied-scientific premises that he had been theorizing over the years, to explore his 
fundamental sense that design was a “life-giving” enterprise. If the urgencies of war felt 
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like a disaster of sorts to Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, it also occasioned a different kind of 
creative flourishing for the school, one that actively tested the Bauhaus pedagogy against 
a conflicted political environment. 
Graphical communication was among the skills that received a particular wartime 
attention, from an exhibition on War Art to a Kepes-designed pamphlet titled 
“Paperboard Goes to War,” which promoted the products of Paepke’s Container 
Corporation of America. This strand of pedagogy also influenced the Chicago-based, 
WPA-affiliated Design Workshop; its director, John Walley, was well acquainted with 
Moholy, had hired Hin Bredendieck after the closure of the New Bauhaus, and was later 
hired by Moholy to teach at the Institute of Design. The Design Workshop’s wartime 
work included graphical teaching aids for retraining workers in an industrial economy 
rapidly turning toward war goods—the “problem of teaching wiring systems on the big 
bombers to bakers, school teachers, and shrimp fisherman.”112 
But it was the jointly graphical and architectural nature of camouflage that 
commanded more of the School’s focus, with a camouflage workshop led by Kepes (the 
only institution in the region authorized by the Office of Civilian Defense to give 
accredited certificates about camouflage). Kepes—still developing the “language of 
vision” that would become fully articulated in the book by that title of 1944, smitten by 
the vertiginous views of airplane pilots—had already been considering the eye as 
something of a scientific instrument, an unsurprising approach given his affiliations with 
Moholy. The eye/brain complex was a processor of images, patterns, light-shadow, 
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figure-grounds, degrees of difference—each of which was the purview of the artist, in 
Kepes’s vision of vision, thus making the designer an ideal camoufleur. [FIG. 3.22] 
Expertise in perception granted the artist the expertise to disrupt it, a magician able to 
make whole cities disappear, at least from the perspective of the high-altitude bombers 
that patrolled the anxious minds of wartime urbanites in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. 
Urban camouflage quickly entered the public imaginary through breathless newspaper 
articles, with Kepes leading the charge in the Midwest.113 He began teaching camouflage 
in spring 1942, only later receiving government training at Fort Belvoir that summer in 
their civilian camouflage workshops which furthered his own pedagogy, an episode that 
has been documented by the art historian John Blakinger. 
Blakinger describes an exchange of letters between Kepes and Moholy, presaging 
their eventual falling-out and Kepes’s departure from the School in the spring of 1943. In 
them, Moholy describes the School’s camouflage coursework as a “two way service: one 
towards the country, its future soldiers, and for the war industry; secondly, for the school 
itself. In fact, there are few occasions when altruistic and selfish motives coincide in such 
a perfect way.”114 Blakinger continues: “Moholy-Nagy suggests here the cynical 
opportunism of camouflage instruction; by instrumentalizing its educational mission, the 
School of Design made itself useful and relevant, even though it fundamentally altered its 
primary mission.” And indeed, this is the question that hovers more generally over the 
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School of Design, whether in war or peace—the alliances it struck (with industrialists or 
the military) and the opportunism of its coursework (courting military resources, as in the 
case of the camouflage workshop, or, to take another example of several, Moholy’s 
establishment of dressmaking workshops at a moment when it was anticipated that fewer 
male students would be available for increasing enrollment).115  
Was the camouflage course a technoscientific intervention at the hands of 
designers, or at least an expression of a will to intervene on the part of designers, against 
the technoscience of bombardment? Was it an instrumentalization of the Bauhaus 
pedagogy? It was indeed, though the question itself opens others. It might just as well be 
asked whether the School of Design’s camouflage courses pointed to an instrumentality 
that was as epistemic as it was historically contingent—that is, whether this alliance 
between Bauhaus pedagogy and militarization was not an aberration so much as a 
resurfacing of the discourses that Bauhaus training had already grounded itself in.  
These questions are equally apparent in the aspect of the School of Design’s war 
program that Moholy was more personally involved in—the courses in occupational 
therapy, first announced in a brochure for the summer session of 1943. “SUMMER 
VACATION with a PURPOSE,” this mailer declares, featuring two wartime courses 
(camouflage and occupational therapy) alongside listings that frame the School of Design 
more vocationally than usual—mechanical drawing, blue print reading, production 
illustration, welding, machine shop work, etc.116 [FIG. 3.23] That summer found twenty 
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students in the day classes (held at Somonauk, a farm 65 miles north of Chicago made 
available by Paepke) and seventy in the night school in Chicago. The latter included 
several trainees from the Psychiatric Institute of the University of Illinois participating in 
the coursework on rehabilitation—an expansion of the student body supplied in part by 
Dr. Conrad Sommer of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare. “They are a very alive 
group of doctors, nurses, recreational and occupational therapists, and the course is 
progressing very well,” Moholy writes.117 (Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, on the other hand, 
describes Moholy’s “despair at the unresponsiveness” of the nurses and Red Cross 
workers brought by Sommer—who reveals a particularly virulent strand of misogyny, in 
Sibyl’s telling, by replying that “these old maids, they are overworked and 
underfertilized.”)118 Regular visitors also included the “bright, young interns,” as John 
Walley recalls them, that Franz Alexander brought from the Institute of Psychoanalysis—
a cadre of young therapists who were “constant visitors of the school, observing the 
methods developed in the foundation course.”119 
In Moholy’s lectures from the period, he was explicit about what he saw as the 
links between therapy and design. “Psychoanalysis already shows the mechanics of 
dreams, the role of the unconscious. The hope is justified that the mechanisms of creative 
work and its sources will be unveiled one day as well.” Without a full accounting for 
creative work, he argues, one relies too much on discrete methods and 
overspecialization—a regime of training in which one “agrees voluntarily to the 
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amputation of these most valuable potentialities.”120 Amputation is not an accidental term 
for a designer steeped already in the psychotechnical study of hands, and the phrasing 
points in part to the School’s ongoing collaboration with governmental bureaucracies of 
war rehabilitation.  
These ideas are also fully present in Moholy’s syllabus for the second iteration of 
his occupational therapy class in the fall of 1943, co-taught by Eugene Bielawski, an 
artist who taught at the School of Design through much of its early years. The course 
described as Rehabilitation I—on Monday evenings from 6:30–9pm—was in effect an 
abridged version of the School’s “basic course” tailored for the occasion, at the cost of 
$25 for physicians, therapists, nurses, and social workers, or $30 for laymen. The 
sequence of Moholy’s lectures emphasized his tactile interests over the optical ones, with 
the first order of business being sessions on hand sculptures—the aspect of his pedagogy 
that connects most to Giese’s Arbeitshand—alongside tactile charts and textures.121 The 
sequence then moves from sculpture to an introduction to “the new architecture,” only 
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then turning to painting, “new ways in photography,” and eventually Dadaist and 
Surrealist literature.  
It was the tactile charts and hand sculptures that Moholy found most 
demonstrative of his approach to rehabilitation, even if this was a somewhat convenient 
repurposing of a pedagogy he’d embraced for some time. [FIG. 3.24 and 3.25] As Zeynep 
Çelik Alexander has amply documented, Moholy used tactile devices from the earliest 
days of his teaching in the Bauhaus Vorkurs in a search, as she puts it, for “that elusive 
thing called ‘experience,’” a project shared by many at the Bauhaus whose trajectories 
were inflected by kinaesthetic and psychophysiological thought.122 Two years before the 
occupational therapy courses, the tactile chart was discussed as an essential part of the 
School’s pedagogy: “Every student builds a device with all forms of surfaces arranged on 
it; prickly tacks, smooth fur, raspy sandpaper, velvety mohair. Then he draws a chart 
analyzing the ‘touch response’ of each one. He will always know how to use any surface 
in its proper relationship.”)123 His student’s “hand models,” a sleekly bulbous telephone 
receiver chief among them, had also long been proudly displayed. [FIG 3.26 and 3.27] 
The occupational therapy course, then, was not a moment of reinvention so much as an 
admission of the discourses that Moholy had been drawing on in unacknowledged ways. 
This most dramatically illustrated, in “Better than Before,” by a new departure in his 
tactile pedagogy—bringing in blind people to experiment with tactile charts that had long 
been the purview of the seeing. [FIG. 3.28] 
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Rehabilitation II, meanwhile—held on Friday evenings and planned to span 
across two semesters—outlined the intellectual foundations of the work and its most 
pragmatic applications, intended “to clarify means and aims leading to an integrated 
agency for rehabilitation.”124 (Moholy also invited the friends of the school to attend this 
lecture series—“we feel that seldom so impressive a group of lecturers have been brought 
together for such an important and timely subject as the rehabilitation of our returning 
disabled men.”) Speakers ranged from psychiatrists to physicians, from specialists in 
vocational guidance to those in arts education, from the Warden of the Cook County Jail 
to the director of Hull House, and including the already-mentioned visit by Lilian 
Gilbreth. In its breadth of speakers and themes, it becomes clear that “rehabilitation,” for 
Moholy, meant something more than the pragmatism of the Gilbreths’ interest in 
equipping veterans for jobs requiring diminished faculties. [FIG. 3.29]  
Occupational, recreational, physio- and psychotherapy; physical education; 
mental hygiene; scientific motion studies; social services; family counseling; problems of 
nursing; occupational therapy through the arts; psycho-drama; psychological tests; 
vocational guidance; fatigue and monotony. These were among the discourses woven into 
Moholy’s thinking, as were a number that pointed to another reality of such work, that it 
aims to “normalize” those seen as occupying the margins of a society. He included line 
items for “preventative aspects of delinquency; rehabilitation in penal institutions; 
alcoholics and other addicts; rehabilitation of the blind; rehabilitation of racial 
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minorities.”125 The latter is a particularly discomfiting term. Moholy’s rhetoric and 
politics were doggedly integrationist, so one might imagine that he refers here to the 
destructive legacies of white America’s racial exploitation, advocating for individual 
respect and a desire to replace social punishment with education (as his invocation of 
prisoners and alcoholics are surely intended). And yet there is evident paternalism and a 
tendency to pathologize in describing race itself as a thing to be rehabilitated. But what 
Moholy’s litany points to is an attention to the inequities of social life—historical, 
circumstantial, personal, identitarian—and his belief that design education was one 
trajectory for beginning to right them. This program imagined a sweeping apparatus of 
social reform, all to be carried out under the auspices of artistic pedagogy—and perhaps 
this was the sensibility that most firmly undergirds his “socialism of vision.” 
The two courses—both could be taken together for an additional $15—were 
geared toward teachers and therapists more than the veterans themselves, advocating for 
artistic training not for the purposes of self-expression or creativity alone, but rather that 
the subject of occupational therapy “may not only try to restore the standard of his 
previous state, but attempt to rise beyond it to a higher efficiency and a higher productive 
level … He has now the ability and the courage to increase his level of activities; to 
attack new problems with a sharpened sense of logical and intuitive interpretation; to 
focus his interest more and more on specific vocational tasks.”126 At the heart of this 
statement of principle are two epistemic assumptions—those of efficiency and vocational 
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selection, even if Moholy redirects them from their usual foundation in governmental or 
industrial bureaucracy. 
It comes as little surprise, then, that the principle summary of his thought and 
teaching, Vision in Motion, includes a subheading on aptitude tests and vocational 
guidance. “The Basic Course in its entirety forges a working union, a spirit of 
cooperation for social aims,” he writes, arguing firstly for the communitarian aspects of 
Bauhaus pedagogy. “This is its main function since its vocational aspects, the acquiring 
of skills, can be assumed as a matter of course for any competent school.” And yet, he 
continues to describe the particularizing, individual nature of this pedagogy, reiterating 
some of what he wrote for Giese almost twenty years earlier: 
The Basic Course is also used as a talent test. This has great 
bearing upon the student’s choice of later professional 
training. Such a talent test—covering through two 
semesters—seems to be more reliable than any aptitude test 
known at present.  
This fact has to be emphasized because it may give some 
stimulus to vocational guidance work and new techniques 
for aptitude tests. Such tests today are usually to fulfill 
ephemeral requirements of employment or personality-
check. To be sure, they give a more or less clear picture 
about the existing abilities which can be readily applied in 
industry or war, but not about the latent capacity of the 
person tested.127 
For Moholy, the task of vocational testing was to reorient itself from obvious skills and 
tendencies toward latent ones (an intention that aligns with much of Hugo Münsterberg’s 
outlook and rhetoric on testing, whether or not Moholy meant to invoke it), and to 
                                               




assume an aspect of self-assessment on the part of its candidates. This is a lengthy 
process in which assessment and education are combined into a single encounter, giving 
the student, as Moholy puts it with a characteristic organicist flourish, “ample chance to 
shed the often depressing clichés of his previous studies and to recover his all-embracing 
biological potency … The evaluation must rest with the potentiality of the individual, 
with his ‘best.’”128 
A version of this text published in the magazine Arts and Industry leaves it there, 
moving on to describe the School’s specialized workshops.129 His language of “recovery” 
and his invocation of “industry or war” already points to the inherent relationship of 
vocational selection and military bureaucracy. In Vision in Motion, however, this point is 
furthered by an italicized note that “such ‘aptitude tests’ seemed to be of value for the 
handicapped.” Moholy then continues the footnote with a testimonial from none other 
than Conrad Sommer (which, having been written after the School of Design’s remaking 
as the Institute of Design, refers to it under the new name): 
The Institute of Design’s method of group therapy can be 
likened to psychoanalysis in that it reaches down into the 
unconscious. It often causes discomfort and anxiety for a 
time, since it bids the student to loosen his moorings from 
his inhibiting past.  
This seemed to be especially true in the class of which I 
was a member. In this class were a number of specialists 
with considerable skill in their fields. To each of us our 
special skill was an anchor giving us security. To raise the 
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anchor and sail out into the sea of heart-brain-creative 
experience presented a real danger to the unconscious. … 
These creative experiences thus can be used to supplement 
the individual approach of the psychotherapist.130 
It was Conrad Sommer who encouraged Moholy to participate in the November 1943 
meeting of the Illinois Welfare Association in Chicago, delivering a paper that became 
his essay “Better than Before,” which emphasized the process of breaking-down and 
building-up that was common to both psychoanalysis and design as conceptualized at the 
Bauhaus—two projects in rebuilding from fundamentals. “The approach is to break down 
complex tasks into their fundamental components so that they can be digested one after 
the other,” he writes, “to re-examine tools, materials and processes and then to attempt an 
integration of the results,” and much the same could be said of the ideas underpinning 
analysis, or Alexander’s “corrective emotional experience” after the therapeutic 
excavation of the psyche.131 In Moholy teaching the practitioners of occupational therapy, 
the two fields become epistemologically coincident. 
 
 
MoMA and the Therapeutic Arts 
Much as Moholy found himself wondering whether it was “right to become a painter in 
times of social revolution” at the close of the First World War, the educational and 
exhibitionary organizations of art were quick to try to justify their own utility during the 
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Second. Moholy’s wartime retooling of the School of Design was of a piece with a 
prevailing sentiment that art was not exempt from the geopolitical urgencies of its 
moment. New York’s Museum of Modern Art, which wielded an outsized influence in 
American art and architecture from its founding through the adoption of modernism in 
the United States, mounted nearly fifty war-themed exhibitions of varying sizes across 
the war’s duration in the faith that “modern art could pave a pathway to democracy.”132 
While the museum’s history and collections resulted in an unsurprising bias for the art of 
the Western front, the exhibitions related to the Pacific Theater—on the “human problem 
of reoccupation” in Bali, on “Art from Fighting China”—as well as projects like Herbert 
Bayer’s “Airways to Peace” point to an increasingly global mindset. The larger program 
of exhibitions also points to a politics of intervention, at least during the war years—this 
being the institution, as previously mentioned, known principally within the field of 
architecture for having made the Bauhaus safe for capitalist America’s consumption 
(though Barry Bergdoll has also noted that an aesthetically-oriented show like the famous 
“International Style” exhibition of 1932 should be seen alongside more politically 
engaged exhibitions of the time, like “America Can’t Have Housing” [1934] 
and “Architecture in Government Housing” [1936]).133 
At the outset of the U.S. intervention in the Second World War, the Museum’s 
director, Alfred H. Barr, Jr., made this new mission explicit in texts like “What We Are 
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Fighting For: What Have the Arts to Do With the War Effort?,” published in June 
1942.134 This turn toward political engagement began with an exhibit of Luis 
Quintanilla’s drawings of the war in Spain in 1938 (a theme suggested to Barr by Ernest 
Hemingway), and continued with shows on art education, wartime housing, the “war 
maneuver models” of Norman Bel Geddes, contemporary photojournalism, “Camouflage 
for Civilian Defense” (which focused on Pratt Institute’s camouflage workshops just as 
the School of Design’s were first getting underway—an exhibition that later visited the 
Art Institute in Chicago),135 a competition in collaboration with the federal government 
for “National Defense Posters” (paired with a Picasso retrospective that included his anti-
war “Guernica”), and a frankly-titled survey of “Useful Objects in Wartime Under 
$10.”136 
The latter exhibition, assembled in considerable measure from shopping trips to 
New York City department stores, would likely have excited Moholy the industrial 
designer. But it was MoMA’s creation of an Armed Services Program in 1942, under the 
directorship of James Thrall Soby, that spoke most to an emerging interest in the 
intersection between art pedagogy and rehabilitation. The program was launched with 
program titled “Art Sale for the Armed Services,” which ran at the museum from May 6 
through June 16, 1942. The program’s initial goal was to “provide facilities and material 
for soldier-artists in Army Camps throughout the country” and to “utilize the talents of 
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American artists for therapeutic work among disabled soldiers and sailors,” tasks for 
which MoMA sought to raise funds by selling donated works solicited from the 
Museum’s members and board.137 (Among the many items for sale was an abstraction in 
oil by Moholy-Nagy, listed for $135.)138 
This program offers a crucial link in understanding the genesis of Moholy’s 
occupational therapy—while the techniques of the Bauhaus preliminary course persisted, 
they suddenly found newly articulated valences, and MoMA’s program offered both a 
significant template and an exhibitionary venue for the School of Design’s work with 
veterans. Moholy was certainly intimately acquainted with the museum’s programs at this 
moment. As a follow-up to the “Bauhaus 1919–1928” show (exhibited in the winter of 
1938–1939), his work appeared prominently in the largely poster-oriented “Preliminary 
Course of the Bauhaus” exhibition that opened in July 1941, notably in the form of a 
“tactile library” that displayed his material experiments yet again.139 [FIG. 3.30] And 
Moholy was the central protagonist of their “How to Make a Photogram” exhibition that 
was displayed at MoMA starting in September 1942, after returning from circulation to 
eight cities—a show that opened three days after the closure of MoMA’s show 
“Camouflage for Civilian Defense.” “How to Make a Photogram” included two 
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photograms by Man Ray, with the remainder provided by Moholy and the School of 
Design, which also designed the exhibition.140  
The New York City reprise of the Photogram show coincided with Soby’s launch 
of a competition on “The Arts in Therapy for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors,” which 
resulted in the first of three exhibitions on veterans and occupational therapy undertaken 
at MoMA between 1942 and 1945. “The Arts in Therapy” exhibition, which opened 
February 3, 1943—also designed by Bayer, a fellow Bauhäusler of Moholy’s—was 
divided into two sections. The first, termed “Occupational Therapy,” displayed the 
objects gathered from this Soby’s competition, while the second, termed “Creative 
Therapy,” explored “the function of spontaneous self-expression through the arts as a 
means of psychological release and as a partial guide in the diagnosis of mental 
disturbances and conflicts.”141 This second part of the show would be further explored in 
“Occupational Therapy: Its Function and Purpose,” which followed quickly on the heels 
of “The Arts in Therapy,” running from June through October 1943 and focusing largely 
on arts and crafts being produced within medical and psychotherapeutic institutions. 
[FIG. 3.31] (The descriptions of these objects take on an almost anthropological 
character, as though the patients were outsider artists developing artistic obsessions that 
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carried them through difficult recoveries, and were accompanied by documentary 
photography and even the odd model of an institution of occupational therapy.)142 
These two shows had a conflicted reception even within MoMA itself, with one 
museum staffer cruelly calling them “a jungle of tangled skeins involving the Armed 
Services, valentines, finger painting, movies of the Museum’s Educational Department, 
plus a couple of their non-photogenic friends in bed … crewel work, hand-blocked prints; 
lousy pottery; and Alexander Calder.”143 (The latter exhibited a series of toys, outside of 
the competition program, made of “wastebasket media,” as the Museum’s press release 
put it, such that “a soldier or sailor would have to be very much disabled indeed not to 
laugh at first sight and then demand that the wastebasket be emptied on his bed to furnish 
him with similar materials for comic creations of his own.”)144 “The Arts in Therapy” 
struggled to reconcile the tensions between the sections on art’s roles in expressive 
psychotherapy and physical occupational therapy—a rift that stemmed in part from the 
Museum’s two major collaborators, the Red Cross Arts and Skills Corps and the 
Occupational Therapy Association, which represented different approaches. 
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On its own, however, the competition attached to “The Arts in Therapy” displays 
a more univocal character, and the objects entered—those that made it and those that 
didn’t—indicate a complex middle ground being sought by MoMA, one that embraced 
aspects of modernist pedagogy (the Bauhaus Vorlehre chiefly) while avoiding others. 
Among the entries that never made it into the show was an apparatus known as the 
“Design-o-graph,” invented by Glen McNeley of the Iowa Federal Works Agency as a 
way of teaching principles of abstract composition in an easily manipulated way, 
requiring more of the eye than of the hand. [FIG 3.32] The apparatus could pass for one 
of Münsterberg’s or Nikolai Ladovsky’s, though it was also a matter of some amusement 
for the museum’s curators. “Georgie Morris ought to eat it up,” writes Soby to Barr, 
referring to the author of articles like “On the Abstract Tradition.” “The man says you 
can’t do anything but abstractions on it.”145 In the end, the Design-o-graph was rejected 
from the show for precisely that quality. “The abstract design would not hold the interest 
of the average wounded soldier,” writes Misson in a letter to McNeley, “although I think 
personally that the idea has good possibilities.”146 From Black Mountain College, Anni 
Albers sent seven samples of card weaving (which “allows for simple reproduction easily 
learned… as well as being suitable for the intelligent and imaginative person in allowing 
for rich design possibilities.”)147 The pieces’ exclusion may have been because weaving, 
along with woodworking, was disproportionately represented in the submissions—
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harkening back again to the Gilbreths’ complaints about basketweaving—or simply 
because Albers’s techniques were in fact quite traditional and, as her own photographs 
indicated, demanded dexterity. 
Moholy’s School of Design fared better—matching abstraction with a sensibility 
for material, mitigating expertise of the hand in favor of its ethic of possibility and 
variance. Although not representing the School of Design officially, Juliet Kepes (wife of 
Moholy’s close associate György) and Marli Ehrman won the $75 second prize in the 
competition for their “child’s cloth book,” which contained shapes of varying degrees of 
representational accuracy, from vague outlines of camels and cows to more finely 
articulated depictions of a house or a “fairy tree.” The patience and creativity required for 
the assembly of such objects, Kepes and Ehrman argued, was “better suited to 
occupational therapy purposes rather than to mass production”—imbuing the objects of 
these imagined children’s books with something resembling individuality.148  
Moreover, nine of the eighty-four pieces in the exhibition were by Grace B. 
Seelig, a student in the School’s weaving workshop—no small coup considering that 
Moholy had yet to begin offering courses on occupational therapy. [FIG. 3.33] (Seelig 
was among the initial students at the New Bauhaus, claiming in a letter that “the one year 
… was worth five years of my life to me,” and continued on at the reformulated School 
of Design.)149 Seelig’s work, taking the form of surface treatments like screens, 
placemats, and window shades, relied on a mix of new and found materials like cotton 
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warp, plastic warp, straw, cattails, raffia, hickory splits, and the stems of bulrushes. This 
gleeful deployment of found miscellany is of a piece with Moholy’s scrap-filled 
photograms, but also plays to Moholy’s and MoMA’s shared belief—registered in the 
exhibition competition brochure’s depiction of a hand with branching nerves—that 
tactility was a step along the way to dexterity, alongside Moholy’s desire to elevate the 
materials of industry to the status of art. The materiality of Seelig’s work also reflected 
MoMA’s caution about the availability of materials. In a letter to Moholy explaining 
MoMA’s refusal to exhibit a Plexiglass chess set by the School of Design student Richard 
Filipowski, Misson writes that the War Department had requested MoMA “not to 
encourage the use of materials used in defense industries, even scraps.” Despite Moholy 
recruiting letters of support from Dupont, the Celluloid Company of America, and Rohm 
and Haas—who assured the curators that many aircraft companies were happy to supply 
plastic scraps for therapeutic purposes—materials like Lucite, acetate, and Plexiglass 
were forbidden from the show.150 
Moholy’s longstanding interest in as-found, everyday materials—their aesthetic 
breadth and their tactility—was opportune at a moment when requisitioning had 
substantial effect on the possibilities of artistic creation. But the School’s successes in the 
Arts in Therapy competition speaks more directly to an affinity between MoMA and the 
Moholian strand of Bauhaus pedagogy, one that would, in the months after the show 
opened, inspire Moholy to undertake his own efforts in occupational therapy. (The first 
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mention of his pedagogical initiative at the School of Design came with the 
announcement for the summer 1943 program.) If occupational therapy seemed a natural 
outcome of Moholy’s version of the Vorlehre, it required the prodding of the Museum of 
Modern Art for Moholy to realize it in his own curriculum. 
Just what kind of an idea of “occupation” is this? In place of the task-centered 
tooling that predominated after the First World War, this is an occupational therapy that 
assumes fundamental design education—with its quasi-analytical approach to materiality 
and form-creation—as a more fruitful path toward productive employment than a 
bureaucracy of selection. But moreover, it assumes continuity between “rehabilitation” 
and what comes after, imagining that the wounded veteran comes out the other side 
differently.  
In 1944, MoMA launched a War Veterans’ Art Center [VAC], and that new 
institution’s first year of work would go on to comprise the exhibition “Art for War 
Veterans,” which opened September 26, 1945. “The primary function of the War 
Veterans’ Art Center is not to find artists,” the program’s opening statement reads, “but 
to help veterans find themselves.”151 The VAC avowed itself to be both recreational and 
prevocational, insisting that “design fundamentals”—foundations that can again be 
understood as an American translation of the Bauhaus curriculum—were at the core of 
recovery and occupational training alike. [FIG. 3.34] “Dilettante methods and projects of 
mere entertainment value are carefully avoided,” writes the VAC’s director, Victor 
D’Amico. “The veteran is introduced at once to the fundamentals, because a knowledge 
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of them in any art gives him the opportunity to progress as far as his interest and ability 
will allow.”152 (The teachers undertook their own training, with a bibliography on 
training methods largely drawn from Practical Psychology by F.K. Berrien, a book 
known for being an accessible and terminology-free introduction to applied psychology 
and psychotechnics.)153 The program even included a trajectory toward architecture in its 
Design Workshop, which taught graphical representation, the organization of form, and a 
general introduction to materials and construction systems. “While it does not presume to 
fit these veterans for vocations,” the program’s brochure states, “it establishes an 
understanding and lays a basic foundation of information, techniques, and skills … in 
each case, the instructor attempts to reveal the veterans’ potentiality.”154 
The resulting exhibition—largely poster-based, as many of the Museum’s 
exhibitions destined for traveling were in this period—contained a substantial amount of 
work that could have emerged from the Bauhaus Vorlehre, alongside more figurative and 
representational work (pieces which betrayed the veteran’s status as an artistic amateur 
more directly than the “Preliminary Course” exhibition of 1941). [FIG. 3.35] The show’s 
difference was marked by a series of promotional materials depicting the veterans 
themselves and stating the program’s principles through slogans, among them one that 
Moholy’s “Better than Before” presaged—“EACH VETERAN IS DIFFERENT.” (The 
show also included an example of an architectural model made by a veteran.) The 
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opening of the exhibition included several of MoMA’s artistically-minded veterans 
demonstrating their craft; one photograph of the event includes Major General Norman T. 
Kirk, the Surgeon General of the United States, watching a veteran sculpt a dachshund 
alongside Nelson Rockefeller and MoMA’s René d’Harnoncourt. [FIG. 3.36] At stake in 
this exhibition, and the institution it sought to promote, was the idea that the Museum 
was an ideal site for rehabilitation, one that might commit itself to the Moholian project 
of sharpening the dulled senses of the war-wounded. 
But the “Art for War Veterans” show also marked a point of closure in this 
uncommonly activist chapter in MoMA’s programming, and this attempt at positioning 
the Museum in political life has not been substantially revisited since. In 1944, foreseeing 
the end of the conflict and fretful that the “relaxed standards” of wartime curating would 
undermine the Museum’s prestige in the coming years, MoMA began dismantling Barr’s 
linkage of art and the war effort. “We would not deny that the Museum had duties to the 
Nation at War which we, as good citizens, had to fulfill,” writes Henry Allen Moe, on 
behalf of the Museum’s Committee on Policy, “but the time has come when the Museum 
must get on a quality basis, else it perish as a cultural force.”155 The immediate answer to 
the problem of quality was to curtail the number of exhibitions, both at the Museum and 
in circulation, and to end the Department of Dance and Theater as well as the Department 
of Photography—a notable move, given the explosion of interest in photography, 
particularly among returning veterans taking classes under the recently-passed G.I. Bill at 
institutions like the School of Design. The Armed Services Program was soon to 
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dissolve, and recognizing the changes underway at the Museum, Soby resigned his 
position a week after the opening of “Art for War Veterans.” “There is very little left to 
do,” he writes, adding that “I cannot help feeling that on the whole the Program did some 
good.”156 The Veteran’s Art Center, running largely on the enthusiasm of D’Amico and 
the financial support of Abby Rockefeller, continued somewhat longer—but it too 
became a project of decreasing urgency for the Museum. Despite talk of transforming it 
into a “People’s Art Center,” for which space and funding were never seriously sought, 




Like MoMA’s, Moholy’s experiment in occupational therapy was short-lived, albeit for a 
different set of reasons. Under financial pressure, the School of Design reformulated 
itself in 1944 as the Institute of Design, a change that included bringing on a business 
manager and a new board of directors. In the spring of 1944, the School’s student body 
included twenty-two employees of Marshall Fields, the Fair Store, and the School of 
Design patron Walter Paepke’s Container Corporation of America, pointing to a 
newfound focus on servicing industry; for the fall of 1944 they had their eyes on United 
Air Lines, Butler Brothers, and Sears, Roebuck. A lecture series geared to their corporate 
beneficiaries was planned.157 Always willingly pragmatic, Moholy regards these 
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developments with guarded optimism in his personal letters, as much as they reoriented 
the school’s chosen wartime trajectory. “We believe firmly that we can withstand the 
storm!” he writes to Myron Kozman.158 
The school also turned towards educating veterans themselves, rather than those 
who would aid in their rehabilitation, and focusing on more strictly artistic topics. The 
veterans here became a conduit for a different kind of federal funding—in June 1944, 
Moholy proposed to the school’s board that they might institute a one-year post-graduate 
program that “could be offered also to discharged veterans whose studies would be paid 
for by the Government.”159 In November, he reported back that the school had five new 
students funded by the Veterans’ Administration. “We are faced with the problem of 
individual adjustment in each case,” he writes to the board, “but we are trying to make 
them good students and a credit to the Institute.”160 
After discussions with the local VA in Hines, Illinois, Moholy determined “that a 
fairly large group of discharged veterans are photography-minded. Particularly as an 
outgrowth of this, the school has established a special course in photography which is 
officially two years in length, but may be condensed into one year for those studying 
under the terms of the G.I. Bill.”161 In this regard, charges of opportunism have further 
foundation at a moment of financial uncertainty for the school, though not quite to the 
extent of Kepes’s later claims that the school was “producing people who would be war 
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attendants.”162 The instrumentalization of the school’s pedagogy remains the most 
fraught aspect to this American Bauhaus. At the same time, though, the school’s courting 
of public funding for education might also be seen as a small but honestly felt act of 
resistance to the increasingly corporate nature of the newly named Institute—after all, as 
the new board of directors dismantled Moholy’s more social rehabilitory vision, G.I. Bill 
funding allowed it to continue in a diluted but still potentially useful form. 
Equally significant for the end of Moholy’s occupational therapy program was the 
fact that the vastness of the war led to a similarly vast need for rehabilitation, one that 
could hardly be addressed by institutions as modest as the School of Design. As the war 
ground on, the professionals took over, and in September 1944 the Illinois Veterans’ 
Service and the Department of Public Welfare (again with the personal involvement of 
Conrad Sommer) announced a rehabilitation center that sounded not unlike an expanded 
and medicalized version of the School of Design. “Every conceivable art, craft, and 
recreational activity will be investigated to determine its usefulness for our purposes,” 
their release reads, and they solicited donations of supplies and tools for woodworking, 
bookmaking, plastics and metal manufacture, photography, and a range of arts 
(expanding the School of Design’s more visual/tactile repertoire to include music and 
theater).163 [FIG. 3.37] The facility was opened that November, with the Governor of 
Illinois and the President of the American Medical Association in attendance. Sommer 
was there as well, his collaboration with Moholy having by this point run its course—
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each having learned what he needed, and each having learned the limits of the School’s 
capacities.164 The rehabilitory complex that made such strides in physical treatment in the 
First World War, and which vigorously embraced the broadening applied science of 
psychology in the Second, had provided the intellectual foundations for Moholy’s work 
but also exceeded it, in scale and scientific rigor. 
The avant-garde, as is the case more often than we admit, was playing catch-up. 
That which seems radical through the disciplinary lens of architectural history—a mode 
of historical seeing still overdetermined by privileged institutions, genealogies of known 
names, archives worked into familiar grooves, and an occasionally nostalgic desire to 
recuperate various strands of vanguardism—looks more like an admission of design’s 
belatedness in the face of technosocial change. Given the paltry scale at which Moholy or 
MoMA were able to work, should this intermingled history of design and occupational 
therapy be understood as something closer to Heinrich Wölfflin’s concept of a 
Kunstgeschichte ohne Namen, an “art history without names,” in which culture is 
understood as the serial passage through visual epistemes inflected by their broader 
sociotechnical milieu rather than as a narrative of major figures, dates, and masterpieces? 
Wölfflin’s approach was famously realized by his student Sigfried Giedion in 
Mechanization Takes Command, a book in which names like Frank Gilbreth figure more 
prominently than names like László Moholy-Nagy, with anonymous furniture-makers, 
forgotten industrial designers, and unheard-of patent recipients being prized over both, 
thanks to their implications for the scaling of their ideas. Humans, in Gideon’s text, much 
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as in those of Fritz Giese and Konrad Biesalski, are understood as the bearers of a hand—
“a prehensile tool, a grasping instrument,” he writes in a section titled simply “The 
Hand”—which operates in tandem with an eye.165 Moholy’s attempt at influencing the 
course of occupational therapy, from this point of view, might appear simply an 
idiosyncratic tangent to a history better sited within the study of the professionalization of 
rehabilitation, or of war and governmentality, or of the paired development of applied 
psychology and industrial economics. 
But if the swiftly moving currents of war and recovery largely flowed around the 
School of Design and not through it, Moholy nevertheless reached out to grab hold of 
those currents in a manner that has much to say about his ambitions for design as a 
political force, design as a participant in the “biological happiness” that had preoccupied 
him since his own military service three decades before. His efforts point to a familiar 
difficulty across the history of utopian thought, that idealist humanisms like these are 
shadowed by their reliance on the administration of norms and biopolitical 
instrumentality, even in their desire to invert the aims toward which that instrumentality 
is characteristically aimed.  
On a more disciplinary level, Moholy’s occupational therapy reminds us that the 
history of modern design is always a history with and without names, in which the urge 
to engage something of the larger world leads designers to pursue areas of knowledge 
which are distinctly not theirs, to forge new intersections between individual creative acts 
and more generally technosocial tendencies. It is in these moments, moreover, that we 
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catch sidelong glimpses of what lies at the corwe of what is believed to be proper to 
design. For Moholy, that core of creative production was the Bauhaus method that he 
worked within and developed across the twenty years as a practicing teacher. His most 
distinctive addition to that method was to expand its scope across unexpected disciplinary 
lines—believing, perhaps more than any other Bauhäusler, that design could collaborate 
with science and not simply emulate its procedures or evoke its aesthetics (the 
“scientism” so common to the art and architecture of the first half of the twentieth 
century)—and to augment that educational method with his own prosthetic imagination. 
Moholy’s faith in the applicability of the Bauhaus pedagogy to the ends of 
occupational therapy also asks us to consider the inverse—that the original Bauhaus had 
been a center for rehabilitation all along. Recall again Moholy’s statement, in “Better 
than Before,” that the experience of the industrial nineteenth century had already seen a 
deterioration in “the mental health of the people,” implying that rehabilitation is not 
strictly a matter of war, though it is evidently amplified by it, but becomes required by 
modernity itself. The Bauhaus certainly cultivated an aura of vitality (if not virility), but 
one that always existed in tension with a sense of bodily or psychical lack.166 The 
colliding soccer players in Lux Feininger’s famed photograph of Bauhaus building are 
avatars of fine-spirited health, while the balconied and unitized architecture in the 
background resembles nothing so much as a sanatorium, one whose residents never self-
identified as patients. The depictions of Moholy’s own hand, the uninjured one he 
                                               
166 Though referring to a different context, David Serlin’s work on masculine body cultures and 
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allowed to be seen, or the hand that appears in Hannes Meyer’s widely-circulated “junge 
menschen kommt ans bauhaus!” graphic, are the very picture of assured dexterity, the 
latter dryly contrasting Gropius’s well-known inability to draw, perhaps, while at the 
same time Oskar Schlemmer’s Triadic Ballet interrupted and even handicapped the fluid 
movement of its dancers with constrictingly geometrical costumes—an equation of 
bodies and geometry that was already being explored in his wartime diaries.167 (It was 
Schlemmer who noted, in a letter to the Swiss painter Otto Meyer-Amden, that “the 
Bauhaus is ‘building’ something quite different from what was planned—human beings.” 
It might also be added the seeming idealism of this sentiment is tempered by the first half 
of the same sentence, in which he refers to the students as “a crazy sampling of modern 
youth.”)168 Hannes Meyer pointedly placed Feininger’s 1927 photograph opposite 
Schlemmer’s “Mensch im ideenkreis” in his 1929 Bauhaus brochure, which advertised 
lectures by psychotechnicians like Hanns Reidel (see chapter one) alongside designers 
like El Lissitzky.169 [FIG 3.38] In Schlemmer’s drawing, the human form in motion 
(rendered semi-realistically in the space of the drawing, and more abstractly in another 
drawing hanging on the flat wall within in the drawing) is circled by concepts that double 
                                               
167 In October 1915, in the midst of his military service, Schlemmer wrote something of a poem in 
his diary that uncannily presages the design of his Triadic Ballet: “The square of the ribcage. / the 
circle of the belly, / the cylinder of the neck, / the cylinders of the arms and lower thighs, / the 
circles of the elbow joints, elbows, knees, shoulders, knuckles, / the circles of the head, the eyes, 
/ the triangle of the nose, / the line connecting the heart and the brain, / the line connecting the 
sight with the object seen, / the ornament that forms between the body and the outer world, 
symbolizing the former’s relationship to the latter.” Schlemmer, The Letters and Diaries of Oskar 
Schlemmer, 32. See also Karl Toepfer, Empire of Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement in German 
Body Culture, 1910–1935 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 143. 
168 Oskar Schlemmer to Otto Meyer, February 3, 1921, in Schlemmer, The Letters and Diaries of 
Oskar Schlemmer, 98. This idea is noted and discussed in Beatriz Colomina and Mark Wigley, 
Are We Human? Notes on an Archaeology of Design (Zürich: Lars Müller Publishers, 2016), 155. 




as the realities of human experience—space and time, psychology and mechanics, 
musculature and ethics. 
When Gropius optimistically described the emerging world-concept [Weltbegriff] 
of the year 1923 as “a universal unity in which all opposing forces exist in a state of 
absolute balance,” this was only partially a return to the supposedly organic community 
of the Gothic workshop, as implied in Gropius’ text and made famously explicit by 
Lyonel Feininger’s woodcut of a crystalline cathedral, designed as the cover for Gropius’ 
pamphlet. The preliminary course was indeed primarily concerned with materials worked 
by hand—but not, as is commonly assumed, because the hand marked a return to Guild-
style craftsmanship. Rather, that hand, thanks to the psychotechnical science of work, had 
come to be seen as the interface between a tactile world of labor and the mental space of 
perception and the psyche. These were hands engaged in an interior and domesticated 
form of production, a workshop at the scale of the individual in which the individual is 
meant to “workshop” his or her own self, a precept that found later echoes in MoMA’s 
“Arts in Therapy” exhibition. These were hands like those depicted in Herbert Bayer’s 
“Lonely Metropolitan” of 1932, in which touching and seeing are conjoined into a single 
understanding of metropolitan subjectivity. [FIG. 3.39] Where industry and 
mechanization appear at the Bauhaus—Schlemmer’s theater, Moholy’s light-space 
modulator, the myriad photographic representations of industrial structures that never 
quite translated into the Bauhaus’s designs—they appear as metaphors, as psycho-
perceptual figments, as ephemeral effects, as the return of the not-so-repressed recent 
past. This was a Weltbegriff, then, defined in opposition to the alienation of mechanized 




was a project of making things closer to whole again, or indeed “better than before,” from 
the state to the subject, with artistic and industrial production in an intermediary position. 
Wallis Miller has convincingly argued that “the Bauhaus was always a school of 
building but never a school of architecture … Building was always the motivating force 
behind a curriculum in which architecture could never find a resting place.”170 The 
example of Moholy-Nagy might suggest that the mythical Bau that sits at the center of 
the Bauhaus’s pedagogical diagram was, by its nature, always Aufbau. Peter Galison has 
pointed to the term’s philosophical connotation as a kind of world-construction, 
emblematized particularly in the work of Vienna Circle figures like Carnap and 
Neurath.171 Miller and Galison’s accounts converge in recognizing that design could only 
provide one small part of the larger conceptual reordering of artistic and economic life 
that the Bauhaus proposed, and rarely lived up to.172  
Aufbau also carries a connotation of rebuilding (sometimes additionally specified 
as Wiederaufbau, literally “constructing again”), a further reminder that such conceptual 
reordering necessarily takes place on the basis of a recent history under constant 
remaking as well as immediate experience. The Bauhaus was, after all, the remaking of a 
school, at a moment of widespread reconstruction of German cities and the German 
                                               
170 Wallis Miller, “Architecture, Building, and the Bauhaus,” in Bauhaus Culture from Weimar to 
the Cold War, ed. Kathleen James-Chakraborty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006), 89. 
171 “The Schedule of the Night Class,” Spring 1938, IDC UIC, box 3, folder 55. 
172 Galison, “Aufbau/Bauhaus.” Frederic Schwartz has pointed to some of the Bauhaus’ 
shortcomings in living up to its own mission of influencing the world of industrial production 
(having more success as a familiar name and “style” rather than for their actual products); see 
Frederic J. Schwartz, “Utopia for Sale: The Bauhaus and Weimar Germany’s Consumer Culture,” 
in Bauhaus Culture from Weimar to the Cold War, ed. Kathleen James-Chakraborty (Minneapolis: 




economy. Moreover, as Çelik Alexander has documented, the epistemological 
foundations of Bau and Raum pointed to a nineteenth-century model of selfhood, one 
captured in Gropius’s own statement that the project of the Bauhaus was the construction 
(or perhaps reconstruction) of a self, “uns Selbst aufbauen.”173 That the Bauhaus could be 
organized around this kind of subjective becoming—an inherently conflicted attempt at 
reorienting the futurity of the vocational biopolitics, then being widely explored for the 
veterans of war, toward more utopian ends, for both society and the individual, both of 
which were to emerge “better than before”—points to the largely-unacknowledged 
vitality of rehabilitation, and its promises of transformation, for the modern pedagogy of 
design. 
One property of “total war,” if we grant the First World War that category, is that 
everyone is by definition a veteran, and that “recovery” is required everywhere. If the 
pseudo-functionalist Bauhaus building was a machine of any kind, Moholy’s diagram of 
1920 might have named it best—a “machine of emotional discharge,” registering, 
releasing, and even rehabilitating the traumas of a harsh modernity. [FIG 3.40] 
                                               
173 Zeynep Çelik Alexander, “Mass Gestaltung,” E-Flux Architecture, Superhumanity, 2016, 
https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/superhumanity/68728/mass-gestaltung. The idea that the 












In Foucault’s lectures of 1978–1979, later collected as The Birth of Biopolitics, he 
describes the figure of homo oeconomicus (that famed avatar of Chicago School thought) 
for whom “economic behavior is the grid of intelligibility” through which the self is 
understood. It is in this way, he adds, that “the individual becomes governmentalizable.” 
It is an awkward word, and the translator for the English edition notes that Foucault 
stumbles over it, mulls an alternative, and then says again, “well, yes, 
governmentalizable.”1 At the risk of overextending an artifact of marginalia, it remains an 
appealing hesitation because it speaks to the slipperiness of articulating exactly what such 
a concept of the human does. As a technique for describing the subject, the term does not 
produce a given relationship between the individual and governmental power but rather 
outlines the contours through which the individual can be rendered as a subject of 
organization—the ends being only partly determined by the means. As should be evident, 
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this dissertation takes the psychotechnical project as a crucial twentieth century 
participant in the lineage of this homo oeconomicus, and throughout the preceding case 
studies, this body of thought registers in a similar way—not as the determinant of 
subjectivity, but rather as a “grid of intelligibility” through which the subjects of 
architecture could be made known in ideologically distinct contexts. 
“Rational conduct,” Foucault continues in a later lecture, still sketching out this 
imagined subject of eighteenth-century liberalism as refracted through mid-twentieth-
century economic thought,  
is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the 
variables of the environment and which responds to this in 
a non-random way, in a systematic way, and economics can 
therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature 
of responses to environmental variables.2 
That William James’s definition of our “neural machinery” with which this dissertation 
began proposes that same sensitivity and systematic reaction to environment shows the 
extent to which applied psychology trafficked in a similar understanding of human 
subjectivity. If Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics more generally charts out the genealogy 
through which neoliberalism came to define critical aspects of late-twentieth-century 
governmentality, the psychotechnical modernism described here explains something of 
the role of design, vocation, and rehabilitation within that trajectory.  
Whether taking the design student, the tram driver, or the disabled veteran as a 
subject of architectural thought, the preceding chapters have sought to show that the 
stakes of that modernism lay as much in the subjectivities it cultivated as in its artistic 
                                               




and architectural forms. In each of these cases, psychotechnics emerges as the central 
means of rationalizing a given school of thought—vocation, attention, rehabilitation—
that doubles as its own understanding of the human organism. In its embrace of an 
economic mindset, the faith of psychotechnics that such an interface between individual 
and system could be calibrated through design becomes palpable. 
And what of its aftermath? As suggested in the introduction, the term 
“psychotechnics” would effectively vanish from the American, Soviet, and German 
contexts by the onset of the Second World War. In the United States, the term never took 
off to the extent that it did elsewhere, quickly translating instead into a discourse around 
human factors, industrial management, or, in a term that only held brief currency after the 
First World War, “manpower engineering.”3 In the Soviet Union, 1935 saw Stalin turn 
against psychotechnics as a field of expertise, effectively ending its presence there, even 
if some of its precepts were as vital for the Second Five Year Plan as they were for the 
First. If psychotechnics continued longer in Germany, it did so because of its potential 
applicability to the ends of Nazism, as the experimental testing methods of 
psychotechnics were harnessed to the ends of eugenics or translated into a “rationalizing” 
force within projects of colonial violence.  
In South Africa, for example, the Labor Bureau’s regulation of “European” and 
“Bantu” populations was the “backbone of apartheid,” as the historian Ivan Evans puts it 
in Bureaucracy and Race.4 Formed in 1952 by the Minister of Native Affairs Hendrik 
                                               
3 Frances A. Kellor, “Welfare or Manpower Engineering?,” National Efficiency Quarterly 1, no. 3 
(November 1918). 
4 Ivan Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa (Berkeley: University 




Frensch Verwoerd (who would later become prime minister), the Labor Bureau instituted 
a regime of psychotechnics even as it was falling out of favor elsewhere. Verwoerd had 
studied in Leipzig and Berlin in the 1920s, where he took a strong interest in 
experimental psychology and Völkerpsychologie, and published research shortly 
afterward on “The Distribution of ‘Attention’ and its Testing.”5 That such a text could 
easily appear as an item of interest for any number of the figures in this dissertation gives 
one pause at how seamless the alliance of psychotechnical thought and racial subjugation 
could be. In a similar vein, the historian Michael Hau has discussed the case of Walther 
Jaensch, whose “Institute for Constitutional Research,” founded during the Weimar 
period in Berlin (and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation), was easily converted to a 
project of racial hygiene during the Nazi era.6 
These unsettling continuities facilitated by the supposed neutrality of 
psychotechnics provide further examples of what Max Horkheimer famously called the 
“eclipse of reason” in his writings on instrumental rationality after the war.7 It was 
precisely that modernist “grid of intelligibility”—the conditions of making a subject 
knowable—that gave psychotechnics the power to participate in such violence. While 
much has been said about the distinctions between Foucault and Frankfurt School critical 
theory, it has also been noted that both emphasized the “applied” over the “ideal,” as did 
the social sciences, while calling for the critique of precisely those sciences in terms of 
                                               
5 See Ross Truscott and Michelle Smith, “Aftershocks: Psychotechnics in the Wake of Apartheid,” 
Parallax 22, no. 2 (2016): esp. 249–253. 
6 Michael Hau, “Constitutional Therapy and Clinical Racial Hygiene in Weimar and Nazi 
Germany,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 71, no. 2 (September 2015): 
115–143. 




how they are applied to the ends of administration and “rationalization.”8 Under such 
conditions, the psychotechnical project was, by the end of the Second World War, easy to 
discredit on such grounds..  
But even where the term itself disappeared, the findings and methods of 
psychotechnics remained, sublimated into a host of discourses that flourished in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, some of which grew directly out of psychotechnical 
research, others which proceeded in parallel. “Ergonomics” is a common enough word 
today, though was little known when it was coined by the Polish naturalist Wojciech 
Jastrzebowski in his 1857 Rys ergonomji, a book that was never translated into English. It 
was proposed again by the British psychologist Hywel Murrell in 1949 to describe a 
discipline that studied the interactions of humans and their tools—a field that Fritz Giese 
had evocatively named “object psychotechnics” twenty years prior. Likewise, “human 
factors,” a term which is often used interchangeably with ergonomics, became 
widespread in the late-1950s (with the foundation of a journal and society by the same 
name), had already been deployed by Frank and Lillian Gilbreth in their 
psychotechnically-inflected research during the First World War. The field of aptitude 
testing—which grew out of Münsterberg’s vocational methods, his “Testing the Mind” 
principal among them, alongside those of colleagues like Edward Thorndike at Columbia 
University and Lewis Terman at Stanford University—remains a persistent part of 
scholastic placement in the United States.9 The language of cybernetics relies on upon an 
                                               
8 Thomas McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School,” 
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9 Hugo Münsterberg, Vocation and Learning (St. Louis: Press of the People’s University, 1910); 
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understanding of feedback systems as nervous systems, a technologized version of the 
previously psychophysical interaction between external stimuli and the human’s 
Nervenleben—now reframed as computational intelligence—that had, a generation 
before, been the subject of psychotechnical inquiry. Various strands of behaviorism, until 
that field’s eclipse by the so-called “cognitive revolution,” carried on methods of 
psychotechnical testing, indebted to its instrumentation in particular. And if the field of 
environmental psychology owes its philosophical framing to the notion of Umwelt 
explored by the Baltic biologist Jakob von Uexküll, its laboratory methods and 
dependency on surveys, developed largely in the post-WWII era, belonged to the 
experimental protocols of the psychology of the preceding decades.10 Each field owes 
something of its intellectual trajectory to this impossibly broad vision of subjecting the 
totality of life to laboratory experiment.  
These various fields are also all a part of a particular formulation of knowledge, 
technology, and politics that has been widely described as an academic-military-
industrial complex, one that congealed across the 1950s and 1960s (in concert with these 
emerging disciplines) and which was instrumental in promoting ideas for the 
management of a globalizing world. A remarkable body of literature has been written 
over past decades that describes this burgeoning influence of American models of 
corporate power and education on architecture and urban planning after 1945, whether 
                                               
moment, the National Football League still administers the Wonderlic test, an aptitude test 
developed in 1936 by E.F. Wonderlic (for broad purposes, though few professions continue to 
use it). At the time, Wonderlic was a graduate student at Northwestern who initially sold copies of 
the test out of his house. 
10 For an example of how enduring these tropes continue to be, see John Flach, ed., Global 





focusing on specific institutions (MIT and IBM providing notably consequential case 
studies), the conceptual organization of corporate architecture (as seen in figures like 
Kepes, among many others), the countercultural practices that sought a more utopian cast 
to these emerging tendencies, the mobilization of ideas about design, environment, and 
territory for the ends of warfare and spatial violence, or, in a thread that runs throughout 
such texts, the growing importance of understanding buildings and cities through 
“research,” an empirical imperative of the postwar university that understands the built 
environment on the grounds of sociotechnological thought.11 
This dissertation is, in part, an attempt to map out new genealogies for this 
ostensibly “postwar” moment within the modernism of the earlier decades of the 
twentieth century, and to reposition these histories within a longer laboratory culture of 
architecture that grew out of the vocational managerialism sought by psychotechnics—a 
fundamental remaking of how the field of architecture saw its work, its workers, and its 
subjects. If the computer was not a consequential figure of thought for Münsterberg, as it 
was for cybernetics or data-driven planning, his laboratory nevertheless asked how 
                                               
11 On the institutionalization of design thinking at places like MIT and IBM, see Arindam Dutta, et 
al., A Second Modernism: MIT, Architecture, and the “Techno-Social” Moment (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 2013); John Harwood, The Interface: IBM and the Transformation of Corporate 
Design, 1945–1976 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). On corporate 
architecture, see Reinhold Martin, The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, and 
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Scott, Architecture or Techno-Utopia: Politics After Modernism (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
2007). On warfare and spatial violence, see Jean-Louis Cohen, Architecture in Uniform: 
Designing and Building for the Second World War (Montreal: Canadian Centre for Architecture, 
2011); Felicity D. Scott, Outlaw Territories: Environments of Insecurity/Architectures of 
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University of California–Berkeley, 2009); Brendan Moran, “Research: Toward a ‘Scientific’ 
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human capacity and experience could be rendered and interpreted as data. If the 
economies implied by psychotechnics still imagined a production-oriented capitalism, its 
vision of the subject was that of a “self” whose mandate was self-sufficiency (the 
“commercial battles of self-support” that were addressed in chapter three). This economic 
subjectivity, alongside the way that psychotechnics grants organizational authority to 
sites of vocation, whether corporate or governmental, speaks to the technocracy and 
personal “responsibilization” of late capitalism.12 If the “control society” diagnosed by 
Gilles Deleuze in 1990 was not yet visible as such in the period between the world wars, 
the biopolitics of psychotechnics—a vision of management that atomizes and classifies 
individuals under the rubric of aptitude, a transfer of discipline from institutions (schools, 
hospitals, prisons) to bureaucracies—were laying its groundwork.13 And perhaps above 
all, the model of the psychotechnical laboratory, a primary site for the development of 
applied science that resolutely spanned academy, military, and industry, provided a 
principal template for the rise of research as a now-ubiquitous claim of spatial disciplines 
like architecture and urban design. 
                                               
12 Amidst a wide range of books addressing the political economy of the twenty-first century, I 
have been particularly influenced by Michel Feher, whose work is forthcoming as Michel Feher, 
Rated Agency: Investee Politics in a Speculative Age (New York: Zone Books, 2018). See also 
Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. 
Joshua David Jordan (Cambridge MA: Semiotext(e), 2012). 
13 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies [1990],” in Negotiations, 1972–1990, trans. 
Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 177–182. In using terms like 
“discipline,” “institution,” and “biopolitics,” the influence of Foucault on my own work, as well as 
the architectural histories that I have drawn on, should be evident. 
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El Lissitzky, “Nies van der Rohe” spread in Merz, 1924




Nikolai Ladovsky and El Lissitzky, 
apartment block at 15 Sivtsev Vrazhek, 
Moscow, 1925
El Lissitzky, cover of Izvestiia ASNOVA, 







Harvard Psychological Laboratory at Dane 
Hall, 1893
from Hugo Münsterberg, “Psychological Laboratory at Harvard,” 
pamphlet prepared for the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893
Harvard Psychological Laboratory, 
instruments pertaining to time and optical 
perception, 1893
from Hugo Münsterberg, “Psychological Laboratory at Harvard,” 
pamphlet prepared for the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893
Floor plan of Emerson Hall, 1906
published in Harvard Psychological studies, vol. 2, 1906
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Hugo Münsterberg, “The Vocation of the Architect,” 1910
from Vocation and Learning, 243
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VKhUTEMAS “space” course, exercise in 
form and tension
VKhUTEMAS “space” course, clay 
volumetric models
VKhUTEMAS “space” course, project on 
rhythm
VKhUTEMAS “space” course, exercise in 









Hanns Riedel’s testimonial about the Bauhaus, 1929
from junge menschen kommt ans bauhaus!










Wilhelm Wundt, color diagram, 1863
from Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele, first edition of 
1863, 154
Philipp Otto Runge, color sphere, 1810
from Farben-Kugel (Hamburg: F. Perthes, 1810)
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Michel Eugène Chevreul, hemispherical 
color chart, 1839
Johannes Itten, color cone, ca. 1922
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Wilhelm Wundt, color cone, 1893
from Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele, second edition of 1893, 121
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Ivan Pavlov’s “Tower of Silence”




Pavel Rudik, “Test for Ascertaining the Metrics of the Eye,” 1927
from Pavel Rudik, “Opyt psikhotekhnicheskikh ispytanii telefonistok,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi, 






F. Kheifits, exercise matching shapes to 
gaps, 1927
from F. Kheifits, “Psikhotekhnicheskoe issledovaniia obshchei 
odarennosti uchashchikhsia tekhnikuma sviazi,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie 
ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi, ed. Rudik, 1927, 113
F. Kheifits, exercise in shape matching 
and combination, 1927
from F. Kheifits, “Psikhotekhnicheskoe issledovaniia obshchei 
odarennosti uchashchikhsia tekhnikuma sviazi,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie 
ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi, ed. Rudik, 1927, 109
F. Kheifits, exercise in the memorization of 
geometric forms, 1927
from F. Kheifits, “Psikhotekhnicheskoe issledovaniia obshchei 
odarennosti uchashchikhsia tekhnikuma sviazi,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie 
ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi, ed. Rudik, 1927, 108
F. Kheifits, exercise matching 2D 
representations to 3D objects, 1927
from F. Kheifits, “Psikhotekhnicheskoe issledovaniia obshchei 
odarennosti uchashchikhsia tekhnikuma sviazi,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie 




Potential telegraph operator sorting beads, ca. 1926
from A.A. Smirnov, “Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov telegrafa,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov 
sviazi, ed. Rudik, 1927, 41
A.A. Smirnov, number matching exercise 
for telegraph operator tests, 1927
from A.A. Smirnov, “Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov 
telegrafa,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi, ed. 
Rudik, 1927, 21
A.A. Smirnov, labyrinths for telegraph 
operator tests, 1927
from A.A. Smirnov, “Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov 
telegrafa,” in Psikhotekhnicheskie ispytaniia rabotnikov sviazi, ed. 
Rudik, 1927, 37
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“Collective Testing” at the Psychotechnical Laboratory of MKKh [otdel 
Kommunal’nogo Khoziaistva Mossoveta], ca. 1926
from D’iakov and Petrovskii, Psikhotekhnika v Kommunal’nom Dele i Mestnom Transporte, 56







“Skhema glazomernogo apparata,” 1920s 
from D’iakov and Petrovskii, Psikhotekhnika v Kommunal’nom Dele i 
Mestnom Transporte
Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture, “Liglazometr,” 1927 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Nikolai Ladovsky, 2007, 63
Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture, “Ploglazometr,” 1927 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Nikolai Ladovsky, 2007, 63
Psychotechnical Laboratory of 
Architecture, “Uglazometr,” likely 1928 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Nikolai Ladovsky, 2007, 64
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Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture, “Oglazometr,” 1927 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Nikolai Ladovsky, 2007, 64
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Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture, “Prostrometr,” 1927 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Nikolai Ladovsky, 2007, 65
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ASNOVA, Kostino complex, Moscow, as portrayed on the cover of 




Georgii Krutikov, “Flying City,” 1927
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Georgii Krutikov, research boards from his 
diploma project 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Georgii Krutikov
Georgii Krutikov, research boards from his 
diploma project 
from S.O. Khan-Magomedov, Georgii Krutikov
Georgi Krutikov, the mathematical theory of combination and the theory 
of spatial combination, 1927
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Psychotechnical Laboratory of Architecture, record of test results, 1927 
or 1928
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Stills from the opening scene of Walther Ruttmann’s Berlin: Die Sinfonie 
der Großstadt, 1927; note advertising in the bottom middle image
Billboards lining the train corridor to Atlantic City, NJ, December 1916





Mikhail Kaufman mounting a camera to a train in Dziga Vertov’s Man with 
a Movie Camera, 1929
László Moholy-Nagy, “Dynamik der Gross-stadt,” 1927










Hermann Pautze, tram driver testing apparatus, ca. 1925
from D’iakov and Petrovskii, Psikhotekhnika v Kommunal’nom Dele i Mestnom Transporte, 23
Wilhelm Wundt, diagram of the eye’s Blickpunkt (the 
center of focus, marked H) and Blickfeld, the field of view 
that extends as meridians
from Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, 1874, 548
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Tram driver testing apparatus, after Hugo Münsterberg’s of 1912
discussed in Münsterberg’s Psychology and Industrial Efficiency (1913), image reproduced from Morris S. Viteles, 




Experimental Street Lighting on Intervale Avenue, the Bronx, 1914
from Jeremy Blatter, The Psychotechnics of Everyday Life, 141. Originally from “Progress Report of Street Lighting 
Committee,” Thirtieth Annual Convention of the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies, White Sulphur Springs WV, 
September 15–17, 1914.
Photograph for testing brightness and shadow of streetlights, Detroit, ca. 
1937




Psychotechnical Laboratory of the Moscow Municipal Administration 
(MKX), booth for testing tram drivers, 1920s




MKX, wiring diagram for experimental screen for tram drivers, 1920s
from D’iakov and Petrovskii, Psikhotekhnika v Kommunal’nom Dele i Mestnom Transporte, 1928, 85
MKX, scenes from the experimental screen for tram drivers, 1920s




German precedent for the use of forced perspective in testing tram 
drivers
from D’iakov and Petrovskii, Psikhotekhnika v Kommunal’nom Dele i Mestnom Transporte, 1928, 22
Viktor Kalmykov, “Saturn,” or the Levitating City project, 1930, completed 
as a student of Ladovsky
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MKX, “Kino-apparat” for testing chauffeurs, 1920s





from Sovremennaia Arkhitektura, no. 3, 1930
Konstantin Melnikov, “Sonnaia Sonata,” also known as the Laboratory of 
Sleep, as part of his Green City competition entry, 1929
309
2.19
ARU Brigade, Avtostroi, 1930




Viktor Kalmykov, model photograph and sketches for Avtostroi, 1930, as 
part of the VKhUTEIN competition entry
from Sovetskaia Arkhitektura, no. 1–2, 1930, 24 and 25
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Viktor Kalmykov, diagrams and model photo for Avtostroi, 1930, as part 
of the VKhUTEIN competition entry
from Sovetskaia Arkhitektura, no. 1–2, 1930, 22–23
312
Walter Miles, “Sleeping with the Eyes Open,” 1929
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László Moholy-Nagy teaching a summer workshop at Mills College, 
1940; Gyorgy Kepes leans on the radiator in the background




László Moholy-Nagy, “The Peace Machine 
Devouring Itself,” 1920
Art Institute of Chicago, acc. num. 2007.2, box 1, folder 9, brochure
Wilhelm Wundt, “Schema der 
hypothetischen Verbindungen des 
Apperceptionscentrums,” 1874
From Wundt’s Grundzuge der Physiologischen Psychologie, 324.











Curricular diagram (based on Walter Gropius’s diagram for the Bauhaus) 
and logo (based on Oskar Schlemmer’s Bauhaus logo), brochure for the 
New Bauhaus, 1937
Catalogue for the New Bauhaus, 1937–38; UIC, Institute of Design collection, box 3, folder 53
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Lucia Moholy, “Untitled” (portrait of László Moholy-Nagy), 1925
Museum of Modern Art, New York
László Moholy-Nagy, cover of Foto-Qualität, 
1931








Plaster statue cast with prosthetics, 1919
Ersatzglieder und Arbeitshilfen für Kriegbeschtidigte und Unfallverletzte, 1919, reproduced in Mia Fineman, “Ecce Homo 
Prostheticus,” New German Critique 76 (Winter 1999), 86
3.10
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Standardized Care of the Handicapped [Krüppelfürsorge], 1911




Konrad Biesalski, Grundriss Der Krüppelfürsorge, 1911 (from second edition of 1926), 118
Frank Gilbreth, “Conservation of the World’s Teeth,” 1917




Lilian Gilbreth, notes for a talk on motion study and occupational therapy, 
n.d.




“Build,” page layout from School of Design catalogue, 1941–42
UIC, Institute of Design collections, box 3, folder 63
3.15
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Fritz Giese, “Practical Handle Types for the Hand,” 1928
Giese, Psychologie der Arbeitshand, p.32
3.17
Hannes Meyer, diagram of revised Bauhaus curriculum (including 
coursework in psychotechnics), 1929
3.16
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“The New Bauhaus,” in MoMA’s Bauhaus 
1919–1928 catalogue
3.18
Flyer for the night course lecture series at the 
New Bauhaus, 1938
UIC archives, box 3, folder 55
3.19
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Myron Kozman, target practices sketches in letter to Moholy and the 
School of Design, 6 December 1942
IIT Archives, acc. num. 2007.015, Findeli Papers, box 4, mislabeled folder
3.21
Myron Kozman, thesis project for bomb shelter, 1942
Art Institute of Chicago, acc. num. 2007.2, box 1, folder 15
3.20
325
Camouflage exhibition at the School of Design, 1943
IIT Archives, acc. num. 1998.031, box 7
3.22
Summer Session brochure, School of Design, 1943




A. Corrazzo, Tactile Chart, c.1943
Institute of Design catalogue, 1944-45; IDC, UIC,  box 3, folder 85
3.25
3.24
Tactile charts as published in Vision in Motion, 1946
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Nolan Rhoades, plastic model for a telephone, 
c.1943
Institute of Design catalogue, 1944-45; IDC, UIC,  box 3, folder 85
3.26
Anne Binkley, hand sculpture, c.1943
Institute of Design catalogue, 1944-45; IDC, UIC,  box 3, folder 85
3.27
Blind people feeling tactile charts and hand sculptures at the School of 
Design, 1943–44
Institute of Design catalogue, 1944-45; IDC, UIC,  box 3, folder 85
3.28
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Syllabus for the Rehabilitation courses at the School of Design, fall 1943




Installation view of “The Arts in Therapy,” MoMA, February–March 1943
Museum of Modern Art Archives, MAID Catalogue Number IN216.2B
3.31





Panel from MoMA’s circulating exhibition of “The Arts in Therapy,” with 
materials from the School of Design, 1943–45
Museum of Modern Art Archives, MAID Catalogue Number MA1251
3.33
Glen McNeley, Design-o-graph, 1942





Brochure for the Veterans’ Art Center, MoMA, 1944–48
Museum of Modern Art Archives, EMH I.3.o
3.34
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Installation view of “Art for War Veterans,” MoMA, September–November 
1945
Museum of Modern Art Archives, MAID Catalogue Number IN297.9
3.35
Installation view of “Art for War Veterans,” 
MoMA, September–November 1945
Museum of Modern Art Archives, MAID Catalogue Number IN297.9
3.36
Dedication of the Veterans’ Rehabilitation 
Center in Chicago, 3 November 1944





Herbert Bayer, “The Lonely Metropolitan,” 
1932
3.39
László Moholy-Nagy, “Machine of 
Emotional Discharge,” 1920
Art Institute of Chicago, acc. num. 2007.2, box 1, folder 9, brochure
3.40
“Der Mensch als Einheit [Man as Unit],” Bauhaus brochure, 1929
Bauhaus [Junge Menschen kommt ans Bauhaus!] (1929), Avery Classics
3.38
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